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Abstract of Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to show that a familiar hermeneutical movement from suspicion to 
affirmation of rational meaning, as a reader reflects on a narrative, is, in part, grounded in the 
narrative's rhythmic structure which mediates a sonorous condition of being appropriated by the 
reader. 
This hermeneutical process involves the reader in appropriating the temporal perspective (or the 
'implied author's' or Other's viewpoint) which creates a 'space' for reflection in which a 
provisional conceptual unity is made possible, but subject to continuing movement from 
suspicion to affirmation. It is shown that this relationship between Self and Other is dialectical, 
and mediated by the textual modes of metaphor and narrative. Particular examples of poetry and 
prose are examined, and the story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in the 'Authorised Version' of 
the Bible is analyzed in detail in an attempt to show how the reader, imaginatively inhabiting the 
world of the text, is involved in a process in which there is an 'instant' of letting go Self 
reflection; and there is affirmation of reasonable hope that the narrative may be rationally 
understood. In an attempt to address the critical issue of validation of rational meaning to show 
that affirmation may be given reasonable hope, the analogy of juridical legality is examined, 
particularly with respect to Aristotle's notion of phronesis. 
The analysis draws upon the hermeneutical philosophy of Paul Ricoeur with particular regard to 
his theories of metaphor and narrative, and the role of the creative imagination. It also makes use 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the lived body in terms of a dialectical relationship 
between its material objectivity and its phenomenological aspects, especially, with respect to 
sonorous being and corporeal intentionality. From the discipline of literary criticism, Northrop 
Frye's notion of prose rhythm in his Anatomy of Criticism is employed to identity this key 
mediatory characteristic. 
Introduction 
The more self-forgetful the listener is, the more deeply is what he listens to impressed 
upon his memory. When the rhythm of a work has seized him, he listens to the tales in 
such a way that the gift of retelling them comes to him all by itself. 
The Storyteller' in Illuminations, p. 83ff. Walter Benjamin. 
In his book Oneself as Another, based upon his 1968 Gifford Lectures given at the University of 
Edinburgh, Paul Ricoeur refers to Walter Benjamin's essay entitled 'The Storyteller' in which he 
recalls that 'the art of story telling is the art of exchanging experiences'. It is, according to 
Benjamin, the decline of this art, which he laments, that is manifested in the earliest symptom 
of the rise of the novel at the beginning of modem times. In contrasting these two art forms, he 
identifies a significant difference in a confrontation of novel and story in the slogans, 'meaning 
of life' and'moral of the story'. Drawing upon the work of Georg Lukäcs, he claims that the quest 
of the novelist is to grasp the temporal unity, or'meaning of life'. 
From the philosophical perspective of this thesis, Benjamin's view of the decline of storytelling 
may be seen to coincide with the breakdown and fragmentation of temporal unity and 'meaning 
of life' of the grand narratives which set the scene for the storyteller until the beginning of 
modem times in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The art of exchanging experiences in 
the craft of writing then becomes in-formed by the quest for the 'meaning of life' around which 
the narrative moves. There is an issue here, according to Benjamin, that the storyteller 'takes what 
he tells from experience', whereas the novelist is a solitary individual who carries 'the 
incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life. ' The issue may be looked at 
in terms of the relationship between fantasy and reality in the art of creative writing. It is an issue 
of particular importance with respect to the role played by the novel and other forms of narrative 
in the quest for the affirmation of the meaning of life in a continuing process of interpretation of 
experience against an open horizon of infinite possibilities of meaning. That is, affirmation with 
unconstrained questioning and explanations . This issue will be taken up in the analysis 
developed in this thesis. 
The aim of this thesis is to focus upon what may be discerned as a common element in the oral 
tradition of storytelling and written narratives. The above quotation relates the significance, 
according to Benjamin, of 'the rhythm of a work' in relation to memory and the retelling of 
stories. It is in the ability to listen to the story in terms of self-forgetfulness and being seized by 
a deep rhythm that the storyteller is able to memorize and consequently develop the art of 
exchanging experiences. It may be understood as a rhythm of the listener's state of being as he 
or she actively responds to the story in an imaginative grasp in a moment of self-forgetfulness. 
There is a profound rhythmic resonance whereby the listener's memory is imprinted with the 
experience of the story. Analogously, the reader may be understood to be rhythmically disturbed 
in relation to the text. In this sense, the written text may be considered analogous to the memory 
of the storyteller. That is, the ontological rhythm is mediated by the rhythmic structure and 
patterns of the text. To this end, the particular aim of this thesis is to develop a notion of prose 
rhythm which is taken from Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. 
In developing the analysis with respect to this notion, the purpose is to show that prose rhythm 
is the mediation of an ontological foundation of what will be called sonorous being by which 
there may be an affirmation of temporal unity and 'meaning of life' in relation to unconstrained 
questioning and provisional explanations. In Ricoeur's terms, an affirmation of meaning founded 
upon an affirmation of the reader's self-identity within a process of a'hermeneutics of suspicion'. 
For this reason, the purpose of the analysis may be seen to relate to the view that written 
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narratives may play a significant role in the affirmation of self-identity in the continuing process 
of interpreting and sharing experiences in the contemporary world of fragmentation and 
dissemination. It is an analysis set within a hermeneutical philosophical perspective drawing 
upon the work of Paul Ricoeur. 
The aim of the first three chapters is to analyze the poetic/narrative mode of the text, in contrast 
to the rational, discursive mode, drawing upon Ricoeur's theories of metaphor and narrative as 
a basis, in the following chapters, for identifying prose rhythm as a key characteristic of the 
objective nature of the text. To show that it is not simply the rhythms of intonation and emphasis 
of individual readers but the structural stress patterns that are intrinsically part of the text. To this 
end, the analysis in these initial chapters begins to address the problematic of unity with respect 
to the notion of'presence' in order to identify the fundamental role played by sound in relation 
to image, and developed in later chapters as prose rhythm, with respect to metaphor and 
narrative. 
The examination of the notion of 'presence' in the phenomenological and ontological 
philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, with particular reference to the contrasting critical 
perspectives of Derrida and Ricoeur, aims to show that, in this context, the problem of'presence' 
is not fundamentally concerned with a question of conceptual unity with respect to the meaning 
of particular words, but with the relationship between the figurative characteristics of metaphor 
and narrative, and the semantic structures of sentence and discourse. That is, it is the reader's 
imaginative grasp of the figuration of the text in relation to reflection upon the narrative which 
must be examined in addressing the question of 'presence'. This grasp, it will be shown, is the 
mediation of a grounding of the relationship in a rhythmic, sonorous condition of being. It is a 
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relationship which Ricoeur terms a primordial dialectic, first used in his theory of metaphor, and 
developed in his theory of narrative between the world of the narrative in terms of its textual 
configuration and the self-identity of the reader in terms of rational description and explanation. 
It is an attempt to show that the question of 'presence' is not fundamentally a question of 
conceptual unity but the unity of the world which the reader imaginatively appropriates and 
inhabits, and that sonority and rhythm play a key role in this notion of unity. 
Drawing upon Ricoeur's theories, the thesis is concerned to show how metaphor and narrative 
may be analyzed in terms of the objective textual mediatory characteristics of a figurative and 
semantic dialectic. Further, to show that the figurative being grounded in symbolic structures 
which mediate activity in terms of its ontological roots, and that sonority and rhythm are essential 
features of this activity. Analogously to participating in liturgical activity with symbols playing 
an ontological mediatory role, the reader imaginatively participates in the active world of the text 
by means of the symbolic rhythmic structures of metaphor and narrative. Unity, or presence is 
achieved in the rhythmic drive in the move to inhabit the world of the text. But the movement 
is dialectically related to a continuing process of interpretation with respect to reflection upon 
the semantic structures of the text, which is a'hermeneutics of suspicion'. Therefore, the question 
of the possibility of affirmation through the mediation of sound and rhythm must take account 
of'suspicion' which cannot be suspended. 
But what is the nature of this 'rhythm', particularly regarding the question of the relationship 
between 'affirmation' and 'suspicion' ? Chapters four, five and six are devoted to an attempt to 
develop the notion of prose rhythm by identifying and addressing four ontological issues. The 
first issue is concerned with the way the reader appropriates the viewpoint, or perspective, of the 
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world of the narrative. How does the reader imaginatively become immersed in the narrative to 
participate in that world? How does he grasp the unity of that world in terms of its temporality 
and identity? These questions are focused, in addressing the first issue, upon the relationship 
between ontological unity and sound. In relation to the former, the analysis will draw upon 
Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity, and with respect to the latter an attempt is made to develop 
the analysis by the introduction of the notion of prose rhythm. Literary examples are given to 
illustrate the role of rhythm in poetry and narrative, based on the development of the 
philosophical analysis drawing also upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of phonic gesture as 
an important feature of the 'lived' body. This is an attempt to show the way in which the reader's 
grasp of the narrative identity is rooted in an ontological sonority which is mediated through the 
'lived' body. The body must be understood phenomenologically in the way it is consciously 
mediated at different levels, and objectively in terms of its physical materiality. In other words, 
ontological sonority as the fundamental characteristic of the reader's grasp of ontological unity 
in terms of narrative identity is mediated in the rhythmic resonance of the physical body, and 
phenomenologically mediated in rhythmic sound patterns. 
The first issue of ontological unity and narrative identity is pursued in terms of the second with 
respect to Merleau-Ponty's notion of corporeal intentionality. The concern is to relate the work 
of Ricoeur in Time and Narrative, in which he analyzes the process of grasping the world of the 
narrative in terms of mimetic configuration, with a corporeal understanding of intentionality. 
Furthermore, to show that this intentionality involves a dialectic between what Merleau-Ponty 
calls, particular and operative intentionalities. That is, with respect to reading, the attention is 
focused upon particular parts of the text in the process of grasping the meaning, the unity of the 
narrative. But this particular attention is made possible by the background of the unfolding world 
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which the reader imaginatively inhabits but of which he is not directly conscious. These are two 
levels of dialectically related intentionalities. In relation to the mediatory textual characteristics 
of rhythm, prose rhythm is shown to be the mediation of operative intentionality with the 
rhythmic characteristic of the iconic focus of metaphor being the mediation of particular 
intentionality. The significance of the latter being that it is the concrete nature of metaphor and, 
according to Ricoeur's interactive theory, its power of redescription in terms of new meaning that 
captures the reader's attention. Again literary examples are given to illustrate the dynamic process 
of corporeal intentionality. 
As proposed above, the grasping of the narrative by the reader is a dialectical process between 
the reader and the world of the narrative; between self reflection and the temporal perspective 
of the narrative. In becoming immersed in the story, the reader's self-identity is disturbed in an 
imaginative appropriation of the narrative identity. It is a process of habitation which disturbs the 
reader's state of being. The aim is to show that, as with listening to a story which Benjamin 
claims is being seized by the rhythm of the story, this disturbance of the reader's state of being 
is rhythmic in a profoundly ontological sense, and is the grounding of the primordial dialectic 
in sonorous being. For this reason, the mediation of this rhythmic sonority in the textual 
characteristics of the narrative must be evident in the structural rhythmic texture of the 
poetic/narrative mode. Chapter five is devoted to providing this evidence in addressing the third 
ontological issue which is the relationship of sonorous being to the primordial dialectic. 
An attempt is made to analyze poetry in terms of the variety of rhythmical beat, and to show that, 
for the most part, although prose rhythm is essentially based upon stress patterns, there is not a 
dichotomy between these two forms. That is, they are part of a rhythmic spectrum which may be 
6 
discerned in prose narratives, particularly in the relationship between metaphor as the textual 
focus of attention and the discursive, descriptive passages which, to a great extent, form the 
background in the reader's grasp of the narrative. In this sense, poetic rhythm relates to the 
metaphorical iconic focus, and prose rhythm to the background of the imaginative world of the 
text. The latter may resonate beyond the reader's conscious attention in his physical body and 
state of being. The rhythmic beat of the former is the dynamic of the reader's grasp of the iconic 
focus of unity, the grasp of the metaphor's concrete image, which vehemently generates a new 
meaning to provoke the reader's self reflection. By an examination of textual rhythm in a number 
of examples, an attempt is made to show that the rhythmic structure of the text may be seen to 
mediate the ontological grounding of the primordial dialectic in the relationship between the 
metaphorical rhythmic beat and the stress patterns of prose rhythm. As part of this examination, 
it is also shown that textual rhythm mediates emotional states, activity and - significantly with 
respect to rhythmic anticipation - the mediation of temporality. 
The issue of presence, which is the theme of the first three chapters, forms part of the analysis 
of the third ontological issue in relation to appearance. The question is, how does the rhythmic 
texture mediate the primordial dialectic of sonorous being? How does sonorous being appear? 
The aim is to develop the work of Heidegger and Ricoeur with regard to the ontological notion 
of within-timeness, with some acknowledgement of Heidegger's later seminal notion of the 'rift' 
as the appearance of the figure. The key question is, how does being appear without being 
grounded in an unquestioned transcendental subjectivity. Or rather how can being appear if its 
unity, its meaning, is not open to an horizon of continuing interpretation? Does not 
transcendental subjectivity inhibit such a hermeneutical process by being fundamentally 
unquestioned? An endeavour is made to show that Ricoeur and Heidegger have not gone far 
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enough in addressing this key question, and that the rhythmic structure of the text in particular 
provides the way of doing this. It is because prose rhythm resonates at the 'edge' and beyond 
consciousness that it evades the criticism that it is tied to transcendental subjectivity. The 
appearance of sonorous being in terms of its primordial dialectic therefore is mediated in the 
textual rhythmic structure. 
Chapter six is a further development of the primordial dialectic with respect to the fourth 
ontological issue which is the understanding of this dialectic in terms of Self and Other. Here the 
philosophical notion of 'Other' is used to refer to narrative identity, and particularly to what 
Ricoeur calls the 'who' of the narrative. The aim is to analyze the relationship of the reader to the 
viewpoint, or temporal perspective of the narrative in terms of a dialectical relationship between 
the reader's Self, and the Other-than-Self of the narrative. That is, the reader's imaginative grasp 
and habitation of the Other's viewpoint, of a different and new meaning which may be affirmed 
and yet never be free from questioning. In other words, the dialectic between Self and Other in 
the process of habitation is a dialectic of affirmation and suspicion. To this end, the analysis 
draws upon the work of Ricoeur, particularly in Oneself as Another, and Emmanuel Levinas. 
With respect to the latter's rejection of any possibility of comprehending the Other, an attempt 
is made to show that the aim is not to affirm an understanding of the Other but to appropriate the 
perspective of the Other. The reader appropriates the viewpoint of the Other, the 'who' of the 
narrative, and does not attempt to face the Other in an act of comprehension. 
In this analysis of the dialectic between Self and Other, an attempt is made to investigate the way 
in which the rhythmic structures of a text may mediate the ontological sonority of the reader's 
grasp and habitation of Another perspective which is seemingly incomprehensible and therefore 
beyond the reach of any act of affirmation. This particularly refers to tragedy and the apparently 
absurd perspectives which seem to defy any attempt at understanding of the singularity of a 
particular viewpoint. An example of the latter which has occupied, among others, the thoughts 
of Kierkegaard and Derrida, is the Biblical narrative of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac. In 
a detailed analysis of the text, an attempt is made to demonstrate how the rhythmic structures of 
the 'Authorized Version' of the Bible may be seen to mediate a dialectic of Self and Other in 
terms of affirmation and suspicion. That is, the text may be shown to mediate a sonorous 
resonance in the act of reading whereby the reader is driven to affirm a provisional meaning 
which possesses a teleological dynamic which gives to the reader a conviction of reasonable hope 
to persist in a continuing process of interpretation. 
Following the examination of the notion of presence in relation to the sonorous characteristics 
of metaphor and narrative, in the first three chapters, in showing that it is the reader's condition 
of being which is the grounding of that presence in terms of meaning, and then the attempt in the 
next three chapters to identify and analyze the critically related ontological issues, the concluding 
two chapters focus upon two principal features of the analysis which become the main themes 
of chapters seven and eight. More than anything else, the reader's grasp of the narrative and 
habitation of its world is a work of the imagination. It is the creative imagination which generates 
a hermeneutical process in which the reader is responsive to a horizon of meaning provoking self 
reflection and a redescription of self identity. Chapter seven is devoted to an analysis of the 
creative imagination by first looking at the way Ricoeur draws upon and re-interprets Kant's 
notion of the productive imagination in his Critique of Judgment. An attempt is then made, using 
Ricoeur's understanding of this notion, to develop the analysis of this thesis to show that the 
dynamic of the creative imagination is grounded in the 'lived' body and sonorous being. 
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In conclusion, the second principal feature of the analysis is addressed in chapter eight. It relates 
to the issue, mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, of the relationship between fantasy 
and reality. With respect to the role of the creative imagination, is there a way of affirming the 
meaning of the narrative in terms of reasonably opening the reader to new perspectives of 
understanding the world and himself? Is there a way of reasonably validating such meaning in 
contrast to the imaginative flights of fantasy? If written narratives may indeed play a key role in 
the quest for meaning in a world of fragmentation and dissemination, is it possible that there may 
be reasonable hope that such meaning may be affirmed in the historical context of unconstrained 
questioning and provisional explanations. Or is it inevitable that, in this sense, reasonable hope 
must be abandoned in favour of pragmatic conventionality? In the final chapter, validation as the 
basis of reasonable hope is analyzed in terms of Ricoeur's notion of attestation as the basis of a 
conviction of probability. That is, attestation analogous to juridical witness and testimony, and 
evaluated by practical wisdom as specified through the Aristotelean notion of phronesis. It is the 
aim to show that attestation and reasonable hope are fundamentally the work of the creative 
imagination grounded in the rhythm of hope of sonorous being and mediated in the dialectic 
between affirmation and suspicion. 
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Chapter One 
Presence, Meaning and Metaphor (Part I) 
The Vulgar Notion of Presence 
The ordinary, or vulgar notion of presence is the understanding that individual and corporate 
entities may be affirmed as being at hand on the basis of sensible, empirical evidence. An object, 
for example, a table, to be accepted as being present must be subject to sensate experience of 
sight and touch. Complex objects, such as a computer, may require a more critical demonstrative 
process but fundamentally the basis of any attempt to affirm that the object is present is sensible 
evidence. Even when the part played by language in rational descriptions of simple or complex 
demonstration of presence is recognized, the vulgar notion still retains the view that empirical 
experiences lies at the foundation. That is, it is the linguistic capacity of words and sentences in 
terms of any statement or description to provide ostensible reference as indications and 
expressions of empirical experience; it is the semantic characteristic of language to refer beyond 
language to entities and situations in the world that provides the medium for giving expression 
to presence. 
Although this vulgar notion of presence does not go unquestioned in ordinary discourse, for 
example, in the recognition that sense experience is susceptible to distortion and 
misinterpretation, it is, nevertheless, to all intents and purposes for everyday life, accepted as a 
sound basis for human perception and knowledge. Any discernable error of judgment regarding 
the presence of an object will be subjected to a disciplined rational analysis based upon sensible 
experience. The juridical system, for example, places circumstantial evidence under suspicion 
of judgment in contrast to clearly demonstrated eye witness report. And yet, philosophical debate 
has always raised radical epistemological questions about these matters. How is it possible to 
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know what it is that sense experience is derived from? Can sense experience alone be the 
foundation for an epistemological judgment with reference to an object? Is the question of 
presence fundamentally an epistemological issue? What is the basis, if any, for affirming that 
something is present? If affirmation is not possible, does this mean that there is no way of 
knowing what if anything is present at hand? Or does it mean that there will always be an 
element of suspicion about the objects of thought and language? Is it only if there is a source of 
affirmation beyond sensible experience and the process of rational thought, a source beyond 
language, that the presence of things may be known? That is, is it only if there is a metaphysical 
foundation for knowledge of the objective world that presence may be affi med? However, in the 
debates of modem Western philosophy, since the major work of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason(s) in which he exposes the fundamental problem of the empiricist's epistemological view 
of sensible experience, and attempts to demonstrate the foundation of transcendental idealism 
in the a priori categories of rational thought, there has been a development in the radical 
questioning of any metaphysical trace. 
The Problem of Presence - Three Perspectives 
In attempting to address this critical issue of presence, three possible approaches would seem to 
present a choice of perspective for analysis. Firstly, there is the cognitive process of rational 
thought. Does the key to the question of affirming presence, as Kant proposes, lie with the 
structuring and capacity of the rational mind? Or, secondly, should the critical perspective be 
focused primarily on the question concerning the possibility of direct or immediate access to the 
objective world in terms of sensible experience, intuition or some ontological condition which 
may be analyzed and defined? Thirdly, there is the linguistic medium which may be understood 
to relate the first to the second. Is the critical clue to the question of affirmation to be found in 
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the nature of language which may reveal either endemic suspicion, or the possibility of a 
hermeneutical movement towards affirmation of presence? The three perspectives cannot, of 
course, be separated, and each will involve an acknowledgement and account of significant issues 
relating to the other two. Therefore, in taking a limguistic perspective for this study it will be 
necessary to give careful consideration to the critical questions raised by processes of rational 
thought and its relationship with the world. Obviously, the latter immediately provokes the 
question, what is meant by'the world', but this will be taken up in due course. 
The reasons for choosing the linguistic perspective will be made clear in the analysis which will 
be based upon the developments in the discipline of philosophical hermeneutics, in particular, 
the work of Paul Ricoeur. A central concern will be to focus the perspective upon the key 
question, 'what is presence? '; and to show that it is in terms of language that this question must 
be addressed. To this end, Ricoeur's theories of metaphor and narrative in The Rule of 
MetaphorR) and Time and Narrative(3) will provide the critical means of analyzing the linguistic 
possibilities of responding to this question; more especially, how it may be demonstrated that 
metaphor and narrative are to be understood as the medium for a foundation of a hermeneutical 
process from suspicion to affirmation of presence; and to show that the linguistic perspective 
reveals that the question of presence is not answered by a clear, conceptual statement and 
description, nor yet by a negative response precluding any possibility of affirming presence, but 
by a dynamic process whereby affirmation is held in tension with suspicion. 
This chapter and the next will begin the analysis by attempting to define the problem raised by 
the question of presence, and critically to examine Ricoeur's theory of metaphor as the key to its 
resolution. Such an examination must take account of critical questions posed by a philosophical 
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approach from within the same tradition as Ricoeur but with radically different conclusions. For 
this purpose, the comparative similarities between the work of Jacques Derrida and Ricoeur(4), 
particularly in the way they have been influenced by Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, and, 
among other topics, their interest in metaphor, provides a valuable critical perspective. With 
respect to metaphor, their theories, it will be shown, form part of their respective projects of 
Deconstruction and Hermeneutics which lead to radically different conclusions with respect to 
the question of presence. Therefore, an attempt will be made to pay close attention to the critical 
difference in evaluating Ricoeur's position. However, in order to appreciate the fundamental 
significance of metaphor and their contrasting theories , it is first necessary to attempt to define 
the problem of presence. 
Metaphysical Assumptions 
The fundamental problem of presence is the seeming impossibility of rationally affirming the 
absolute unchanging unity of particular entities on the basis of the ceaseless flux of temporal 
experience. To make the statement, 'here is the table' is acceptable in terms of the vulgar notion 
of things, but if the word 'table' in this sentence is an ostensible reference for the presence of the 
object, how is it possible for the word to affirm that presence if it is subject to a changing play 
of sensate experience in relation to positionality and temporal flux? If it is claimed that empirical 
experience cannot be the foundation of the word, or concept, but takes its capacity to affirm 
presence from the a priori structures of the rational mind(s), that the mind, as it were, is 
metaphysically constructed, this not only raises fundamental questions about the notion of 
presence, if, as according to Kant, there is no possibility of the rational mind deriving the source 
of its ability to conceptualize from empirical experience(6), but also provokes radical questions 
about the seemingly unquestioned metaphysical assumptions with respect to the a priori 
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categories of rationality. This crucial issue of unquestioned metaphysical assumptions will play 
a central part in this study in pursuing the question of presence. At this juncture, it is simply 
noted within the context of these preliminary remarks. 
Language and Phenomenology 
In attempting to define the problem of presence, these remarks, as already indicated, could lead 
to detailed critical analysis of particular philosophical perspectives, but in following the 
hermeneutical tradition, and particularly the work of Paul Ricoeur, it is the linguistic perspective 
which will determine the shape and development of the analysis. However, language here is 
being approached phenomenologically, and not in terms of grammatical structures. That is, it is 
the relationship of language to the way the conscious mind perceives objects as phenomena, how 
they appear in consciousness, that will be the basis for the analysis. The significance of this will 
be made clear in due course. What is important is that empirical experience is taken up into a 
givenness whereby a critical analysis may begin the process of questioning. This does not mean 
that consciousness, or some level of consciousness to be determined, may provide a kind of 
ultimate foundation in the manner of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum(7), but it is the conscious 
mind which questions that is the location of givenness(8). Empirical experience with respect to 
rational thought is mediated through the phenomenological structuring of the conscious mind. 
The sensate experience of an object, such as a table, in terms of sight which will include colour, 
size, shape, etc., may only be the object of rational thought through the mediation of appearance 
in consciousness - This is a table; the table is square and has four legs; it is a dining table. It is 
the appearance as the mediation of empirical experience of the object which is the givenness 
where the questioning must begin. To this end, the nature and structure of this appearance 
provokes the initial stage of the analysis. 
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Husserlian Phenomenolgy 
Both Ricoeur and Derrida have been profoundly influenced by the phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. Presence for Husserl - or rather the essence of pure being, or the thing-itself, 'the judged 
state of affairs [Urteilsverheit] (the affair-complex [Sachverhalt]) "itself'(9) - raises the question 
of what genuine grounding, what evidence can be taken for knowing that it is there. It is a 
question of uncovering, what Husserl calls, the final sense of science. As already noted, the task 
is to begin with the given, not with the Cartesian rational subject. The given, according to 
Husserl, is consciousness in which the objective world appears, and is the grounding of the 
cogito. What the given reveals is the problematic of knowing the thing-itself. If it is the 
grounding of the cogito in contrast, for example, to the transcendental Cartesian or Kantian 
subjects(io), then what is it that ensures a continuing affirmation of the presence of the thing-itself 
in consciousness? 
Husserl is at pains to demonstrate that sense experience cannot provide genuine evidence for 
knowing the object itself. For example, consciousness is always subject to the modalities of being 
in the world. There are the spatial modalities whereby an object is experienced from particular 
positional perspectives. For example, a house cannot be viewed from all sides at once. 
Furthermore, the position determines the appearance of the building. Also, as Husserl writes, 
(For example: the "modalities of being", like certainly being, possibly or presumably being, etc.; 
or the "subjective" - temporal modes, being present, past and future. ) This line of description is 
called noematic. Its counterpart is noetic description, which concerns the modes of the cogito/ 
itself, the modes of consciousness (for example: perception, recollection, retention), with the 
modal differences inherent in them (for example: differences in clarity and distinction). 
Cartesian Meditations ed. 1995 p. 36 
Thus, there is no such thing as pure consciousness in relation to ordinary experience. In other 
words, the naive or natural attitude, which implicitly tends to disregard the critical part played 
by spatial and temporal modalities of perception, takes empirical experience of tables, chairs, 
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doors, and all entities in the world at hand as genuine evidence of the things-themselves, and 
consequently may be subject to sensible illusion. For example, a person walks into a room and 
sees an object for the first time and is uncertain what it is, and therefore moves to different 
positions concluding that it is indeed a table. There is of course some awareness of the influence 
of positionality, or perspective, but the dominant concern, for the most part, is to gain sufficient 
empirical evidence to make the judgment that the object is a table. But, according to Husserl, 
such judgments cannot be grounded in sense experience since the intentional, constituting nature 
of consciousness plays a significant and determinate role in the judgment. 
Husserl: Expression and Indication 
What, therefore, is the ground of consciousness? This is a question that for Husserl arises from 
his fundamental concern with the ground of science. That is, on what foundation is the logic of 
science grounded? To this end, in pursuing his phenomenological analysis, he defines 
consciousness as structured by phenomenal images in terms of Expression (Ausdruck), and 
Indication (Anzeichen)(11); that is, images as signs both expressing meaning and indicating certain 
objects or states of affairs. In his analysis of these meaningful signs, Husserl is concerned to 
make clear that both expression and indication are related to motivation and intentionality of the 
thinking subject. For example, in Logical Investigations, Volume 1, he writes 
A thing is only properly an indication if and where it in fact serves to indicate something to a 
thinking being. 
Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, ed. 1970, p. 270. 
For this reason, it is the 'thinking being' that takes priority, and is essentially disclosed in the 
meaningful expressive nature of consciousness. In other words, consciousness is meaningful 
expression in terms of the synthetic activity of intuition and intentionality. Furthermore, meaning 
is expressed even when there is no object present, and, therefore, in this sense, no indication. 
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There are, Husserl claims, two expressive acts which he calls, meaning conferring and meaning 
fulfilling. He writes, 
But if the object is not intuitively before one, and so not before one as a named object, mere 
meaning is all there is to it. If the originally empty meaning-intention is now fulfilled, the relation 
to an object is realized, the naming becomes actual, conscious relation between the name and 
the object at hand. 
ibid. p. 280-I 
Again, priority is given to expression, to meaningful intentionality of the conscious subject in the 
living present. Indication is integrally related to expression but separate with regard to its 
primordial grounding in the voice of the speaking subject. 
In effect, and in the course of his analysis, Husserl separates Expression and Indication, and, with 
respect to the former, privileges intentionality and intuition. Consequently, in Husserl's 
phenomenological analysis, the question is prompted, is not the presence of the thing-itself made 
dependent upon a metaphysical presupposition? (iz) In his attempt to seek a foundation for the 
logic of science in an access to the presence of the thing-itself through the givenness of the 
appearance of meaningful signs, does he not go beyond the given? This is a fundamental 
criticism of Derrida in Speech and Phenomena, 
We have thus a prescription for the most general form of our question: do not the phenomenological 
necessity, the rigor and subtlety of Husserl's analysis, the exigencies to which it responds and which 
we must recognize, nonetheless, conceal a metaphysical presupposition? Do they not harbor a dogmatic 
or speculative commitment which, to be sure, would keep the phenomenological critique from being 
realized, would not be a residue of unperceived naivete, but would constitute phenomenology from 
within, in its project of criticism and in the instinctive value of its own premises? This would be done 
precisely in what soon comes to be recognized as the source and guarantee of all value, the "principle 
of all principles": i. e., the original self-giving evidence, the present or presence of value to a full and 
primordial intuition. 
Speech and Phenomena, 1989, p. 5. 
Within the constraints of this thesis it is not possible to follow Husserl's profound, complex and 
exacting phenomenological analysis in the light of Derrida's penetrating criticism. The aim here 
is to identify the critical questions which have played an important role in the continuing 
developments of the work of Derrida and Ricoeur. In particular, critically to analyze Ricoeur's 
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attempt to affirm the notion of presence from a Derridean perspective with respect to their 
contrasting theories of metaphor. To this end, these observations on Derrida's critical departure 
from the Husserlian phenomenological project are intended to serve as a preliminary to this 
analysis. The critical question for both Derrida and Ricoeur is, how to honour the debt owed to 
Husserl in the sense of acknowledging his radical critique of the 'given' at the same time as 
disclosing the failure to remain faithful to a complete commitment to the 'given'? Response to 
this question leads Derrida to reject the possibility of affirming the notion of presence, whereas 
Ricoeur attempts to affirm presence at the same time as retaining, what may seem, a paradoxical 
notion of suspicion(i3). 
Derrida criticizes Husserl's endeavour to separate expression from indication. That is, the 
meaningful sign system in terms of language, which as both Derrida and Ricoeur seek to 
demonstrate is the structuring of consciousness, for Husserl is grounded upon the living presence 
of the speaking subject(u). This is why the voice is so important for Husserl. In his commitment 
to his central aim to disclose the grounding of the presence of pure being, his analysis reveals the 
fundamental problematic of affirming presence in relation to the sign system in terms of 
indication. For example, there is the problem, as referred to above, of the modes of being in 
relation to objects and states of affairs. Any description of an object or state of affairs is subject 
to the particular mode of being, and therefore these descriptions are constantly subject to the 
possibility of multiple modalities, and, consequently, may be explicitly or implicitly polysemic. 
Also, there is the problem of temporality which will be considered below. Therefore, indication 
as the basis of rational statement and description cannot be the indication of the presence of pure 
being. A meaningfulfilled, according to Husserl, cannot be grounded in the word or description, 
but in the meaning fulfilled intention of the speaking subject. The essence of consciousness is 
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Intentionality in terms of the synthetic activity of primordial intuition(rs). It is this grounding that 
Derrida claims reveals a metaphysical presupposition in Husserl's commitment to the 
transcendental ego. 
Husserl: Presence and Time 
A particular and crucial focus of Derrida's criticism is set out in Speech and Phenomena in 
relation to Husserl's Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time(16). A key issue which 
Husserl identified is, how is it possible to affirm the unity of the thing-itself, the unity of pure 
being, on the basis of its givenness in the phenomenological structuring of consciousness when 
this givenness is endlessly subject to the changeableness of experience; a changeableness not 
only of spatial positionality but of temporality? Consciousness is always consciousness in time; 
the living present is always in relation to the past and the future. The present continually moves 
from a past which was the present to a future which will be present. How then is the object 
presented, or rather re-presented in the mediation of the linguistic sign system? The answer to 
this question requires a careful study of the concepts of vorstellung in the work of Husserl and 
Derridaw) which will form part of the critique of the way Ricoeur addresses the problem of 
temporality. The immediate concern is Husserl's fundamental attempt to resolve the problem of 
temporality with respect to intentionality by means of the concepts of retention and 
protention(i8). Derrida is critical of these concepts and claims that this attempt at reaching the 
purity of the present by compounding the past and the future with the present in effect 
contaminates that purity and reveals that presence is linguistically derived from nonpresence. 
He writes, 
One sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch 
as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory 
and expectation (retention and protention). These nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do 
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they occasionally accompany, the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensibly 
involved in its possibility. 
As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in 
the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit 
the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into 
the blink of the instant. 
Speech and Phenomena, p. 64-65 
Although, in one sense, this criticism of Husserl's notion of presence in relation to the 
problematic of temporality may be considered only one important element in the development 
of Derrida's wide ranging work on Deconstruction(r9), it may be viewed as a decisive difference 
between Derrida's Deconstruction and Ricoeur's Hermeneutics. Ricoeur takes a more 
sympathetic view of Husserl's attempt to take account of temporality with the concepts of 
retention and protention that relates to his own work on symbols which prepare the way for his 
theory of metaphor. It is his work on symbols that is profoundly influential in his analysis of the 
iconic moment of metaphor(2o) which is of central importance with respect to the immediate and 
presence. In particular, it is Ricoeur's analysis of the productive imagination, drawing upon 
Kant's Critique ofJudgment(2) in relation to the iconic moment of metaphor that calls for critical 
examination, especially from a Derridean perspective. 
This will be examined more closely when analyzing Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. The purpose 
here is to identify a fundamental difference in their departure from Husserl's attempt to resolve 
the problem of presence in relation to temporality. What is important for Ricoeur is Husserl's 
seemingly radical step in understanding the nature of unity in his quest to resolve the aporias of 
temporality. In chapter 2 of Time and Narrative, Volume 3- Intuitive Time or Invisible Time? 
Husserl Confronts Kant', Ricoeur develops his thought in relation to this radical step and 
narrated time. Much of this will be studied in later chapters. Attention at this stage is being 
21 
drawn to the significance for Ricoeur of Husserl's attempt to define the appearance of time in 
consciousness, or time-consciousness(22). What is crucial for Ricoeur to the working out of his 
hermeneutical philosophy in relation to temporality is the difference between lived time, 
intuitive time or internal time-consciousness, and objective time, clock time or the series of 
temporal nows, and the relation between these two. With respect to lived time, he commends 
Husserl's radical discovery. Taking Husserl's example of sound to describe a unity of duration, 
and not the unity of the object, he writes, 
Husserl's discovery here is that the "now" is not contracted into a point-like instant but includes 
a traverse or longitudinal intentionality (in order to contrast it with the transcendent intentionality 
that, in perception, places the accent of unity of the object), by reason of which it is at once 
itself and the retention of the tonal phase that has "just" (soeben) passed, as well as the protention 
of the imminent phase. 
Time and Narrative, Vol. 3,1988, p. 27 
Ricoeur acknowledges that the "one after the other" is formulated by Kant(23) as necessary for 
the appearing of temporal-objects Husserl's zeitobjekt(24)). Nevertheless, he is concerned to make 
clear the difference of continuance that he understands in Husserl's analogous description of 
sound: 
By continuance, however, we are to understand the unity of duration (Daurerinheit) of the sound,... 
"It begins and stops, and the whole unity of its duration (Dauereinheit) of the sound... 
it begins and ends, 'proceeds' to the end in the ever more distant past". There can be no doubt - 
the problem is that of duration as such. And retention, merely mentioned here, is the name of the 
solution that is sought 
ibid p. 26-27. 
According to Ricoeur, this continuance is the effect of retention, or primary remembrance that 
makes possible the perception of the "one after the other", the series of now-points; a unity of 
duration whereby the present and the recent past mutually belong to each other as an enlarged 
present. 
The present is called a source-point (Quellpunkt) precisely because what runs off from it "still" 
belongs to it. Beginning is beginning to continue. The present itself is thus "a continuity, and one 
constantly expanding, a continuity of pasts". Each point of duration is the source-point of a 
continuity of modes of running-off and the accumulation of all these enduring points forms the 
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continuity of the whole process. 
ibid. p. 30 
But what is the ground of this source-point? Even though Husserl takes the unity of the process 
in terms of duration as the primary effect of intentionality, or rather splits intentionality between 
its entwined primary and secondary modes(zs), it is, nevertheless, the intentionality of the 
transcendental subject, the a priori subject, which may in this ultimate sense be compared with 
the Cartesian and Kantian subjects. It is still, therefore, the Husserlian transcendental ego which 
grounds this understanding of presence. And so, Derrida's and Ricoeur's criticism of this 
unquestioned subject remains. Both are concerned with taking the givenness of linguistically 
structured temporal consciousness, and resist any attempt to posit a constituting metaphysical 
subject as the grounding of presence. Such a priori grounding must inevitably constitute a 
'closure'(26) whereby presence understood as pure being is negated. What then for Ricoeur is the 
ground of this unity of the process of duration? Does he attempt to define a ground? If not, how 
is this unity possible? Must not any attempt include an extra-linguistic reference, and 
consequently transgress the given of linguistically structured consciousness? 
Here, it may be understood, is the heart of Ricoeur's project to affirm the notion of presence 
without colluding with a metaphysics of closure. But Derrida's insistence upon the givenness of 
the phenomenological structuring of the sign system whereby presence is endlessly deferred 
challenges Ricoeur's attempt to incorporate an extra-linguistic dimension to this givenness. For 
Derrida, the production of meaning is intra-linguistic in the sense of the Saussurean notion of 
difference(27 , 
but since there is no transcendent grounding for meaning it is always deferred 
beyond the phenomenological horizon(28) of meaning. According to Derrida, the two processes 
are one in what he terms, DLerance. The notion of Dffferance, however, is indefinable and far 
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more complex than this 'semantic understanding(29). Does not Derrida's disciplined commitment 
to the givenness of the linguistic sign system, particularly in its written mode, remain faithful to 
a refusal to collude with a metaphysics of closure, and consequently reveal a fundamental failure 
of Ricoeur's project in embracing an extra-linguistic transcendent dimension? To put it another 
way, does not Ricoeur seem to endeavour to have it both ways? That is, does he not attempt to 
remain within the linguistic medium, and yet, define a linguistic process in the Husserlian notion 
of unity of duration by means of a dynamic that is clearly extra-linguistic? What kind of 
linguistic process is this? What kind of unity is achieved? What kind of extra-linguistic 
dimension is it that does not transgress the givenness of linguistically structured historical 
consciousness? 
Ricoeur and Derrida: A Different Perspective on Language 
In attempting to address these questions, it is important to understand that the critical departure 
from Husserl, by Ricoeur and Derrida, is a departure from his perspective on language. For 
example, Husserl's concern with the sentence, 'The table is there', is with the conceptual unity 
of the table in terms of grounding its presence in the transcendental consciousness of the voice 
that speaks the sentence. In other words, for Husserl this is consciousness that is not essentially 
linguistically mediated. For Ricoeur and Derrida, the concern is with the language sign system 
of which the sentence is a part. Meaning is produced within the dynamics of the system. 
Therefore, presence, in this sense of the possibility of univocity, for Ricoeur, and absence, in 
terms of the illusions of univocity, for Derrida, is mediated through this sign system. That is, the 
possibility of linguistically, and therefore consciously, affirming the presence of the table, the 
thing-itself, or the impossibility of linguistically affirming the presence of the table, is revealed 
in the written text, the trace(3o), of the linguistic sign system as the necessary mediation of 
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historical consciousness. For Ricoeur and Derrida, metaphor is a key characteristic of this sign 
system, which for Ricoeur transcends the system in the creative power of the imagination, but 
for Derrida reveals, through deconstruction, the fundamental disseminating process of the system 
and a semantic retrait(3i). Their critical departure from Husserl involves a radical break with the 
primary conceptual view of traditional Western philosophy(32). But for Ricoeur, this is the way 
to affirm conceptual unity, or at least in a teleological sense of a movement from suspicion to 
affirmation(33), within a hermeneutical spiral, a continuing interpretative process of 
understanding (Verstehen(34)) and explanation in which metaphor plays a fundamental role. 
Whereas, within Derrida's perspective, conceptual language calls for endless deconstruction, or 
rather it is subject to deconstruction through its metaphoric trace(35). 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to attempt to set out the problem of presence. In 
summary, thus far, the aim of the critique of Husserl from Ricoeurean and Derridean 
perspectives has been to identify the given as the site of the analysis of the problem, and to 
discard any assumptions or pre judgments, especially unquestioned metaphysical ones. If it were 
concluded by reason of the analysis that the affirmation of presence must necessarily involve a 
metaphysical dimension, such a conclusion must be derived from an analysis within the site of 
the given and not the other way around. Both Ricoeur and Derrida acknowledge that Husserl's 
attempt with respect to this aim has provided a radical achievement. In his phenomenological 
project, they recognize the importance of the way Husserl demonstrates that the question of 
presence is not simply concerned with access to the thing-itself, but with the presence of the 
rational subject. The problem of presence must include a critique of the fundamental role played 
by consciousness in constituting the presence of the thing-itself. Therefore the central concept 
of intentionality understood as the meaning conferring characteristic of consciousness is taken 
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up by Ricoeur and Derrida. However, they also take a critical departure from Husserl's 
development of his theory of meaning with respect to language in terms of expression and 
indication. For both of them, the site of the given is consciousness linguistically structured 
through and through(36). Although Husserl attempts to affirm presence in the unity achieved 
through expression of the 'now', it is the intentional, synthetic unity of the transcendental ego that 
is the grounding of this unity for Husserl. In this sense, language is not basic to the question of 
presence. Whereas for Ricoeur and Derrida it is primarily the mediation of the linguistic sign 
system that determines the question of presence. It is in their diverging response to this question 
that a critical focus for defining the essential nature of the problem of presence is provided. 
Ricoeur's attempt to show how the affirmation of presence may be achieved in a hermeneutical 
movement from suspicion to affirmation in which univocity of rational explanation and 
description is based upon the metaphoric/narrative mode of language provokes the radical 
question from a Derridean perspective, what kind of univocity or unity is this? 
Heideggerian Ontology and Presence 
This question takes the analysis and the investigation of the problem of presence to an 
ontological level in Ricoeur's endeavour to show how metaphor functions in the linguistic 
mediation of the ontological grounding of rational discourse. What is at stake is an 
understanding of the unity of being as that unity which makes possible a hermeneutical 
movement from suspicion to affirmation of presence. According to Ricoeur, metaphor is central 
to this movement, which will be analytically pursued in later chapters with regard to narrative 
and self-identity. Ricoeur and Derrida begin with a valued recognition of Husserl's appreciation 
of the ontological issues, for example, his critical understanding of the important role played by 
modes of being in the world, and his attempt to demonstrate a rational affirmation of the object's 
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pure being. But they are also critical of his seeming forgetfulness and hiddenness of the 
ontological problematic. 
Husserl's concern to separate expression from indication as the way to affirm presence grounded 
upon the expression of the living presence of the voice, on the one hand, is an endeavour to 
acknowledge the ontological significance of the subject made known in the voice, but, on the 
other hand, is a failure to question the subject with respect to its ontological grounding. Upon 
what foundation does the subject, the transcendental ego, affirm the presence of the voice in 
terms of expression, and consequently the presence of objects? 
This is a question of understanding; the 'upon what' is therefore a question of meaning. What is 
the meaning of being? What is the meaning of the 'is' in the expression, 'The table is there'? More 
especially, with respect to the being of the subject, it is a question of the meaning of the 'is' in the 
sentence 'She is'. But is this a complete sentence? If the 'is' intended as a predicate, the 
sentence is incomplete. If treated as an equivalent to 'She exists', then the 'is' cannot properly be 
construed predicatively, as a number of philosophers have pointed out. It is seemingly to treat 
the copula 'is' as a predicate, which for a number of philosophers, particularly in the Anglo- 
American empirical tradition, is to move into the sphere of non-philosophy(3v). That is, the 
copula cannot be a predicate because it does not assert or affirm a quality or attribute of the 
subject; it is a mere transitive verbal sign of predication. Therefore, there is no logical, rational 
basis, in terms of the subject-predicate linguistic structure, for the question of the meaning of 
being(38). In acknowledging this critical view of philosophical ontology which, as it were, seeks 
to understand the pre-conceptual grounding of rational discourse, the aim is not to engage with 
this debate. It is rather to recognize that Ricoeur and Derrida are part of a tradition, profoundly 
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influenced by the ontology of Martin Heidegger, which consequently wrestles with language. In 
paying tribute to Heidegger's major work, Being and Time, particularly the attempt to expose the 
meaning of Being, freeing it from the hiddenness and forgetfulness of hermeneutical philosophy 
tied to direct vision, Ricoeur writes, 
Is this to say that the attempt to escape the dilemma of direct intuition or indirect presupposition 
can only lead to a kind of hermeticism, considered as a form of mystification? This would be to 
neglect the labor of language that gives Being and Time a greatness that no subsequent work will 
eclipse. Time and Narrative, Vol. 3,1988, p. 63. 
In other words, in moving the debate, as it were, beyond the Husserlian notion of intuition as the 
intentional synthetic activity of the transcendental ego, Heidegger takes the analysis into a 
radically different mode of language. In so doing, he claims that he is resorting to the necessity 
of explicitly stating the question about the meaning of Being which has been neglected and 
ignored since the ontological interpretations of Aristotle and Plato. At the beginning of Being 
and Time he writes, 
On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions towards the Interpretation of Being, a dogma has 
been developed which not only declares the question of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its 
complete neglect. It is said that'Being' is the most universal and emptiest of concepts. As such 
it resists every definition. Nor does this most universal and hence indefinable concept require any 
definition, for everyone uses it constantly and already understands what he means by it. In this way, 
that which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden 
has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged 
with an error of method. 
Being and Time, tr. 1962, ed. 1990, p. 2. 
This note of irony runs through the whole work revealing also the dilemma of attempting such 
a philosophical analysis with the language of Western philosophical debate which must be 
challenged and re-interpreted. This is important with respect to the Heideggerian influence upon 
Ricoeur and Derrida in the way the former seeks to respond to this dilemma in his commitment 
to metaphor and narrative as the linguistic mediation of the ontological grounding of rational 
discourse(39), whereas the latter's admiration is tempered by questioning whether Heidegger has 
indeed escaped from the assumptions of the tradition he presumes fundamentally to challenge(4o). 
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From a Heideggerian perspective, the site of the given with respect to the question of presence 
is not to be defined and analyzed by a rational subject-predicate mode of definition which, he 
claims, is totally inappropriate. The question of presence is the question of the meaning of 
Being, for Being is presence, and this is to be approached by the givenness of the Being that 
questions. The site of the given is the Being-in-the-world, the Being-there, Dasein, the Being that 
questions the meaning of Being. This approach is an ontological inquiry primarily concerned 
with Being, in contrast to an ontical inquiry which is concerned with entities and the facts about 
them(41). 
Temporality: The Horizon of Being-in-the-world 
Heidegger's ontological project is taken up by means of an existential analytic inaugurating 
terminology in his "labour of language" to express that which escapes the subject-predicate mode 
of rational explanation and definition. Dasein is a thrown project; that is, it is manifested as 
Being-there in a condition of thrownness. From this existential perspective there is a key issue 
of authentic Being subject to fallenness in consequence of being thrown into the world. It is this 
perspective that leads Heidegger to an ontological understanding of temporality which 
radicalizes the notion of historical time. It is not simply the question of the intentional synthetic 
activity of historical consciousness in relation to the past, present and future with respect to 
affirming presence in the unity of an object, but the attempt to express the temporalizing activity 
as the condition of Being-in-the-world. It is not temporality (zeitlichkeit) the noun, but 'to 
temporalize (zeitigen)' the verb, which reveals the radical ontological understanding of historical 
time. 
Although Being and Time is devoted to the question of the meaning of Being, and is therefore 
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primarily ontological, it employs an existential analytic particularly with respect to the notion 
of authenticity and the identification of the crucial difference between existentiell and 
existential. The former relating to the facticity of the everyday world, and the entities which are, 
to use Heidegger's terminology, 'present-at-hand, or 'ready-at-hand'(42), the latter having to 
do with authenticity or existential freedom, and the notion of fallenness as that condition of 
Being-in-the-world which must be overcome in the striving for authenticity towards the 
manifestation of the presence of pure Being. Care (Sorge) is Heidegger's notion expressing the 
ontological dynamic of Dasein's openness to authenticity. In this openness Care temporalizes 
Dasein in its ekstaces of being-in-the-world so that 'Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of- 
itself in and for itself (Being and Time p. 377). In contrast to Husserl who takes the present as 
the primary focus of temporality, Heidegger's notion of Care makes Dasein first and foremost 
open to the future in the ecstasis of coming-towards. The future in consequence gives rise to the 
ecstasis of the past, the having-been, but it is the resoluteness of Dasein in Care's anticipation 
of the future that makes the present the place of action. Heidegger writes, 
Only the Present (Gegenwart) in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is: 
namely, letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking 
action. 
ibid. p. 374. 
Temporality is therefore the articulated unity of its three modes of coming-towards, having-been 
and making present. 
In his concern to express the ultimate condition of existential authenticity in Dasein's openness 
to the future, Heidegger identifies this as Being-towards-death. It is Dasein's existential freedom 
to be in the face of ultimate negation that is the mark of its authenticity. It is in the letting be of 
Dasein's openness to its horizon of temporality, especially Being-towards-death, that Being is 
manifested. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the spatiality of Being as the way of 
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expressing the manifestation of Being in relation to temporality. It is in the opening of Being 
towards its temporal horizon that space, understood in existential terms, is the site of the 
manifestation, the appearance of Being. In later writings, after his kehre, Heidegger begins to 
call this understanding of space as the appearance of Being, 'the clearance, or'rift'(aa). It is the site 
opened up by truth; the clearing of the concealment of Being; it is the rift opened up by Dasein's 
letting be, in its struggle to win this open region in which its presence appears. 
The purpose of this all too brief outline of certain aspects of Heidegger's work is simply, at this 
juncture, to indicate the ontological perspective that influences and shapes the thought of both 
Ricoeur and Derrida in their response to the problem of presence. In pursuing Ricoeur's work on 
metaphor and narrative in subsequent chapters it will be necessary to look more closely at 
Heidegger's ontology in the attempt to critically analyze Ricoeur's achievement taking into 
account the Derridean viewpoint. However, what can be said with regard to the aim of this 
chapter in the attempt to define the problem of presence is that this should address Heidegger's 
understanding of temporality as the horizon of Being-in-the-world, and the appearance, or 
unconcealment of Being in relation to that horizon. 
Heidegger, particularly in his later writings, sets out his understanding of the significance of 
language as the structure of this horizon, or, expressed in a different way, the house of Being. 
This co-incides with Ricoeur's and Derrida's commitment to language as the phenomenological 
structure of the given. Therefore, it may be seen that Ricoeur's notion of the text, and Derrida's 
notion of 1'ecriture, or the trace, provide the means for analyzing the ontological implications 
of presence with respect to Heidegger's existential analytic of Being and temporality. To this 
end, in approaching the question of presence in relation to Ricoeur's notion of the text as the 
31 
structure of the horizon of Being, which will be shown to be hermeneutical in agreement with 
Heidegger, the first step will be to critically examine his theory of metaphor as the key feature 
of the text. Particularly, to look carefully at the way he attempts to show how rational discourse 
is ontologically grounded in the iconic moment of metaphor whereby presence may be affirmed 
with a hermeneutical dialectical movement from suspicion to affirmation. The examination will 
endeavour to take account of the problem of presence from a Derridean perspective in which his 
contrasting deconstructive theory of metaphor leads to the conclusion that meaning is endlessly 
deferred. That is, 1'ecriture, as the temporal horizon of Being is subject to never ending 
deconstruction. 
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Chapter Two 
Presence, Meaning and Metaphor (Part II) 
Presence: Two Critical Perspectives 
In the attempt to articulate the problem of presence in chapter one, two interrelated critical 
perspectives were identified. On the one hand, the question of presence is concerned with the 
problematic, particularly revealed in Husserlian phenomenology, of affirming the unity of an 
object. Unless there is some possibility of grasping the essential unity of an object free from 
ambiguity and contradiction, how is it possible to rationally affirm that the object is indeed 
present? In linguistic terms, since from a phenomenological viewpoint language is the medium 
for meaningful expression of such affirmation, on what basis is univocity achieved? In vulgar 
terms, the statement, 'The table is there' belies this problematic of univocity in affirming the 
presence of the table. This arises, firstly, from the position of the speaker in relation to the 
object and the variations in perspective, and the temporal condition in which any statement or 
description is made. Secondly, the problem of the speaker reveals both the important role of the 
conscious subject in addressing the question of presence, particularly with respect to the 
ontological condition of being-in-the-world, and the difficulty of showing how this condition 
may be seen as the foundation of the affirmation of presence. That is, the problem of showing 
how the presence of the subject may be ontologically affirmed thus providing the foundation for 
a hermeneutical process in which there maybe a movement from suspicion to affirmation of the 
presence of objects in the world. 
Taking Ricoeur's hermeneutical philosophy in which consciousness is linguistically mediated 
through and through, the two interrelated critical perspectives identified in chapter one and 
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outlined above must be set within the phenomenological givenness of language. It is a question 
of the phenomenological manifestation, in terms of language, of presence mediated through 
rational description, interrelated with linguistic expression of being-in-the-world, and the nature 
of this interrelatedness. Is the relationship, as Husserl would have it, a privileging of expression 
over indication which, in effect, means founding indication upon expression? But if Husserl's 
attempt to found indication upon expression, according to Ricoeur and Derrida, fails by 
assuming an unquestioned metaphysical foundation, going beyond the givenness of 
linguistically structured consciousness, is it still possible to show how this relationship may be 
maintained in and through language? In other words, is it possible to show by a 
phenomenological analysis of language that the presence of objects in terms of appearance 
mediated through rational description may be affirmed, or rather interpreted in a movement from 
suspicion to affirmation, upon the foundation of linguistic expression of the subject's condition 
of Being-in-the-world? Are there two interrelated modes of language: rational and expressive 
(or, to use Ricoeur's term, 'poetic'(s)) modes which are not separate but mutually influence and 
effect change in each other whereby presence may be affirmed? The significant difference 
between Husserl's understanding of indication and expression, and Ricoeur's rational and 
expressive/poetic modes of discourse is that the latter involve fundamentally an act of the 
imagination, whereas Husserlian expression is a mental intentional act fundamentally cognitive. 
That is, the contrast is between that which is essentially figurative and that which is essentially 
conceptual. The way Ricoeur relates the poetic to the rational so that the imagination may be 
understood as the grounding act for cognition will be a central feature of this thesis. 
Expression: Poetic and Rational Discourse 
In studying the development of Ricoeur's hermeneutical project, it is clear from his early 
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writings, for example, The Symbolism of Evil(2) and, Freud and Philosophy(3) that his interest, 
which he later pursues, in the poetic mode of language arises, as was referred to in chapter one, 
out of his ontological investigation of linguistic expression of Being-in-the-world. Although he 
approves of Husserl's attempt to resolve the problem of temporality drawing upon, according 
to Ricoeur, the Bergsonian notion of duration(4), he is critically concerned that this does not 
address Heidegger's question with respect to the meaning of Being. As considered in detail later 
in this chapter, the ontological question arises from a concern with the condition of Being-in-the- 
world, with the experience of active engagement in which the dominant linguistic mode is 
expression of immediate response with respect to perception, decision and action, which, 
according to Ricoeur, involves an act of the imagination. Whereas "rational discourse" which 
was Husserl's main concern, Ricoeur maintains requires a detour via reflection. It is the means 
of standing back, as it were, to separate and analyze experience. Although this does not exclude 
intuition and synthesis, and therefore the Husserlian notion of expression, the essential aspect is 
reflective analysis. 
Husserl's understanding of expression (Ausdruck) is based upon the intentional mental act 
whereby unity is achieved in terms of the intuitive, synthetic process of the act. This assumes 
a transcendental capacity to achieve an expressed unity as the foundation for scientific, rational 
analysis. In his attempt to show how this achievement may be accomplished by privileging 
expression over indication, he remains committed to the view that expression is essentially the 
way, through speech, the voice confers meaning; and that expression is a mental act essentially 
of the cognitive processes of the rational mind. In contrast to Ricoeur, as noted above, the 
Husserlian notion of expression is not a different mode of language. Although, in the sense of 
privilege, it may be separated from indication, it is integrally part of rational discourse as the 
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means of its foundation and affirmation of conceptual unity. 
Poetic Mode: Ontological Expression 
The concern with the expressive/poetic mode of language is Ricoeur's response to the 
Heideggerian challenge to seek a way of addressing the question of the meaning of Being as an 
attempt to uncover the ontological foundation of rational discourse. In his analytic of Dasein in 
Being and Time, Heidegger engages in a fundamental questioning of the metaphysical concepts, 
which, according to both Ricoeur and Derrida, Husserl assumes as the foundation of the 
transcendental subject, in a process he calls Destruktion(s), and which Derrida develops in the 
notion of Deconstruction(6). According to Heidegger, the task is to destroy the traditional 
metaphysical/ontological concepts of the post-Socratic Greek philosophers, which remain even 
in Kantian philosophy where the 
basic ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which 
arise in a new inquiry. Being and Time p. 49. 
The method of Destruktion in the Analysis of Dasein is essentially hermeneutical in a process 
of uncovering, of disclosing, of letting be whereby Dasein may be encountered. It is a task of a 
disclosive understanding of Being, though non-conceptual). However, Ricoeur is concerned to 
point out that in Being and Time 
from a Heideggerian perspective, the only internal critique that can be conceived as an integral part 
of the enterprise of disclosure is the deconstruction of metaphysics 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences p. 89. 
According to Ricoeur, what Heidegger fails to recognise in Being and Time is the fundamental 
part played by language and discourse in the disclosure of Being. Although the question of 
language is introduced it remains a secondary articulation. Language is derivative of the 
ontological structures which precede it. Ricoeur quotes from the passage on language and 
comments as follows, 
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The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time', says Heidegger in paragraph 34, 
'will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosed- 
ness' (SZ 160; BT 203); and further on, 'Discourse is the articulation of what understanding is' 
(SZ 161; BT 203-4); It is therefore necessary to situate discourse in the structures of being, rather 
than situating the latter in discourse: 'Discourse is the "meaningful" articulation of the understand- 
able structure of being-in-the-world' (SZ 161; BT 204). 
Ricoeur then observes, 
The last remark anticipates the movement of the later philosophy of Heidegger, which will ignore 
Dasein and begin directly with the manifestative power of language. 
ibid p. 58. 
In his later writings, Heidegger does indeed give greater prominence to the importance of 
language in the disclosure of Being. The disclosure of Being is then defined in terms of the 
existential space, the clearance or rift whereby Dasein is made manifest through language, the 
structure or house of Being. The letting be of authentic Being appears through the mediation of 
language. With respect to Ricoeur's theory of the poetic mode of language, the significant 
development in the later writings of Heidegger is in relation to art and poetic language(8). For 
example, in The Origin of the Work of Art, he describes the process of the manifestation of 
authentic Being, which he calls the shining forth of Truth, as creative strife whereby 
Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself. This composed rift is the fugue 
of truth's shining. What is here called figure [Gestalt] is always to be thought in terms of the 
particular placing [Stellen] and enframing [Ge-stell] as which the work occurs when it sets itself 
up and sets itself forth. Basic Writings p. 189. 
Heidegger uses the word "poetry" for this creative act, but he does not limit this to language. He 
writes, 
Language is not poetry because it is primal poesy; rather poesy propriates in language because 
language preserves the original essence of poetry. 
and so, 
the linguistic work, poetry in the narrower sense, has a privileged position in the domain of the arts. 
ibid p. 188 & 189 
There are a number of critical issues raised by Heideggees understanding of poetry in relation 
to Ricoeur's work on the poetic mode of language which will be examined in detail in due 
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course. One of which is the question Heidegger poses in the same essay: 
If we fix our vision on the essence of the work and its connection with the happening of the truth 
of beings, it is questionable whether the essence of poetry, and this means at the same time the 
essence of projection, can be adequately thought of in terms of the power of the imagination. 
ibid. p. 197. 
Ricoeur's Theory of Metaphor 
The purpose of this brief outline of the significant influence of Husserl and Heidegger upon 
Ricoeur's work is to introduce his theory of metaphor as the way into understanding the 
hermeneutical movement from suspicion to affirmation in terms of the creative relationship 
between the rational and poetic modes of discourse. The problem of presence with regard to the 
two interrelated critical perspectives identified in chapter one is taken up in the development of 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, and subsequently in narrative theory. His aim is not only to 
respond to the Heideggerian challenge to uncover the ontological foundation of being-in-the- 
world, but to show how this foundation is dialectically related to rational discourse in a 
hermeneutical process; that within this process the possibility of rational affirmation is 
ontologically founded upon the possibility of the affirmation of the unity of self-identity(9). 
Throughout his work, Ricoeur is critical of Heidegger for failing to address the issue of return 
from the disclosure of ontological foundation to the level of rational discourse. For example, in 
his essay'The Task of hermeneutics' he writes, 
With Heidegger's philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are 
left incapable of beginning the movement of return from the fundamental ontology to the properly 
epistemological question of the status of the human sciences. From Text to Action p. 69. 
It is this return which is evident in the Ricoeurean understanding of the function of metaphor. 
Metaphor is the focus of the poetic mode of language which brings together in a dialectical 
relationship the ontological and rational levels of discourse. However, it is important to make 
clear that in defining the two modes of poetic and rational language, this is not a limitation on 
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the wide variety of texts in which there is an interpenetration of these two modes: those which 
have a dominant rational mode in, for example, scientific texts, and those with the poetic as the 
dominant mode, for example, poetry and story(Io). Metaphor is ubiquitous in the sense that it 
functions in every kind of text and is the focus of the creative dialectic between the rational and 
the ontological in which the latter is the founding of meaning and the affirmation of presence. 
But the full effect of the function of metaphor may only be critically examined as the focus of 
narrative embracing the ontological foundation of self-identity which will be the theme of the 
next chapter. The question of whether metaphors that appear in the rational mode of discourse 
originate in the poetic mode will be then be considered. 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor draws upon the long tradition beginning with Aristotle's Poetics 
and Rhetoric(I1), but particularly upon the recent semantic work of literary criticism in the 
interactive theories of metaphor, especially in the studies of I. A. Richards(12), Max Black(13) and 
Monroe Beardsley(l4). The significant feature of these theories is the idea of the creation of new 
meaning, in contrast to the predominant traditional theories of substitution in which metaphor 
is essentially an ornamental figure of speech effecting an emotional response and surprise(1s) 
However, it is the philosophical perspective that Ricoeur brings to these theories with respect 
to what he calls the primordial dialectic(16) that sets the semantic interaction and the consequent 
creation of new meaning within a hemeneutical movement from suspicion to affirmation of 
meaning and presence. It is primordial because it is, according to Ricoeur, the way rational 
meaning is grounded in the ontological condition of being-in-the-world; the latter being the 
source of which he calls ontological vehemence(i7) which is the dynamic of semantic interaction 
creating new meaning. The linguistic mediation of this ontological vehemence is the figurative 
characteristic of the metaphoric process. It is through the mediation of the figure, the image, and, 
39 
as Ricoeur describes it, the iconic moment(18) of metaphor that language is dynamically related 
to the immediacy of the living present and the affirmation of rational unity. This primary 
characteristic of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, therefore, is the way into a critical examination 
of what has been referred to above as the second critical perspective upon the problem of 
presence. 
Iconic Moment: Ricoeur's Work on Symbols 
In examining this iconic moment of metaphor, it is important to be critically aware of its 
background in Ricoeur's early work on symbols, and the prior development of his thought in 
existential philosophy(iv). From the beginning, he is committed to what may seem, and will be 
the subject of closer analysis in a later chapter, the paradoxical aim of affirming existential 
freedom, that is, Heideggerian authenticity, by way of philosophical reflection upon the 
condition of fallibility which inhibits and potentially negates affirmation. Drawing upon the 
work of Gabriel Marcel(2o), Ricoeur identifies a crucial effect of fallibility as the spirit of 
abstraction, or "the peril of the objectification" of the human being. According to Ricoeur, this 
in effect and actuality denies human freedom, by failing to take a holistic approach whereby 
abstraction and objectification may be understood as rooted in the spiritual and cultural activity 
of the corporate life world of historical human beings. In other words, there is a non- 
philosophical background to philosophical reflection in the meaningful structures of the spiritual 
and cultural features of the Lebenswelt(21). Through continuing human historical activity there 
is a constant shaping and re-shaping of these features. Reflection plays a central part in this 
hermeneutical process but is not originary. He writes, 
Philosophy does not start anything independently: Supported by the non-philosophical, it derives 
its existence from the substance of what has already been understood prior to reflection. However, 
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if it is not a radical beginning with regard to its sources, it may be with regard to its method. 
Fallible Man p. 4. 
It is this commitment to philosophical method that first led him to explore the problem of myth 
as that which gives rise to meaning as the expression of the'Pathetique of "Misery"'(21). That is, 
it is the language of myth that reveals the human struggle with the condition of fallibility. Myths 
then become human stories, the history that in-forms and structures the spiritual and cultural 
environment of the Lebenswelt. The question for Ricoeur is, how is it possible to philosophically 
engage with mythos in a hermeneutical process? What method may be adopted to interpret the 
sensible, symbolic manifestations of the pervading mythos of the spiritual and cultural milieu? 
Since philosophical reflection is supported and grounded in these manifestations, how is it 
possible to achieve affirmation if its very ground is flawed by the aporias of endless struggle to 
overcome human finitude? Ricoeur is acutely aware of this profound problematic in his work, 
The Symbolism of Evil; and yet, in his dedication to'lucidity, of veracity, of rigor' in "the passage 
to reflection", in Freud and Philosophy he responds to his own challenging question, 
Is it possible, I asked, to coherently interrelate the interpretation of symbols and philosophic 
reflection? My only answer to this question was in the form of a contradictory resolve: I vowed, 
on the one hand, to listen to the rich symbols and myths that precede my reflection, instruct and 
nourish it; and on the other hand to continue, by means of the philosophical exegesis of symbols 
and myths, the tradition of rationality of philosophy, of our western philosophy. Symbols give rise 
to thought, I said, using a phrase from Kant's Critique ofJudgment. Symbols give, they are the 
the gift of language; but this gift creates for me the duty to think, to inaugurate philosophic discourse, 
starting from what is always prior to and the foundation of that discourse. I did not conceal the 
paradoxical nature of this promise; on the contrary, I accentuated it by affirming first that philosophy 
does not begin anything, since the fullness of language precedes it, and second that it begins from 
itself, since it is philosophy which inaugurates the question of meaning and of the foundation of 
meaning. Freud and Philosophy p. 38. 
Symbols: Levels of Consciousness 
In Ricoeur's approach to symbols, it is also important to appreciate his phenomenological and 
ontological perspective in which the linguistic sign system is directly related to, what are defined 
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as, other levels of consciousness, and particularly to an understanding of intentionality and 
meaning that is not only self-conscious but corporeal and active. To this end, he acknowledges 
his debt to Maurice Merleau-Ponty(23). In Freud and Philosophy he writes, 
The first corollary to the theory of intentionality concerns the phenomenological notion of one's 
own body, or, in the language of the later writings of Merleau-Ponty, the notion of the flesh. 
When asked how it is possible for meaning to exist without being conscious, the phenomenologist 
replies: its mode of being is that of the body, which is neither ego nor thing of the world. The 
phenomenologist is not saying that the Freudian unconscious is the body; he is simply saying 
that the mode of being of the body, neither representation in me or thing outside of me, is the 
ontic model for any conceivable unconscious. This status as model stems not from the vital 
determination of the body, but from the ambiguity of its mode of being. A meaning that exists 
is a meaning caught up with a body, a meaningful behaviour. 
ibid. p. 382. 
At the level of Freud's notion of the subconscious, Ricoeur's early work is devoted to the analysis 
of non-rational symbolic activity at this level. He came to Freud via his work on the voluntary 
and involuntary will in which, as Walter J. Lowe writes in the introduction to Fallible Man, the 
third part of this early work, 
... in and through the 
interpretation of human experience, he has sought to fashion "a notion of being 
which is act rather than form, living affirmation, the power of existing and making exist". 
Fallible Man p. vii & viii.. 
What he learns from his 'debate' with Freud is the way a phenomenological approach to the 
subconscious shows that symbols both conceal and reveal the pre-reflective meanings of human 
activity. Drawing upon, at the same time as being critical of, Freud's topography of the 
archaeological symbolic structuring of the subconscious, Ricoeur understands the concealment 
and revelation of this pre-reflective subconscious symbolic structuring as intrinsic to human 
activity in the struggle for affirmation in the historical human condition. It is this which discloses 
the need for a dialectic between an archaeological and teleological opposition(24) within a 
hermeneutical movement. Symbols have opaqueness which has the effect of concealing the 
hidden ground of reflection. By means, therefore, of hermeneutical suspicion there may be a 
process of revealing the arche of language and rational thought in a dialectical relationship with 
42 
an open teleological horizon of affirmation of new meaning. 
It will be necessary to study in closer detail critical aspects of this background to Ricoeur's early 
work in subsequent chapters. As indicated above, the purpose here is to provide a general view 
of his work on symbols as a background to an analysis of the symbolic characteristic, and 
particularly the iconic moment, of his theory of metaphor. It is the background to the analysis, 
presented below, of the ontological grounding of linguistic expression in terms of the figurative 
characteristic of metaphor in which the iconic moment is the focus of the primordial dialectic 
in the movement from suspicion to affirmation of presence. 
According to Ricoeur, the iconic moment is the focus of the linguistic mode of symbolic activity 
and structuring of historical human activity; it has its roots in corporeal and subconscious 
activity in the struggle for existential freedom. This aspect of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is 
crucial in his attempt to show that the expression of being-in-the-world is objectively grounded. 
In contrast to the dominantly affective characteristic of the traditional substitutional theory of 
metaphor, his work on symbols, in terms of its corporeality, provides a way of understanding the 
materiality and therefore objectiveness of metaphoric iconicity. In this respect, his study of 
religious symbols and the significant difference between sign and sacrament(25) plays an 
important part in the development of his theory. That is, symbols do not simply point to in the 
manner of the sign, they are the objective material presence of what they make known. In this 
sense, the symbol is the concrete moment of the living present. But there is a need to recognize 
it is the concrete moment of a symbolic richness, which Ricoeur calls a mixed texture(26) whereby 
the opposed poles of the dialectic between archaeology and teleology are held in a hermeneutical 
movement. That is, the symbolic richness, or overdetermination in Freudian analysis(27), that 
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makes possible the process of interpretation from concealment to disclosure, from suspicion to 
affirmation, is contained in the concrete mixed texture which is the symbol. 
Objective Nature of Symbols 
This concrete mixed texture is the effect of the convergence, the centripetal dynamic, the 
bringing together of the iconic moment, the symbolic characteristic, of metaphor as the 
expression of being-in-the-world in the context of the symbolic richness related to conscious, 
subconscious and corporeal activity. It will be necessary to study Ricoeur's theory of narrative 
to give full consideration to the implications of this symbolic activity in relation to the problem 
of presence. The aim at this stage is to look carefully at the concrete mixed texture with respect 
to the iconic moment of metaphor as the grounding of rational discourse in the ontological 
expression of being-in-the-world. 
There are three linguistic integrally related elements of the iconic moment involved in the 
dynamic of metaphor that effects a convergence of symbolic activity. In metaphoric expression, 
an expression of historic experience of being-in-the-world, there is a convergence of symbolic 
activity with respect to the contextual symbolic richness relating to all levels of consciousness 
and corporeal activity. The three linguistic elements are imagination, image and sound. The first, 
which is based upon Ricoeur's interpretation and development of the Kantian notion of the 
productive imagination(28) and is central to his whole philosophy, will be the subject of a detailed 
examination in chapter 7. The important characteristic of Ricoeur's understanding of the 
imagination with regard to the iconic moment of metaphor is the way that language is 
transcended in and through language; that the dynamic of this converging moment is the 
imaginative act directed beyond language in and through the mediation of linguistic symbolic 
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structuring of human activity; a symbolic richness which in this converging moment is subjected 
to a dialectical tension of suspicion and affirmation. The power of the productive imagination, 
essentially linguistic, is its creative play of images, the second element of the iconic moment. For 
example, Aristotle defines the creative artistry of the poet as follows, 
... the greatest gift 
by far is to be the master of the metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt 
from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception 
of the similarity of dissimilars. 
Poetics 1459 a3&8. 
This gift of perceiving similarity of dissimilars, essentially dependent and derivative from the 
creative play of images, produces an iconic fusion in an image grounded in the living present. 
Poetic Language: Sound and Image 
The nature of this grounding is given in sound, the third element of the iconic moment (although 
it must be clear that imagination, image and sound are inseparable). The key to whether the 
attempt to ground expression in the living present lies with the possibility of showing that, in this 
sense, language has an objective materiality. This is why the voice was so important to Husserl. 
It is the sound of the living voice that may ground language in the present, although, Derrida's 
criticism of Husserl has already been noted and will be taken up again in relation to Ricoeur's 
theory of metaphor. However, the voice as the grounding of imaginative expression in contrast 
to expression of rational unity is fundamentally a different approach to sound as linguistic 
objective materiality. The latter is an attempt to understand how the sound of the voice in the 
living present is bound up with the imaginative play of images in the fusion of the iconic 
moment. 
As mentioned above, Ricoeur is influenced by his study of religious symbols in the way that 
liturgical sacraments are concrete symbols which are the means of active participation(29). The 
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sensible objective materiality of these symbols means that they are not simply signs of'this for 
that' but the mediation of human activity in the living present. Liturgical symbols, as an example 
of the symbolic structuring of historical, social contexts, show how people actively inhabit the 
lifeworld of the liturgy which is ontologically structured by the material, objective presence of 
the symbols. The sensible materiality of the religious symbol is analogous to the sensible 
materiality of the linguistic symbol; that is, the sound of the living voice. It is this that grounds 
the mediation of the linguistic symbol, the iconic moment of metaphor, in the immediacy of the 
present. 
Taking, as an example, a metaphor for old age, specifically, the figure of an elderly man in the 
poem, Sailing to Byzantium by W. B. Yeats, 
An aged man is but a paltry thing 
A tattered coat upon a stick... 
Ricoeur would agree that working with images is central to the function of metaphor. The image 
of the old man as a tattered coat upon a stick is the result of Yeats' working with images. It is the 
power of the imagination to intuitively create an image through a process of fusion of images 
drawn from the linguistic symbolic structuring of consciousness at all levels. This is a process 
of image-making analogous to any artistic creativity. This linguistic process of working with 
words, according to Ricoeur, is radically different from the working out of a propositional, 
descriptive sentence. For example, the possible paraphrases of the above metaphor, (e. g. an aged 
man is frail and insignificant) are "objective descriptions" of an old man. To use Saussurean 
language, they are signifiers based upon an internal differential system of meaning whereby they 
signify the signifiedpo). This is working with words in the attempt to describe the figure of an 
aged man through signification, that is, working with words as signs. Ricoeur claims that this 
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is not what the poet does. Neither is this the process in the creation of metaphor. He writes, 
The poet, in effect, is that artisan who sustains and shapes imagery using no other means 
than language. 
The Rule of Metaphor p. 211. 
What does this mean? It means that a poet like Yeats is predominantly working with sound, with 
rhythm, with those acoustic modulations which are the very stuff of linguistic imagery. It is 
immediate sensibility that is the basic means of the linguistic image making. In the same way 
as the sculptor's image is created out of the marble, that the materiality of the marble, its texture, 
its particular makeup is fundamental in the fusion of the image, so too phonic sensibility is the 
warp and weave of metaphor. 
Ricoeur, however, makes the point that 'the essential trait of poetic language is not the fusion 
of sense with sound, but the fusion of sense with a wave of evoked or aroused images. This 
constitutes the true "iconicity" of sense. The iconic moment is the moment of fusion. But, in 
making this point, Ricoeur could be accused of concentrating too much upon the image to the 
neglect of the key role played by sound. Reading poetry, and narrative in-formed by metaphor, 
evokes images in the memory and symbolic images of the cultural context in the sound of the 
text. Language has its own 'music' which is the stuff of images. But this is not 'music' of the 
emotions alone; it is, as Ricoeur is so concerned to make clear, integrally related to the iconic 
moment that is the ontological dynamic of semantic interaction and innovation. 
Reading poetry is an act of listening and seeing as the grounding of mediation of understanding. 
To listen to the sounds of the words, 
The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window panes, 
The Love Song ofJ. Alfred Prufrock T. S. Eliot 
or, 
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Pale Flakes with fingering stealth come feeling our faces - 
Exposure Wilfred Owen 
is to be responsive to the arousal of images that fuse into a configuration which makes disclosure 
possible in provoking semantic interaction at the level of reflection. His early work on symbols 
sets the scene for this analysis. The images are aroused from the sedimentation of the linguistic 
trace; they are part of the sedimented figuration of the imagistic texture of the trace. A trace that 
is grounded, according to Ricoeur, in archaic figures: 
The most innovative figures that the artist, writer or thinker can produce call forth energies 
originally invested in archaic figures, comparable to oneiric and neurotic symptoms, the 
creator reveals man's most open and fundamental possibilities and erects them into new 
symbols of the suffering of self-consciousness. 
Freud and Philosophy p. 522. 
In his work on narrative, he attempts to show that its composition is anchored in the symbolic 
resources of the practical field. That is, all actions are symbolically mediated, and therefore 
symbols are interpretants of action: 'Symbolism confers an initial readability on action. '(31) The 
linguistic trace is woven into the texture of the symbolic system of social activity. 'The tattered 
coat and stick' is not simply drawn from language describing utilitarian items of clothing and 
aids for disability, they symbolize an active condition of particular people recognizable in the 
social context. Every aspect and activity of social life are potentially or actually part of its 
symbolic texture. It is through metaphor that symbols, in terms of image and sound, are part of 
language and ground linguistic mediation in the ontological condition of being-in-the-world. 
The fundamental feature of this process is the way that the symbolic image is united with sound. 
It is important to listen to the sound when reading metaphor (whether reading aloud, or listening 
with the 'inner ear'). It is that sound in relation to meaning which is decisive in the choice of 
metaphor in the process of drawing upon background symbolically structured social activity. This 
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is why the creative ability required for translation involves the intuitive grasp of sound and 
image in both languages. Metaphor cannot be translated in the manner of seeking equivalent 
lexical meaning, but by an imaginative, intuitive perception rooted in sound and image of both 
languages(32). The process of listening in the creation of metaphor, or an appropriation of sound 
in reading, is not limited to the phonics of lexical meaning based upon the notion of Saussurean 
difference; that is, sound related to linguistic concepts, which can be, according to Derrida, 
relinquished in favour of inscription(33), so that sound is not the basis of meaning but writing 
whereby meaning is endlessly deferred through the process of metaphor, or, more particularly, 
metonymy(34). In contrast, the phonics of metaphor, according to Ricoeur, is essential to the 
dynamic of the centripetal fusion of images in the intuitive perception of similarity between 
dissimilars. Of course, the semantics of metaphor is what matters in the affirmation of presence, 
but what is claimed is that this cannot be separated from sound. In this sense, there is an 
agreement with Husserl that the voice is involved in the affirmation of presence, although not 
as the expression of the transcendental subject and the grounding of univocity. 
Image, Sound and Objectivity 
There does, however, seem to be a question with respect to Ricoeur's analysis of sound and 
image which is brought to light by comparison with Husserl's treatment of the image. The 
question is whether the image can be placed on the side of objectivity, or must it inevitably be 
defined as a mental image and placed clearly on the subjective side? If the affirmation of 
presence is to be grounded in the given of linguistically structured consciousness, and not in the 
metaphysical assumptions of the transcendental subject, and if metaphor plays a crucial role in 
this grounding, then should not the image, or imaginality, be on the side of objectivity? 
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Husserl's concern is to separate the image from intentionality in order to ground the intuitive 
unity of the object upon the latter. According to Husserl, the image-theory poses the appearance 
of the image in consciousness as the representative (im bildlichen Vorstellen) of the object(35). 
The image is the resemblance of the object in experience, but such resemblance cannot provide 
access to the original beyond the image. On the basis of this theory, it is not possible therefore 
for intentionality, for meaning, to be directed at the object. What constitutes the image as a 
representation of the object is intentional consciousness. Husserl's notion of intentionality is not 
a matter of a relation between two things: an act and an intentional object in consciousness, but 
one intentional experience by which the object appears. As John Sallis writes, 
Husserl refers, finally, back to the domain of fundamental problems, to what is preeminently 
at issue in that domain, namely intentionality. It is imperative to realize that an object is 
present to consciousness, not because a content similar to the object is somehow present 
in consciousness, but rather because it is constituted as object in and through the intentional 
experience. 
Delimitations p. 67. 
Sallis takes up the critical problem raised above in his study, in chapter 5, 'Image and 
Phenomena', particularly the subsection, 'Image and Imaginality'. He observes that Husserl's 
critical achievement in insisting on the distinction between intentional experience and the 
intentional object, which has the effect of removing the latter from the sphere of immanence, 
serves to eliminate the mental object, clears the way for a return to the thing-itself, as it shows 
itself. The issue therefore is, if it is part of the fundamental problem of presence, how may the 
image be regarded as belonging to the domain of the object? According to Sallis, in his 
phenomenological analysis(36), Husserl does not allow the image to be the basis of presentation 
because it is constituted by intentional experience. The intentional object, which Husserl 
identifies as the actual object, the original, appears, is presented as an image that is constituted 
by intentionality. For the image to participate in the process of presentation, it would have to be 
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involved in objectivity. That is, intentional experience would have to be in relation to the 
image as object; its imaginality would have to be made manifest. Husserl claims that this cannot 
be because the image is not a predicate of the object. 
Ricoeur, however, does not claim that the image provides access to the thing-itself in terms of 
rational unity, but that it opens up the possibility of affirming such unity on the basis of 
ontological unity with respect to self-identity. The image is the expression of being-in-the-world. 
Its objectivity lies in the integral relationship with linguistic materiality of sound, the living 
voice, in the iconic moment of metaphor. Furthermore, intentionality, according to Ricoeur, is 
fundamentally, with respect to the creation of meaning in a hermeneutical process, an 
imaginative act. It is an ontological act of expression; an imaginative expression of being-in-the- 
world. This act, which will be studied more closely in chapters 6 and 7 particularly in relation 
to narrative, is a creative process whereby intentionality is understood as working with linguistic 
images. Ricoeur writes, 
In poetic language, the sign is looked at, not through. In other words, instead of being a 
medium or route crossed on the way to reality, language itself becomes 'stuff, ' like the 
sculptor's marble. 
The Rule of Metaphor p. 209. 
The ontological unity through linguistic expression in the poetic mode is achieved on the basis 
of an objective linguistic operation in terms of an imaginative act which fuses the linguistic 
images of similarity in dissimilarity in the iconic moment. There is more to be considered with 
respect to the dynamic of this act especially in relation to self-identity, but in terms of metaphor 
it is this act which may be taken as Ricoeur's response to the second critical perspective on the 
problem of presence identified in chapter one. 
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Metaphor and Rational Unity: The Interactive Theory 
What then is the relationship between this act and the first critical perspective regarding the 
affirmation of rational unity? To put it another way, how does the imaginative act enable the 
'route to be crossed on the way to reality'? Or can it? If there is not some way whereby language 
may refer to the reality of the thing-itself, is not conceptual unity a pragmatic or conventional 
achievement, for example, based upon 'use' in a Wittgensteinian 'language-game'? Or is 
conceptual unity an illusion; is it endlessly deferred, as Derrida claims, which will be considered 
briefly below? 
Obviously, this question can only be addressed by pursuing the semantic characteristic of 
Ricoeur's interactive theory of metaphor. A critical feature of this theory is that although the 
iconic moment is the sensible figurative focus that precipitates the metaphora(37) of the meaning 
in the semantic order, it is distinctly separate from this order. It is the linguistic dynamic of a 
semantic interaction process, but its sensible qualities are of a different order. The contrast with 
the traditional substitutional theory of metaphor reveals the key significance of this critical 
feature. The traditional theory is based upon metaphor as the word. Although there are many 
variations of this theory, particularly in the increased interest that has been recently given to the 
study of metaphor(38), the critical characteristic is the 'carrying over' of one word in an act of 
substituting a word having a literal meaning, or a descriptive phrase with a word which conveys 
the effect of surprise and/or heightened emotion. The aim is to 'animate' the text for poetic or 
rhetorical effects. The word becomes a linguistic instrument for emotional effect. Its semantic 
property does not create new meaning in being 'carried over; its deviance or impertinence is 
simply to bring about an intensity of perception and feeling. In the powerful first chapter of 
Thomas Hardy's Return of the Native, in describing Egdon Heath, Hardy writes, 
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Haggard Egdon appealed to a subtler and scarcer instinct, to a more recently learnt emotion, 
than that which responds to the sort of beauty called charming and fair. 
p. 34. 
The literal meaning of 'Haggard' is related to a human being, or possibly an animal, which is 
wild-looking, especially resulting from fatigue (OED). Therefore it cannot be applied literally 
to an area of land such as a heath. The effect of its literal meaning therefore, according to the 
substitutional theory, is to stimulate an emotional response to the heath. The meaning of heath 
does not change; it remains a waste tract of land, but the feeling for this particular heath in the 
story is intensified. 
In contrast, the interactive theory of metaphor is not based upon the word but the sentence or 
discourse. Metaphor understood as a process, metaphors, is not limited to the single word, it is 
the whole sentence or text. In Study 1, 'Between rhetoric and poetics: Aristotle' of The Rule of 
Metaphor, Ricoeur identifies the first characteristic of metaphor as 'something that happens to 
the noun' (p. 16), but claims that this became definitive of the dominant view confining 
metaphor to one of the figures of speech contained in Aristotle's theory of tropes. This view, 
resulting, according to Ricoeur, from a decline in the importance of Rhetoric and a separation 
between speculative and poetic discourse(39), led to a failure to recognize the fundamental 
importance of the second characteristic. He writes, 
The second characteristic is that metaphor is defined in terms of movement. The epiphora of a 
word is described as a sort of displacement, a movement'from... to..: This notion of epiphora 
enlightens at the same time as it puzzles us. It tells us that, far from designating just one figure 
of speech among others such as synecdoche and metonymy (this is how we find metaphor 
taxonomized in later rhetoric), for Aristotle the word metaphor applies to every transposition 
of terms. 
ibid p. 17. 
This movement is later developed in his analysis to be understood in philosophical terms as the 
ontological dynamic of convergence in the iconic moment of metaphor. Here it can be seen to 
relate to the semantic movement with respect to metaphor defined in terms of the sentence or the 
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complete discourse. In other words, what happens in the movement of metaphor is a 
displacement of meaning in a process of semantic interaction between what may be described 
as semantic fields(4o). In the above example, the word 'haggard' carries over the semantic 
connotations from the field of its literal meaning to interact with the semantic field of the noun, 
'heath'. The epiphoric semantic convergence of these two fields is brought about by the fusion 
of images in the iconic moment. 
Metaphor: Split Reference 
Ricoeur describes this as an ontological vehemence which uproots the literal reference in one 
field to set free a second-order, metaphorical reference to interact in another semantic. Here, 
Ricoeur draws upon the literary criticism in the work of Roman Jacobson, particularly his notion 
of split-reference(4i). He writes, 
The most radical consequences of this is that what happens in poetry is not the suppression of 
referential function but its profound alteration by the working of ambiguity: The supremacy of 
poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous. 
The double-sensed message finds its correspondence in a split addresser, in a split addressee, and 
what is more in a split reference, as is cogently exposed in the preambles to fairy tales of various 
peoples, for instance, in the usual exordium of the Majorca storytellers: "Aixo era y no era" (It was 
and it was not)' 
ibid p. 224. 
What Ricoeur is at pains to make clear is reference, in this sense of metaphorical second-order 
reference, is not the literal denotation of rational identity, but the reference to an active state of 
affairs, to a lifeworld appropriated and inhabited by an act of the imagination that is linguistic 
through and through. With regard to metaphor, it is through the iconic moment that this reference 
is made possible; but to consider the full implications of this notion of split reference in relation 
to the imaginative act will require the critical analysis of Ricoeur's theory of narrative set out in 
the next chapter. The issue at this stage is how is conceptual unity achieved at the semantic level 
in affirming the presence of the thing-itself? If the interactive process is based upon ambiguity, 
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and involves reference which is of second-order association and connotation, not literal 
denotation, how is it possible for conceptual unity to be achieved? 
Two Levels of Operation: Figurative and Semantic 
As mentioned above, the interactive theory of metaphor is based upon an understanding of 
metaphor as sentence or discourse not a single word. According to Ricoeur, the sentence, the 
basic unit of language refers to the reality of the objective world because meaning is based upon 
this unit. Words only have meaning in relation to the sentences or discourse of which they are 
part. With the exception of proper names which are limited to designation(42), all lexical 
definitions are interpreted by reference to other words on the basis of the sentence or discourse. 
The literal abstract meaning is created out of a dialectic between the two levels of operation: the 
metaphorical operation whereby reference is achieved through the sentence, and the level of 
abstract meaning with respect to rational discourse based upon the word. In defining this 
dialectic, Ricoeur presents his particular interpretation of what Hegel calls Aujhebung(43). In 
Study Eight of The Rule of Metaphor, he writes. 
The first operation which is purely metaphorical, takes a proper (eigentlich) meaning and transports 
it (übertragen) into the spiritual order. Out of expression - non-proper (uneigentlich) because 
transposed - the other operation makes a proper abstract meaning. It is the second operation that 
constitutes the 'suppression-preservation' which Hegel calls Aufhebung. But the two operations, 
transfer and suppression-preservation, are distinct. The second alone creates a proper sense in the 
spiritual order out of an improper sense coming from the sensible order. The phenomenon of 
wearing away (Abnutzung) is only a prior condition allowing the second operation to be constituted 
on the ground of the first. 
ibid p. 292. 
Conceptuality in speculative, rational discourse is constituted on the ground of the metaphoric 
iconic focus in a primordial dialectical relationship whereby the interactive process of the 
semantic fields brings about the creation of new meaning. As the sensible element wears away 
through continuing use over time, the proper sense of the new meaning is constituted in the 
rational, conceptual order. 
55 
But the question remains, how can conceptual unity be constituted on the basis of ambiguity in 
the metaphorical order? Janet Martin Soskice writes, 
In The Rule of Metaphor, Paul Ricoeur comes perilously close to committing himself to both 
a'dual sense' and a'dual truth' thesis. 
Metaphor and Religious Language. p. 89. 
She is critical of Ricoeur's attempt to appropriate the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung. Ricoeur 
claims that through the ontological vehemence of the iconic moment a tension is set up 'deep 
with the logical force of the verb to be' between an impossibility of a literal interpretation and 
the metaphorical 'is. That is, the tension between the 'is' and the 'is not'. He writes, with respect 
to the metaphorical 'is', 
To state 'that is' - such is the moment of belief, of ontological commitment, which gives affirmation 
its 'illocutionary' force. 
ibid. p. 249. 
Here Ricoeur is drawing upon the Speech Act theories of J. L. Austin and John Searle(44) in which 
language is understood to be performative in the sense that certain forms of speech are central 
to the performance of the acts that are expressed. An aim of this study is to draw upon Ricoeur's 
dynamic theory of metaphor in an attempt to show how unity, in terms of the iconic moment 
achieved through an active, ontological commitment, makes possible conceptual unity within 
the tension set up in semantic interaction between the 'is' and the 'is not'. 
As a result, new meaning is created whereby there is a redescription. Through the power of 
metaphor, Ricoeur claims that the active lifeworld which is symbolically and linguistically 
structured is constantly redescribed making possible logical, rational analysis and explanation 
in relation to the entities abstracted from the life world. Metaphorical, poetic language is 'fluid' 
open to the expansiveness of the experience of the lifeworld, constantly disclosing the new 
meanings of the opaque richness of the symbolic structure and sedimentation at all levels of 
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consciousness in a hermeneutical process from suspicion to affirmation. 
Soskice's criticism of this theory of metaphor, in which she takes note of the work of Max Black 
which influenced Ricoeur, deserves quoting at length. 
Ricoeur's suggestion that the tension of metaphor is ontological is somewhat ambiguous. It is motivated 
in part by his desire to emphasize the redescriptive power of metaphor, hence the "critical incision of the 
(literal)'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is"' The most obvious reading of 
these remarks about redescription and ontological tension is as a restatement of the unsatisfactory (A is a 
B)'two-subjects' view that we have criticized in Max Black, thus'Man is a wolf and'Man is not a wolf, 
The lake is sapphie and The lake is not sapphire. ... But this approach comes dangerously near to making 
metaphor a matter of comparison and Ricoeur's use of the term 'redescription' is revealing. The trouble 
with Black's theory is that, in assuming a two-subject perspective in which primary subject (man) is 
modified by the secondary subject (wolf), he is unable to explain convincingly how metaphors can say 
something genuinely new. Similarly Ricoeur's language of redescription inevitably suggests comparison 
because, even accompanied by talk of an ontological tension, it implies that there is some definite, pre- 
existing thing (the principal subject of the metaphor in Max Black's terms) that the metaphor is about 
and simply redescribes. 
ibid p. 89. 
This criticism seems to be unanswerable within the confines of Ricoeur's theory set out in The 
Rule of Metaphor. It is only in the development of Ricoeur's work in his theory of narrative, and 
particularly narrative identity that the critical issue may be addressed. This will be taken up in 
the following chapters when it will be shown that what is at stake is not a pre-existing principal 
subject, but the teleological movement from suspicion to affirmation of self identity grounded 
in ontological commitment mediated through the text, in terms of narrative identity, that is the 
dynamic of new meaning, and not of comparison. 
Derridean Perspective: Critical Questions 
This chapter may be seen to have raised fundamental questions with respect to Ricoeur's 
response to the two critical perspectives upon the problem of presence identified in chapter one 
These may be clear from the comparison with Derrida. Although both are committed to the 
givenness of a phenomenological perspective on language as the basis of any attempt to address 
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the problem of presence, and, consequently, to exclude all metaphysical assumptions, Derrida's 
understanding of metaphor may seem to remain faithful to this commitment in contrast to 
Ricoeur. Derrida takes the linguistic sign system in terms of inscription, since sound, the living 
voice, he attempts to show, assumes the presence of a transcendental subject, and therefore an 
a priori metaphysical foundation for presence. Accordingly, he is committed to inscription, the 
mark, the linguistic trace as the basis of any approach to the problem of presence. Any question 
of the derivation of meaning is confined to 1'ecriture. Meaning is the effect of the play, the 
dissemination of this trace in terms of Saussurean difference, but inscriptive not phonic(45). 
Metaphor is the nature of this play. It is the semantic movement in the context of continually 
changing experience; a constant reverberation in which there is a process of supplementing the 
space in the trace(46). Metaphor therefore is this movement of supplementarity in an endless 
metonymic chain, a process in which meaning is never achieved but endlessly deferred; which 
is the reason for Derrida coining the word, Differance to combine the notions of difference and 
deferred. Derrida makes clear that the trace, in terms of this endless metaphoric supplementarity 
whereby presence cannot be affirmed, determines consciousness; and intentionality, intuition 
and the imagination are linguistically derivative with respect to the trace. 
The intention in this brief reference to Derrida's understanding of metaphor is not to enter into 
a detailed analysis, but first to indicate a fundamental distinction between Derrida and Ricoeur 
which provides a critical perspective on the latter's commitment to the givenness of the text. 
Secondly, to make note of a critical contrasting view which will remain central to this study and 
be taken up at a later stage. With respect to the first critical perspective of the problem of 
affirmingn rational unity, Ricoeur's response in terms of his theory of metaphor raises the 
question, what kind of unity is mediated through the poetic mode of language as the grounding 
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of rational unity? What is the linguistic nature of ontological vehemence and tension in the 
iconic moment which achieves a fusion based upon an ambiguity which is never completely 
transcended. Or, in other words, an ambiguity between suspicion and affirmation with the 
movement towards the latter but never relinquishing suspicion? Secondly, in attempting to 
resolve the second critical perspective of the issue of being-in-the-world in relation to the 
problem, has Ricoeur gone beyond the givenness of language in the imaginative expression of 
the poetic mode? Does not the imagination presume a transcendental subject in a similar manner 
to that of Husserl? Does not the sound of the living voice, even in the poetic mode, point to the 
extra linguistic presence of the transcendental subject? How is it possible for the imagination to 
be linguistic and yet transcend language in referring to the objective lifeworld? To take up these 
questions it is necessary to follow the development of Ricoeur's work on metaphor in his theory 
of narrative. 
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Chapter Three 
Presence, Sound, and Narrative 
Narrative and the Questions of Presence 
Analyzing the two critical perspectives upon the problem of presence, identified in the first 
chapter, a beginning was made in chapter two to examine the possibility developed in Paul 
Ricoeur's work on metaphor in The Rule of Metaphor that the linguistic focus of the 
interrelationship of these two perspectives may be found in metaphor. That is, that the 
fundamentally metaphoric characteristic of language provides the way to resolve the problematic 
of presence in terms of ontologically affirming the unity of self identity. Metaphor is here 
understood as a linguistic movement involving the complete sentence, or discourse whereby the 
figurative feature is the expression of the ontological dynamic of the movement effecting the 
creation of new meaning and consequently the affirmation of its conceptual unity. In other 
words, conceptual unity as the linguistic mediation of the presence of an object, is made possible 
through metaphor with respect to an ontological vehemence arising from its iconic moment. 
However, the questions raised at the conclusion of chapter two with respect to both perspectives 
draw attention to the unresolved problem of presence. Metaphor, according to Ricoeur's theory, 
is the critical linguistic focus for achieving this resolution; but in order carefully to consider 
whether this resolution is possible, it is necessary to pursue the analysis of metaphor which leads 
on to Ricoeur's theory of narrative, particularly as this is set out in Time and Narrative and 
Oneself as Another. He writes, 
The Rule of Metaphor and Time and Narrative form a pair: published one after the other, these 
works were conceived together. Although metaphor has traditionally belonged to the theory of 
"tropes" (or figures of discourse) and narrative to the theory of literary "genres, " the meaning-effects 
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produced by each of them belong to the same basic phenomenon of sematic innovation. 
Time and Narrative Vol. 1, Preface, p. ix. 
The reason for developing the analysis of metaphor in this direction is to attempt to concentrate 
upon the issues relating to the poetic mode of language as the linguistic mediation for the 
grounding and affirming of presence; the mode of language which may be understood as the 
ontological expression of being-in-the-world. The essential characteristic of this mode being the 
symbolic grounding of its figuration in the concrete activity of the lifeworld. There are two key 
questions arising from Ricoeur's theory of metaphor: Firstly, what kind of unity is achieved 
through this grounding in the iconic moment whereby the poetic mode dynamically affirms 
conceptual unity in the rational mode of language? How is it possible for univocity, and 
therefore presence of objects, to be affirmed by means of the mediation of a linguistic mode that 
seems to be rooted in ambiguity and contradiction? In the rational tradition of Western 
philosophy there has been constant vigilance in upholding the law of non-contradiction(s), and 
a dominant concern to separate the rational and poetic modes of language(2). This question 
relates directly to the issue of temporality which was outlined in chapter one and must be given 
closer attention in this and subsequent chapters. 
The second question is, how is it possible for the poetic mode of language, as defined by Ricoeur 
in his work on metaphor and narrative, to be transcended in and through language not by way 
of a metaphysical grounding, whether that be the Kantian a priori rational categories, or the 
Husserlian transcendental subject? What is being considered in this study is how this mode of 
language is the given mediation of consciousness whereby presence is affirmed by means of an 
intrinsic dynamic, ontologically grounded in the activity of the lifeworld, which is transcendental 
and teleological. More particularly, to consider the principal part played by the imagination in 
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this process of affirmation when defined in terms of linguistic figuration and the corporeal nature 
of consciousness which will form part of the analysis below, but will be studied more closely in 
chapters six and seven. 
This chapter will be devoted more to the importance of sound with respect to the objective and 
ontological characteristics of metaphor and narrative, and the unity of self-identity. Therefore, 
it is the first question which will mainly addressed in this and the following chapter, and the 
question of transcendence, although being touched upon in this chapter, and the next, will 
predominate in relation to Ricoeur's development of the Kantian notion of the productive 
imagination in chapter seven. 
Ricoeur, Saussure and Sound 
In raising the question about unity, it is critically important to understand the difference between 
that unity of self-identity which Ricoeur attempts to show is achieved by the iconic moment of 
the poetic mode related to the figurative characteristic of metaphor and the configuration of 
narrativem, and the conceptual unity that, for example, according to Ferdinand de Saussure(4), 
is phonically achieved by the internal structures of the linguistic synchronic sign system. It is the 
latter Derrida criticises, particularly in of Grammatology(s), which will form part of the analysis 
below. Both Ricoeur and Saussure give priority to sound in language, but there is a significant 
difference which is helpful to consider, taking account of the Derridean critique, in an endeavour 
to understand Ricoeur's approach. In so doing, it is important to appreciate that Saussure's 
perspective with respect to univocity is based upon the rational, conceptual mode of language, 
whereas, Ricoeur's approach to unity is grounded in the poetic mode. However, since they seem 
to share a common commitment to the sound of the spoken word, it is worthwhile to compare 
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their work. 
Saussure defines language as a sign system based upon the notion of the linguistic sign 
consisting of two elements. In The Linguistic Sign' taken from his Course in General Linguistics 
he writes, 
A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound 
pattern. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound 
pattern is the hearer's psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of 
his senses. This sound pattern may be called a'material' element only in that it is the 
representation of our sensory impressions. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from 
the other element associated with it in the linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a 
more abstract kind: the concept. 
Course in General Linguistics Tr. Roy Harris. p. 66 
The concept, he calls the signified, and the sound-image is the signifier. This latter element of 
the sign, according to Saussure, reveals how language is grounded in the concrete and particular 
in the way the sound of the spoken word makes a psychological imprint in terms of an image 
which is integrally related to the former element of the sign, that is, the concept or cognitive 
idea. However, the sound-image, the signifier, does not refer to the object in the manner of an 
empirical sense-image, but to the concept, the signified as the mediation of the object. In other 
words, although language is grounded in the concrete and the particular in the spoken word, 
linguistic meaning is an internal production of the sign system. For this reason, Saussure is 
equally concerned to separate the sign system of language, langue, from the spoken word - 
speech, parole - to show how the structure of the sign system produces meaning by an internal 
process. Meaning of words being based upon a purely arbitrary process with respect to phonic 
difference is determined by convention. He writes, 
For any means of expression accepted in a society rests in principle upon a collective habit, 
or on convention, which comes to the same thing. ibid p. 68. 
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In the light of Saussure's definition of the arbitrary nature of linguistic meaning, particularly his 
view of symbol, and the central role played by the symbolic characteristic of metaphor in 
Ricoeur's theory of meaning, it is important to appreciate the difference between their 
contrasting theories in which sound is fundamental to both. Saussure writes, 
The word symbol is sometimes used to designate the linguistic sign, or more exactly that part 
of the linguistic sign which we are calling the signal. This use of the word symbol is awkward, 
for reasons connected to the first principle. For it is characteristic of symbols that they are 
never entirely arbitrary. They are not empty configurations. They show at least a vestige of 
natural connexion between the signal and its signification. For instance, our symbol of 
justice, the scales could hardly be replaced by a chariot. ibid p. 68. 
This understanding of symbol does not, however, take account of Ricoeur's ontological view of 
the metaphoric icon. According to this view, the symbolic characteristic of metaphor is not 
simply a'this for that(6)', a linguistic sound-image signifying the object in terms of the mediation 
of the signified or concept. It is the mediation of a participation in the particular, concrete 
activity of the life-world. It is the mediation of an active, temporal state of being; and the nature 
of this mediation is the integral relationship of sound and image. 
Saussure is concerned only with sound in relation to an arbitrary production of conceptual 
meaning; that is, meaning of single words. Ricoeur is concerned with sound as it relates to words 
as part of sentences and discourse. In these theories, with respect to the spoken word, sound is 
not limited to the structure of phonemes of the particular word; it is part of the expression of the 
sentence and discourse in terms of stress, accent, cadence, inflection and enunciation. This is 
particularly evident in poetry, but it is also true of all forms of narrative which give expression 
to lifeworlds. The spoken word gives expression to an imaginative participation in the world of 
the narrative. It is an expression of sound patterns integrally related to a state of being that is 
actively disturbed by the ontological reverberations of an imaginative appropriation of the world 
of the narrative. 
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A critical analysis of Ricoeur's theory of narrative, undertaken later in this chapter and the next, 
is necessary for a closer examination of this understanding of linguistic sound. However, this 
analysis will only begin to address a key question as to whether there are, what may be called, 
'correct' expressions, or rather interpretative expressions of particular narratives, or an infinite 
number. If, for example, one reading of a narrative text is never the same as another reading, or 
if a text may be subject to a number of different interpretative readings, how can meaning be 
based upon this understanding of linguistic sound? The question is central to the main themes 
of this thesis and will carefully considered in the development of the analysis, and given 
particular attention in chapter six. 
Derrida's Critique of Saussure 
But first, there is need to consider the issue of sound with respect to Ricoeur, Saussure and 
Derrida. As already stated, sound is fundamental to the linguistic analysis of Ricoeur and 
Saussure which is criticised by Derrida. And yet, as discussed in chapter one, Ricoeur and 
Derrida share a common commitment, from a phenomenological perspective, to the givenness 
of language as structuring of consciousness, and consequently to the rejection of an extra- 
linguistic source of meaning. To this end, both define this givenness in terms of the written mode 
of the linguistic sign system; but, in contrast to Derrida, Ricoeur incorporates the sound of the 
spoken word within his definition of the givenness of the written text. Is he attempting to have 
it both ways? That is, is he attempting to maintain an extra-linguistic source of meaning in terms 
of sound as a form of reference at the same time as claiming that the creation of meaning is 
inherent in the written text? 
The significant difference between the seemingly common view of Ricoeur and Saussure with 
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respect to sound has been noted above, but in order to pursue a critical examination of Ricoeur's 
theory of narrative as a development of the analysis of his theory of metaphor in chapter two 
it will be worthwhile to take account of Derrida's critical viewpoint. It will, in fact, be 
worthwhile to attempt to clarify the crucial differences between these three overlapping 
perspectives. 
Although Saussure also defines the production of meaning as a process internal to the sign 
system, that system is primarily based upon the spoken word. The natural bond, according to 
Saussure, the only true bond of sense to senses is sound. Derrida comments, 
This natural bond of the signified(concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would condition the 
natural relationship subordinating writing (visible image) to speech. 
of Grammatology, p. 35. 
Saussure is extremely critical of those who in the Western tradition have, he claims, attempted 
to usurp the main role of the sound of the spoken word by giving priority to the written word. 
According to Saussure, the written word, the 'outside' of language(7), is open to many 
interpretations of meaning. It is sound which determines the meaning of words. But this is not 
sound of speech; that is, linguistic sound of the spoken word in the historical, diachronic context 
of human dialogue. It is the synchronic sound of the spoken word which produces meaning in 
terms of a purely arbitrary process based upon difference internal to the linguistic structure of 
the sign system. However, what Derrida is at pains to point out is that Saussure is not concerned 
simply with sound but the sound-image. He quotes Saussure from Course in General Linguistics 
as follows, 
It is impossible for sound alone, a material element, to belong to language. It is only a secondary 
thing, substance to be put to use. All our conventional values have the characteristic of not being 
confused with the tangible element which supports them... The linguistic signifier... is not [in 
essence] phonic but incorporeal - constituted not by material substance but the differences that 
separate its sound-image from all others (p. 164) [pp. 118-19]. The idea or phonic substance that 
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a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it (p. 166) [p. 120] 
ibid p. 53 (Derrida quotes from the original Cours de linguistique generate, Paris 1931. The above 
translation by Wade Buskin, New York, 1959, is used by Gayatri Chatravorty Spivak in her 
translation of Of Grammatolog; 1976) 
Derrida proceeds to make clear that it is the sound-image that is the structured appearing of the 
sound. In other words, Saussure reduces, in the phenomenological sense, the acoustics and 
physiology of sound to the psychological imprint which through the process or formation of 
difference produces at the abstract level of the signified, or concept, the meaning of the word. 
This is, according to Saussure, as noted above, an essentially arbitrary process. The only 
relationship of meaning to the objective, material world is one of convention. But if the 
production of meaning is an arbitrary process internal to the sign system, according to Derrida, 
there can be no subordination of the written sign to any natural bond of the phonic signifier. 
Interpreting arbitrariness of the sign in terms of unmotivated institutions, he writes, 
Now from the moment that one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken, and a fortiori 
written, as unmotivated institutions, one must exclude any relationship of natural subordination, 
any natural hierarchy among signifiers or orders of signifiers. 
ibid p. 44. 
Taking Saussure's thesis as an important element of his own linguistic philosophy(s), but with this 
radical criticism, Derrida seeks to demonstrate that it is "writing" that is originary and primary 
in the production of meaning, and, in the name of the arbitrariness of the sign, contests the 
Saussurean definition of writing as "image" , in other words, as natural symbol, of 
language. 
Saussure, Derrida and Ricoeur 
The need for clarification between Saussure, Derrida and Ricoeur lies in this critical issue of the 
symbol. Saussure is concerned to separate the sound of the spoken word from writing, making 
the latter dependent upon the former. But, as noted above, it is the sound-image which is the 
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primary source of meaning as it is taken up into the internal process of difference between signs. 
The written sign is, therefore, a material symbol, a visual representation of the image. However, 
the image is a psychological imprint of the sound which is not related to objectivity other than 
by conventional meaning with respect to the arbitrary process of linguistic meaning. In fact, 
Saussure is at pains to make clear that the sound-image is not to be confused with the 
onomatopoeia: 
Onomatopoeia words might be used to show that a choice of signal is not always arbitrary. But 
such words are never organic elements of a linguistic system... The suggestive quality of the 
modem pronunciation of these words is a fortuitous result of phonetic evolution. 
Course in General Linguistics. p. 69 
According to Derrida, there appears to be a confusion in Saussure's understanding of the 
linguistic symbol. For one thing, he points out that the phoneme is unimaginable, no visibility 
can resemble it. In other words, there can be no visible image of sound itself; as pure sound it is 
unimaginable. The critical point here is the way Derrida picks up on the separation that 
Saussure makes between the sound-image and objective sound. He is concerned with the 
appearing of sound as the source of meaning, and not the materiality of objective sound. This 
is what Derrida criticises with respect to the visible image. However, this criticism is not 
intended to favour the fundamental role of the symbol in the creation of meaning, but rather the 
reverse. 
Derrida reveals the failure of Saussure's attempt to ground the affirmation of rational, conceptual 
meaning, that is, to affirm presence in the natural bond of the sound of the spoken word. In so 
doing, he is critical of any attempt to ground presence in the symbolic characteristic of language. 
Consequently, by implication at the least, he is critical of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and 
narrative as the achievement of univocity by means of the poetic mode of language. For 
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example, he refers to the work of the Copenhagen School(v) and quotes Hjelmslev, 
But in any case, as is recognized by modern linguistics, diachronic considerations are irrelevant 
for synchronic descriptions. 
ofGrammatology. p. 58. 
The main concern in this work is to free the literary text from the phonic substance of expression 
to allow the play of form of the purely graphic stratum to be studied in the development of 
glossematics(1o). Derrida acknowledges, what he calls, 'new and fecund researches', but makes 
clear that this is not his primary interest. In order to focus upon 'writing' as the source of 
deferred meaning disclosing, through deconstruction, the absence of presence, he is primarily 
concerned with the freeing of this process from the assumptions of metaphysics, particularly 
with respect to "experience". He writes, 
"Experience" has always designated the relationship with a presence, whether that relationship 
had the form of consciousness or not. At any rate, we must, according to this sort of contortion 
and contention which the discourse is obliged to undergo, exhaust the resources of the concept of 
experience before attaining and in order to attain, by deconstruction, its ultimate foundation. 
ibid p. 60. 
His objection to Saussure's insistence that sound is the basis of meaning, even though this is the 
psychological imprint of the sound-image, is that this is an element of experience which shows 
that there is a metaphysical, transcendental assumption in the institution of the linguistic system. 
That is, there is a pre-critical falling back into a naive objectivism in the origin of the sign 
system; a failure to transcend the scientific perspective and exclude all metaphysical 
speculations(ii). With respect to conceptual unity, which is the question this analysis of sound 
has arisen from, and to which it must return, Derrida shows that Saussure implicitly assumes a 
scientific perspective with the source of this unity derived from the transcendent subject. 
Is Ricoeur also guilty of this a priori assumption in relation to the written text? Is he not 
committed to affirming the objective nature of the text as the basis of scientific analysis and 
explanation? At least, he acknowledges, 
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... 
it is possible to treat the text according to the explanatory rules that linguistics successfully applies 
to simple system of signs which constitute language [langue] 
'What is a text? ' From Text to Action, p. 113 
In one sense, Ricoeur is indeed concerned with the objective nature of the written text; and, in 
contrast to Saussure, this seems to be revealed in his view of the objectivity of sound in relation 
to the poetic mode of language. This was considered in chapter two in the analysis of the iconic 
moment of metaphor. As a development of this, in his theory of narrative, he claims that 'a text 
is any discourse fixed by writing'(12), and 
What is fixed by writing is thus a discourse that could be said, of course, but that is written precisely 
because it is not said. Fixation by writing takes the very place of speech, occurring at the site where 
speech could have emerged. 
ibfd p. 106 
Here, although, he is concerned to separate the written text from living speech which may be 
considered to lie behind the text'I3), the text is nevertheless defined as discourse fixed by writing. 
Therefore, in the appropriation of the text by reading, the sound patterns of speech are 
intrinsically part of the text, and may be understood as that which roots the text in terms of 
objectivity. It is this objectivity, particularly when taken in relation to the configuration of the 
text(r4) which, consequently, may be understood as the basis of a rational, scientific textual 
analysis. But these are not the Saussurean sound patterns of phonic difference as the basis of 
conceptual meaning; they are the sound patterns set up by the iconic moment of metaphor, and 
by the mimetic configuration of emplotment of narrative(is) in the poetic mode of language. 
Ontological Sonority 
There is an objectivity of these sound patterns which means that they are not simply a subjective 
mode of expression, and therefore may be analyzed scientifically to determine their nature with 
respect to the materiality of the structure of the text. But, in a fundamental sense with regard to 
the creation of meaning, they cannot be analyzed in terms of the scientific perspective of the 
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subject-object relationship. These sound patterns are not to be defined in terms of the thingness 
or whatness(i6) of objectivity, whether that be the objects of description included in a poem or 
narrative, or the materiality of sound as the linguistic characteristic of the poetic mode of the 
text. They are sound patterns of an ontological condition. In other words, the sound patterns set 
up by the iconic moment of metaphor, and the mimetic configuration of narrative play a central 
part in the ontological condition of the reader in the imaginative appropriation of the world of 
the text. 
This is not, in Heideggerian terms(17) the ontic condition of objectivity, the traditional ontology 
of the thingness or whatness of the natural world included in the narrative descriptions. It is the 
ontological condition of Dasein, of being-in-the-world which Heidegger attempts painstakingly 
to define in Being and Time, and later in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. What is at 
stake is the being of the pre-objective world upon which subjective and objective being are 
founded. He writes, 
The world is not the sum total of extant entities. It is, quite generally, not extant at all. It is a 
determination of being-in-the-world, a moment in the structure of Dasein's mode of being. The 
world is something Dasein-ish, it is not extant like things but it is da, there-here, like the Dasein, 
the being-da [das Da-sein] which we ourselves are: that is to say, it exists. We call the mode of 
being that we ourselves are, of the Dasein, by the name of existence. This implies as a pure matter 
of terminology that the world is not extant but rather it exists, it has the Dasein's mode of being. 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 166 
However, aware that this interpretation of being may be assumed to be a form of subjective 
idealism, Heidegger, proceeds to explain that the world is something that the subject projects 
outward from within itself, and in the thrownness of this projection other things are uncovered: 
To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world [Heidegger's phrase, sich Welt 
vorher-werfen suggests it is pre-thrown, pre-cast; it is an a priori of the Dasein], and in fact 
in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, with the factical existence of a Dasein, 
extant entities are already uncovered. 
ibid p. 168 
71 
At this point, the purpose of this brief reference to this aspect of Heidegger's work is to provide 
an ontological perspective for Ricoeur's interpretation of the sound patterns of metaphor and 
narrative. Further and more detailed consideration of Heideggerian ontology will be given in 
subsequent chapters. What is at issue here is the way sound may be understood as the critical 
feature of the thrownness of a Dasein's projection of the world. That is, with respect to a written 
text, the ontological condition of a reader's appropriation of a text, which is a hermeneutical 
process, is the projection of the world of the text whereby sound is the prime characteristic of 
the expression of this ontological condition. This involves the pre-thrownness or projection of 
Dasein in the projection or appropriation of the world of the text which sets up a primary 
dialectic between Self and Other, which will be the subject of analysis in chapter five. Here, the 
concern is, what may be called, the 'ontological reverberations' set up by the appropriation of 
the intrinsic sound patterns of the metaphoric iconic moments and mimetic configuration of the 
text. In contrast to Saussure, the sound-image is not simply a psychological imprint but the 
consequence, or expression of an ontological condition, as was seen in chapter two, with respect 
to Ricoeur's understanding of symbol whereby there is an imaginative active participation in the 
event, the Ereignis(18) in Heideggerian terminology. That is, the symbolic image, the iconic 
moment, is the focus of particular intense moments of an active condition of being-in-the-world. 
The sound-patterns of metaphor and narrative, intrinsically related to the image, are the linguistic 
mediation of this ontological condition. 
In Ricoeur's interpretation of this ontological condition there are two critically important 
features. Firstly, in the tenth study of Oneself as Another which poses the question What 
Ontology in View? he attempts to define ontology in terms of action. Secondly, in Time and 
Narrative, he acknowledges the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with respect 
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to the lived body and the power to act(iv), activity is fundamental to Ricoeur's ontological view 
and the phenomenological effects. Taking Aristotle's treatment of the concepts of dunamis and 
energeia in the Metaphysics, he explores the question whether change can be included in the 
notion of being'2o). He concludes that in the relation between power and act Aristotle allows a 
greater freedom in defining these notions so that the one cannot be established independently 
of the other. He writes, 
In this way, being as potentiality (beginning in 9.1-5) allows us to include change within being, 
contrary to Parmenides' prohibition, and, more precisely, to include local motion. Because potentiality 
is a genuine mode of being, change and motion are rightfully beings. 
Oneself as Another, p. 304 
According to Ricoeur, the problem in Western philosophy has been in equating energeia with 
the Latin translation, actualis, denoting 'that in which we exist'(21), with the dominant emphasis 
being placed upon facticity. Does this not, he asks, 'diminish the dimension of energeia and of 
dunamis by virtue of which human acting and suffering are rooted in being? ' It is in the 
maintenance of the dialectic between these two terms that there is the possibility of interpreting 
human action and being together as both act and potentiality. 
Furthermore, this ontological view of human action may be seen to take into account the 
consequential effects in the phenomenology of the flesh, the lived body. It is the lived body 
which incarnates potentiality in the power to act of the 'I can' and action. Ricoeur writes, 
The most radical position in this respect is that by which Merleau-Ponty characterized the insertion 
of the acting subject in the world, namely, the experience of the "I can", the root of the "I am". 
Time and Narrative Vol 3, p. 230 
But there is an ambiguity in the selfs relation to the flesh in that it is both 'mine' and'other'. And 
so, in this sense, the lived body is the original mediator between the course of lived experience 
in the world. It mediates the event in terms of human activity. This mediation engages the 
corporeality of the lived body in which sound is a key element. Merleau-Ponty writes, 
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I am a sonorous being, but I hear my own vibration from within; as Malraux said, I hear myself 
with my throat. In this, as he also has said, I am incomparable; my voice is bound to the mass 
of my own life as is the voice of no one else. 
The Visible and the Invisible, p. 144 
Relating this to the written text in the poetic mode, the appropriation of the objective text, 
fundamentally involves the projection of the world of the text by a Dasein, which means that 
reading, understood as a hermeneutical process based upon understanding, Verstehen, is rooted 
in the thrownness of a sonorous Being(2v). Although reading aloud may therefore be considered 
to be the most appropriate means for poetry and narrative, and indeed this may well be so with 
respect to the former'v, the ontological reverberations set up by the intrinsic sound patterns of 
the written text may be seen to be the effect of the imaginative act of appropriation involving a 
sense of corporeal sonority. 
The imaginative act, which will be more fully considered in chapter seven, is fundamentally the 
key to the thrownness of a Dasein understood as a sonorous being whereby the mediation of 
historical activity is made through corporeal sonority which is intrinsically related to 
phenomenological figuration at the various levels of consciousness. This will be looked at with 
respect to corporeal figuration in the various forms including music and dance, but specifically 
in the particular and peculiar relationship between this imaginative act of figuration and the act 
of cognition, - that is, between understanding and explanation, between metaphor and concept, 
between narrative and rational discourse. The present aim is to analyze the sound patterns of this 
imaginative act as the ontological dynamic of a unifying process manifested in corporeal 
perception founded upon an integral relationship of sound and image. In other words, the sound 
patterns of this ontological centripetal dynamic are intrinsically related to an act of configuration 
in the'grasping'(24) of the text of the narrative. 
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In response to Derrida's criticism regarding the extralinguistic source of unity, the crucial 
question is whether the subject is the foundation of the imaginative act, or whether the text is 
the source of these sound patterns and figuration as the dynamic of unity? This question may be 
posed in terms of unity of self identity. If the affirmation of the unity of rational discourse is 
founded upon the unity of self-identity, and the latter is affirmed through the mediation of the 
poetic mode of discourse which is appropriated by an imaginative act, from whence comes this 
unity of self-identity? Ricoeur's response to this question is in terms of what he calls, narrative 
identity. The source of this unity is the text; which means the text has an extralinguistic 
dimension, but is itself the source of this teleological dynamic of unity referring to the world 
beyond. 
Narrative and Ontological Sonority 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the first part of Ricoeur's theory of 
narrative, particularly as it is rooted in ontological sonority. It is this which may be seen to 
provide the foundation of the development of the theory, and especially narrative identity. At 
this juncture, it is worthwhile referring briefly again to Ricoeur's early development of his 
philosophical anthropology based upon existential concerns, particularly in Fallible Man(25), 
which he calls, the 'Pathetique of "Misery" and Pure Reflection'. According to Ricoeur, the 
pathos of the soul is in the movement from the sensible toward the intelligible, and the 
perplexity, the aporia in this quest for understanding and knowledge. From Kant he borrows the 
threefold structure of "finite", "infinite" and the mediation between the two(26). The progression 
of the soul is caught in the tension between the finite and the infinite, between the inner intuitive 
sense and the outer senses of consciousness. This will be elaborated further in chapter five with 
respect to the relationship of Self and Other. It is mentioned here because in defining the nature 
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of this tension of the soul, Ricoeur introduces the concept of "fault" and fallibility. He writes, 
The idea that man is by nature fragile and liable to err is, according to my working hypothesis, 
an idea wholly accessible to pure reflection; it designates a characteristic of man's being. 
Fallible Man, p. 3. 
Fallibility of human nature is, therefore, ontologically, a key characteristic of a Dasein which 
may be defined in terms of sonority; a sonority which is the teleological dynamic of 
understanding and rational explanation. That is, the dynamic to resolve the condition of 
fallibility in the tension between the finite and the infinite which is manifested 
phenomenologically and linguistically in the creation and re-creation of meaning in a 
hermeneutical movement from suspicion to affirmation. 
Although the concern is to critically consider Ricoeur's view that the text is the source of 
univocity, and therefore the mediation whereby the ontological dynamic of sonorous Being is 
given a teleological dimension in the creation and re-creation of meaning, it is necessary to 
understand that this dynamic roots language in the various ontological and phenomenological 
levels of human experience and activity. For example, in the way, according to Ricoeur, human, 
historical activity is symbolized. In his theory of narrative, set out in Time and Narrative, he 
defines three moments of Mimesis in terms of figuration as the mediation of temporal human 
activity(27). Developing his understanding of the Aristotlean notion of emplotment(28) with 
respect to the figuration of the world of human time and action, Mimesisi is defined as the 
anchorage of narrative composition in the prefiguration of the practical field in its symbolic 
resources. In other words, temporal activity is always mediated by a kaleidoscopic structure of 
cultural symbols. In this respect, Ricoeur acknowledges the work of Ernst Cassirer(29) as close 
to his own: 
... I 
have opted for one close to that of Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 
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inasmuch as, for him, symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience. 
Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, p. 57 
His theory of symbol has already been sketched in chapter two in relation to the iconic moment 
of metaphor. In particular, it was seen that the symbol has a mediating function by means of 
active participation. Cultural symbols may therefore be understood as the structuring of the 
Lebenswelt; the ontological, corporate activity of being-in-the-world, and a patterned sonority 
of temporal human activity. In other words, cultural symbols are the pre-thrownness of a 
corporate, or intersubjective being-in-the-world. Therefore, the act of narrative composition, 
or the act of reading, the appropriation of the world of the narrative, are based upon an 
ontological thrownness or projection of a Dasein which resonates with its pre-thrownness. That 
is, the figuration of the text is rooted in cultural symbolic structuring which sets up a new pattern 
of sonority in the act of composition or reading. 
Temporality 
An important aspect of this symbolic structuring of the pre-thrownness of being-in-the-world is 
a pre-understanding of action; and a fundamental feature of this pre-understanding, according 
to Ricoeur, is the recognition that in action there are temporal structures which call for narration. 
That is, in the symbolic structuring of human activity, which may be discerned in every aspect 
of the Lebenswelt, there is the condition of ontological sonority phenomenologically manifested 
by the power of the imagination in the mediation of patterned sound and figuration. 
Consequently, the vulgar speech of the Lebenswelt is founded upon a pre-understanding of 
action, and in the ordinary way of talking the propensity to relate the stories which happen to 
people, or those which they are caught up in, or simply the story of someone's life. Here, Ricoeur 
acknowledges the question of the notion of a pre-narrative structure of experience, and the 
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'objection about a vicious circle that haunts my whole analysis'(3o) which will be taken up later. 
Ricoeur's analysis of Time and Narrative is a major three volume work in which he extensively 
analyzes particularly the key themes of Augustine, Aristotle, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger(3i). 
However, it is not the aim of this thesis to attempt to deal with all the critical features of this 
work, but simply to take account of those which relate to key issues. In the view that there is a 
recognition in action of temporal structures which call for narration, Ricoeur finds particular 
help from Heidegger's existential analysis in Being and Time. What Ricoeur is concerned to 
demonstrate is that the unity of historical time, the unity of abstract, linear clock time which is 
fundamental to description and discursive writing, is derived from the deep ontological unity of 
temporal being. For this reason, he claims that, although the ontological aim of Being and Time 
is the analysis of Dasein as the "place"(32) where the being is constituted through its capacity of 
posing the question or meaning of Being, it must first have a consistency with a philosophical 
anthropology if it is to achieve the ontological breakthrough that is expected of it(33). 
To this end, it is Heidegger's notion of'within-time-ness' that he finds particularly helpful: 
I find the same powerful breakthrough in the analyses that conclude the study of temporality in the 
second division of Being and Time. These analyses are centred on our relation to time as that 
"within which" we ordinarily act. This structure of within-time-ness (Innerzeitigheit) seems the 
best characterization of the temporality of action for my present analysis. 
ibid p. 63. 
What interests him most is the way Heidegger's analysis of within-time-ness makes Dasein a 
unity whereby a temporal unity is given to action in which "future", "past, " and "present" 
disappear, and time is figured as the exploded unity of the three temporal extases: coming to be, 
having been and making present. (34) This unity which is based upon the dialectic between the 
extases is what Heidegger defines as the constitution of Care (Sorge)(35). Care is an existential 
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concept which is not an abstract measure. For example, a day is a period which corresponds to 
Care and the world in which it is the "time do" something, where "now" signifies "now that... ". 
Within-time-ness is defined by this basic characteristic of Care. But although the description of 
temporality with respect to Care seems to make this dependent upon the description of things 
that are cared about, Heidegger's ontological definition of the constitution of Care attempts to 
prevent it from being determined by this ontic level of objects of care. Care is constituted by the 
dialectic of coming to be, having been and making present, with the primacy given to the future 
over the present. As an existential concept it is directly related to the authenticity of self which 
may be defined in terms of the unity of self identity, or the affirmation of the presence of the self. 
Ontologically, Care is directed toward the temporal horizon of the future; for Heidegger this 
is being-towards-death, although Ricoeur is critical of this view and claims that it is also being- 
towards-hope(36). -is temporal horizon must be looked at in the analysis of the act of the 
imagination in the way being appears, or is uncovered in the form of figuration. Here the concern 
is with a tension set up by Care as the dynamic of "grasping" the horizon by means of a 
configured unity of narrative. 
Existentially, the tension is between authenticity and inauthenticity, between the infinite 
possibilities of the temporal horizon of being and the threat of finitude and its ultimate "weapon" 
of death. In other words, a tension between the affirmation and suspicion of presence-This 
tension, as defined above, is the condition of sonorous Being phenomenologically manifested in 
the sonority of the lived body. Psychologically, it is experienced in the emotions. For example, 
in fear, anxiety, distress as well as hope, peace and contentment being semantically mediated 
through sound patterns. At this level, Care is the emotional propensity to give meaning to these 
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experiences in narrative form. The sound patterns of the narrative, the modulations, cadences, 
stress and pregnant moments of silence resonate with the emotional activity of the lived body 
and the sonority of being in the tension between chaotic discordance and the unified density of 
harmonic concordance. But as one poet wrote, 
Peace does not mean the end of all our striving, 
Joy does not mean the drying of our tears 
The Suffering God G. A. Studdert-Kennedy. 
Care is the basic characteristic of within-time-ness which generates a dialectical tension to affirn. 
self identity in the telling and reading of stories. 
Derridean Critique of Ontological Unity 
However, before continuing with an analysis of Ricoeur's ontological viewpoint in his theory 
of narrative, it is important to notice Derrida's critique of Heidegger's attempt to overcome the 
metaphysical presuppositions of traditional Western philosophy, and particularly the Kantian and 
Husserlian transcendental subject. In his essay, The Ends of Man' in Margins of Philosophy he 
points out that the "formal structure" in which the question of Being is asked in Being and Time 
reveals that in the "we" at the beginning of the text(37) Dasein is founded upon, what Derrida 
calls, phenomenology's principle of principles. That is, the method for the elaboration of the 
question of Being is 
governed by-the principle of presence, and of presence in self-presence, such as it is manifested 
to the being and in the being we are. It is this self-presence, this absolute proximity of the 
(questioning) being to itself, this familiarity with itself of the being ready to understand Being, 
that intervenes in the determination of the factum, and which motivates the choice of exemplary 
being, of the text, the good text for the hermeneutics of the meaning of Being... The proximity to 
itself of the inquirer authorizes the identity of the inquirer and the interrogated. 
Margins of Philosophy p. 125 - 26. 
If the implicit acceptance, or affirmation of self-presence is assumed as the basis for the question 
of Being, it would seem that Heideggerian ontology has not resolved the problem of the source 
of unity whereby presence is affirmed. In pursuing Ricoeur's theory of narrative and narrative 
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identity it may be found that there is no resolution to this problem in terms of the Derridean 
critique, but that one way to resolve the threat of "closure"(38) is the hermeneutical approach 
based upon the dialectic between "suspicion" and "affirmation". 
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Chapter Four 
Prose Rhythm: The Mediation of Sonorous Being 
The attempt to clarify the problem posed at the beginning of chapter one by the question, 'What 
is presence7has led to a consideration of presence in terms of personal identity and an 
ontological grounding as the affirmation of this identity. That is, any attempt to define the 
concept of 'presence' with respect to entities, whether that be a table, a house, the sun, the earth, 
the sky, or whatever may be referred to in an objective sense, is dependent upon an endeavour 
to define this concept in terms of the ontological grounding of personal identity. Such 
ontological grounding and the nature of personal identity, it is proposed, is accessible in and 
through the narrative mode of all texts capable of being written. The analysis of this 
fundamental conclusion was begun in chapter one in relation to the Derridean and Ricoeurean 
critique of Husserl's understanding of the linguistic sign system; and was then taken up in 
chapter three with respect to Ricoeur's view that it is the narrative mode of the text which is the 
key to the mediation of presence. That is, it is through the mediation of the text in the narrative 
mode that presence may be understood in terms of ontologically grounded identity. Ricoeur calls 
this, narrative identity. 
This conclusion has been reached by way of an attempt in the first three chapters to analyze the 
nature of the text drawing upon the work of Ricoeur with particular regard to his theories of 
metaphor and narrative. In doing so, it is claimed that the symbolic characteristic of the poetic 
mode of the text reveals the possible ontological features of the textual figuration as the mode 
of identity appropriated by the reader. This has been examined with respect to the iconic moment 
of metaphor, and, in part, with respect to the configuration of narrative. The development of this 
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theory is the subject of this chapter in relation to narrative identity particularly in relation to the 
ontological issues involved. 
Clarification of Ontological Issues 
As a preparation for this analysis, it is necessary to attempt to give greater clarification to the 
question of presence at the crucial stage that has been reached. The aim of this clarification is 
not a detailed analysis but to identify the fundamental ontological issues which emerge from the 
analysis thus far, to provide a critical perspective upon its subsequent development in this and 
the following chapters. A basic feature of these issues which has been identified is sonorous 
Being. That is, the narrative mode of the text is expressive of its ontological grounding, 
understood as an active condition of being in terms of sonority. In other words, the phonic 
modulations, cadences, and resonance of the text in terms of sentences and discourse in the 
poetic mode are the expressive mediation of sonorous Being. But what is sonorous Being? And 
how does this relate to the question of presence? More particularly, if the question of presence 
is fundamentally a question of the unity of Being and its phenomenological disclosure of identity 
through the mediation of the text, what is the significance of sonority? 
Sonority and Ontological Unity 
In attempting to respond to this question, it will be helpful first to focus attention upon the 
related issue of ontological unity. The concern for sonority has emerged from the role it plays 
with respect to the issue of univocity in metaphor and narrative as the textual mode of mediation 
of the ontological grounding of identity. Sound, it is proposed, is the centripetal dynamic of the 
iconic moment of metaphor, that is, the symbolic unity, and the mimetic configuration of 
narrative whereby univocity is achieved. The question of sonority may therefore be raised in 
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relation to, what has been proposed as, the problematic of ontological unity. If sonority in terms 
of the phonetic characteristics of metaphor and narrative is expressive of an ontologically 
grounded identity, a unity of self, what does sonority manifest about the nature of that 
ontological grounding? If unity is achieved, that is, if identity is affirmed through the textual 
mediation based upon dynamic sonority, what is the ontological nature of this dynamic? If the 
affirmation of identity is mediated through the mode of the text which is ontologically grounded, 
the source of this identity must be ontological. But this, for example, according to Derrida, is 
where the problematic lies. It is, therefore, important to clarify the key issue of sonorous Being 
in relation to the problematic of ontological unity. 
Ontological Unity and Heidegger's Question of Being 
For this purpose, it will be helpful to pursue the criticism made by Derrida, mentioned at the 
conclusion of chapter three, with regard to Heidegger's question of Being, as a way of taking a 
critical view of the issue of identity and ontological unity. Derrida points to the 'we' in the text 
of Sein und Zeit as revealing the unquestioned transcendental subject even in this radical attempt 
to disclose the grounding of Being(/). The 'we' provokes the question, is this an identity based 
upon an assumed unity of Being in Heidegger's ontology? In spite of his careful concern to make 
clear that Dasein is not to be confused with the self-conscious subject(s), he does not appear to 
address the question, who conducts the analysis? Even if the Heideggerian 'we' is avoided by 
using the third person, as this thesis does, it does not escape the question that is implicitly 
directed at the whop). Heidegger's aim is, of course, to uncover the Being upon which the who 
is grounded; that the analysis, as it were, may turn back upon itself to reveal the ground upon 
which it is conducted. But, in so doing, does he adopt an unquestioned perspective which, even 
though it is critically examined in the process of the analysis, may invalidate the disclosure? (4) 
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Is it not necessary to address the prior question, who, or what, is the who who asks the question 
which instigates the analysis? This is prior to the question, 'what is the meaning of Being? which 
Heidegger poses at the beginning of Sein und Zeit because to pose the question is to assume the 
who. How then is it possible to pose any question? This would seem to be the fundamental 
dilemma of any philosophic enterprise(s). 
Heidegger poses the question of Being in initiating his attempt to uncover the ground of the who, 
but is it not the who who poses the question which is revealed by the 'we' in the text? In an 
attempt to uncover not only the identity of the who who makes this attempt, but the ontological 
grounding of this identity, how is it possible to begin such an attempt without assuming an 
unquestioned grounding? Heidegger's attempt is to strip away all phenomenological and 
ontological assumptions, and begin with the question, 'What is the meaning of Being? ', and let 
the question be; that is, let the question, in terms of its internal dynamic, determine and direct the 
process of disclosure of Being. In this process, the who who attempts to lay bare the question 
of Being is disturbed and deconstructed. That is, the who who seemingly appears in self- 
consciousness through the mediation of reflection is radically questioned in the ontological 
disclosurem. 
The Primordial Dialectic of Temporal Being 
The dynamic and form of this questioning arising from the fundamental question of Being is 
existential, and not based upon traditional western logic(7). This is evident in the way Heidegger 
understands that the fundamental question is basic to the experience of life in all circumstances. 
In An introduction to Metaphysics, where he poses the question in the form, 'Why are there 
essents rather than nothing?, acknowledging that many never encounter this question, he writes, 
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And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this 
question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms in moments of 
great despair, when things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes obscured. Perhaps 
it will strike but once like a muffled bell that rings into our life and gradually dies away. It is present 
in moments of rejoicing, when all things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first 
time, as if it might be easier to think they are not than to understand that they are and as they are. The 
question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything 
about us seems hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not - and 
with this question "Why are there essents rather than nothing? " is evoked in a particular form. 
An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1-2 
The question 'is evoked in a particular form. ' It is a form expressive of an existential condition 
arising from the 'hidden power of the question' rooted in a state of Being. From this Heideggerian 
ontological perspective, the condition of Being-in-the-world is disclosed in the existential 
questioning which manifests a hidden power. It is this perspective which will provide the way 
of developing the analysis of textual sonority, and attempting a resolution of the problematic of 
ontological unity. It is in relation to the sonorous dynamic of the narrative mode of the text that 
Derrida's critique will be addressed(8). In other words, the analysis will attempt to show that this 
dynamic sonority, grounded in the hidden power of Being-in-the-world, is the key characteristic 
of narrative identity as the mediation of the who who questions. 
In the development of the analysis, the aim is to demonstrate that the question of Being arising 
from its hidden power is essentially dialectical; and that the questioning is a dialectic between 
suspicion and affirmation of identity, or presence. On the one hand, identity is always under 
suspicion. In the condition of constant temporal flux of Being-in-the-world, there is the 
propensity of endless questioning so that suspicion is never lifted. On the other hand, it is 
proposed that identity is affirmed in the activity of Being-in-the-world through the mediation of 
textual narrative. There is a moment of suspension of, or release from, the questioning, but not 
an escape from suspicion. Existentially, on the one side of the dialectic, suspicion may be 
expressed in terms of distress, insecurity, anxiety, and the threat of insanity; and, on the other, 
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affirmation in terms of hope, belonging, peace and meaningfulness. 
Some consideration of this dialectic has already been given in the analysis of Ricoeur's theory 
of metaphor in chapter two where it is referred to as the primordial dialectic(v). Metaphor is 
defined in terms of the creation of new meaning in response to symbolic activity rooted in 
experience which is the constant expressive activity of intersubjective and corporeal 
intentionality. The iconic moment of metaphor is the figurative characteristic of the linguistic 
mediatory focus of this activity. It is the moment of dynamic intentionality whereby literal 
meaning, held under suspicion in the reflective mode of consciousness, is uprooted in an 
ontological vehemence to affirm new meaning. Borrowing from Roman Jacobson, Ricoeur calls 
this split referenceao) which, with respect to metaphor, is the linguistic term relating to the 
ontological primordial dialectic. The issue becomes a little more complex with regard to 
narrative, as will be seen below. But it is the same dialectic between suspicion, in terms of the 
discursive, descriptive mode of narrative, and affirmation, in terms of the mimetic configuration 
of the plot. Essentially, for both it is a dialectic between reflection and the imagination, a 
dialectic of reflection and understanding(u). 
Sound and the Primordial Dialectic 
What is the ontological condition from which the power of this dialectic originates, and is 
sonority a manifestation of this state? The issue here, from the Heideggerian perspective outlined 
above, is the mediation of the who through the appearance and expression of the primordial 
dialectic in the narrative text. According to the analysis in chapter three, sonority is the 
mediation of the ontological grounding of the text. It is sound, in terms of sentence and 
discourse, which is the expression of temporal Being; that is, the expression of the activity of 
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Being-in-the-world. Furthermore, it is sound that is the inherent characteristic of the 
phenomenological intentional process of figuration and configuration. This analysis is to be 
developed in chaper five in relation to Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity. However, the 
analysis thus far suggests that narrative sonority is the textual mode of the mediation of the 
primordial dialectic. If temporal Being is dialectical, does this sonorous characteristic of 
narrative disclose the ontological nature of the primordial dialectic? In other words, if, as 
proposed above, the ontological primordial dialectic is existentially expressed in distress and 
hope, insecurity and belonging, anxiety and peace, chaos and unity, insanity and meaning, 
suspicion and affirmation, what does textual sonority disclose about the primordial dialectic as 
the grounding of this existential expression? (i2) 
The Dialectic of Self and Other 
The analysis of the narrative mode in chapter three attempted to show that textual sonority, in 
terms of phonic modulations, cadences and resonance, is the dynamic of convergence in terms 
of configuration. The sounds not simply of the words but the expressions of sentences and the 
whole narrative discourse in reading and appropriating the Lebenswelt of the text is the 
intentional dynamic of the plot and its various narrative features. That is, it is the dynamic of 
phenomenological intentionality(13). It is a dynamic of sonority resulting from the dialectic of the 
self who reads and appropriates the world of the narrative, and the identity of that world which 
may be called the other-than-self, that is, the who of the text. It is the dialectic of the self 
reflecting upon the discursive, descriptive mode of the narrative seeking rational explanations, 
and the self imaginatively responding to the world of the narrative, in seeking to appropriate its 
identity in understanding. In other words, this dialectic, manifested in textual sonority may be 
understood as the dialectic of an activity between reflection and understanding, a reverberation 
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of the relationship between self and other grounded in temporal Being. This is stated simply to 
identity a key issue which will be subject to detailed analysis in the next chapter. 
The mark of self-consciousness is the irresistible propensity to affirm its identity through 
reflection which is stained with indelible suspicion. There is no end to questioning. And yet, 
affirmation is paradoxically only possible where the interrogation is relinquished in letting go 
self-consciousness. That is, when self is absorbed in the narrative identity, the other, in the who 
of the text. But is not affirmation essentially an act of self-consciousness? Furthermore, is it not 
intrinsically the achievement of reflection? If it were not, how would it be possible to define 
affirmation? What would affirmation mean? Herein lies the paradox which must be given close 
and careful examination. The crucial and central issue that is being identified here is that textual 
sonority is the active manifestation of the dynamic set up in the appropriation of the narrative 
in the dialectic between the self and the other-than-self, or the who of the text. It is the moments 
of intensity in which the dialectic of reflection and the absorption of self in the other is 
manifested in sonority rooted in the reverberations of the phenomenological lived body and 
ontologically grounded in temporal Being(i4). 
In the act of reading, there is the process of reflection in which the reader takes up the mode of 
self-consciousness(1s) which is the distancing of self and object, of subjectivity and objectivity, 
as the space of abstraction whereby logical interrogation is made possible. The reader, as it were, 
stands back from the text consciously aware of the relationship of self with the text. Why does 
the reader in this mode interrogate the text? What is the ground of reflection? The existential 
response to this question, proposed above, is the dialectic of distress and hope, anxiety and 
peace, insecurity and belonging, chaos and unity, insanity and meaning, suspicion and 
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affirmation. The hidden power of reflective questioning is manifested in the dialectic between 
the reflective process of rational explanation which can never be closed, and the imaginative act 
of understanding(i6). The appearance of temporal Being is, on the one hand, marked by the 
propensity of distress, anxiety, insecurity, chaos, insanity and suspicion through its hidden power 
manifested in the interrogation of the reflection of self. Reflection is grounded in the 
ontologically interrogative hidden power that is released by the appearance of temporal Being. 
In other words, appearance is the distancing of self in relation to objectivity. The appearance of 
Being releases the hidden power of interrogation creating this distancing so that the affirmation 
of appearance may be possiblea7. But authentic interrogation cannot be closed, therefore 
appearance is always subject to suspicion. The inevitable consequence of authentic interrogation 
is the questioning of the self who questions; and even the explicit or implicit interrogation of 
Dasein. Suspicion can only be lifted if the who who questions is beyond questioning, or if 
questioning is relinquished at the moment of affirmation. The moment when the self is lost in the 
who of the text. 
Textually, it is the patterned, or rhythmic sonority precipitated in the appropriation of the 
narrative that effects an intentional convergence in an intensity of resonance rooted in sonorous 
Being. This rhythmic sonority is essentially the key characteristic of the poetic mode in contrast 
to the predominantly rational, discursive mode. In particular, it is the metaphoric and narrative 
features of this mode, analyzed in detail later in this chapter, which effect the levels of intensity. 
Such an intensity of resonance, set up by an appropriation of the text, is an oscillation within the 
dynamic of the primordial dialectic between self and other, between suspicion and affirmation. 
It is the moment when self is lost in the who of the text, but 'in the blink of an eye' (Augenblick) 
there is distance and interrogation. Following the moment, the stain of suspicion retains an 
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indelible resonance of hope(i8). 
The appearance of temporal Being is mediated in the act of configuration made possible by the 
rhythmic sonority of the text. It is held in the moment of the act in a teleological, dialectical 
intensity of suspicion and affirmation. For this reason, it may be called sonorous Being. Sound 
is the essential characteristic of its presence. However, sound is integrally related to all sensible 
activity of the lived body which is affected by the reverberations of temporal Being in the 
creative process of its appearance in the historical activity of human beings. This is why all 
forms of artistic activity are effective in the appearance of Being, particularly in the loss, or 
absorption of self-consciousness in the particular medium; but it is the textual mediation of the 
poetic mode which may uniquely affirm the appearance. Again, this requires closer examination 
of the role of the imagination in relation to cognition which will be the subject of chapter seven. 
Four Ontological Issues 
From the above attempt to clarify the ontological issues of sonorous being as the basis for 
developing the analysis, there arise four key issues: Firstly, the issue of ontological grounding 
of unity in terms of the affirmation of rational identity(iv) mediated through the narrative mode 
of the text, particularly, to use Ricoeur's notion, narrative identity, of which sound is a key 
characteristic. Secondly, with respect to narrative identity, from the Heideggerian perspective of 
the hidden power of the question of Being, the source of this ontological power is mediated 
through the 'other', or who of the narrative, that is, narrative identity, with sound playing a 
critical role in this mediation. Thirdly, this hidden power, revealed in the existential expressions 
of Being-in-the-world, is a primordial dialectic whereby Being appears in the affirmation of its 
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presence; a dialectic manifested in the relationship between narrative identity and rational 
identity, between understanding and reflection in terms of explanation; a dialectic mediated 
through mimetic configuration of narrative as a temporal perspective and discursive, rational 
descriptions. Fourthly, the essential nature of this primordial dialectic is the relationship 
between the rational identity of the self-conscious reader and narrative identity, the 'other' of the 
text; that is, between Self and Other. The first two issues will be examined below, the third will 
be the subject of the next chapter, and the fourth will be examined in chapter six. 
First Issue: Textual Sonority and Ontological Unity 
The first issue of sonority in relation to the affirmation of identity is the issue of unity 
ontologically grounded and mediated in the text. Therefore, as was made clear with respect to 
metaphor, the issue relating to phonetics is not conceptual unity but the unity of perspective of 
Being-in-the-world. It is not, in the Saussurean sense, conceptual unity as the result of phonetic 
difference, but sound as the textual dynamic that, in the appropriation of text by the reader, 
achieves a convergence in the iconic moment of the metaphor which becomes the perspective, 
the viewpoint of the reader in relation to the figurative image of the metaphor. It is this 
ontological perspective which creates the 'space' for the dynamic interaction of the literal 
semantic fields whereby new meaning is achieved resulting, according to Ricoeur's interactive 
theory of metaphor, in a new concept(2o). What must now be considered, particularly with respect 
to narrative identity, is this process in the mimetic configuration of narrative whereby the 
ontological perspective creates the 'space' for logical, rational discourse. 
With regard to sound, as an intrinsic characteristic of language, the issue is the role played by 
sound in the linguistic mediation of ontologically grounded identity. Although it is the givenness 
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of the text in terms of the linguistic sign system that is basic to the structuring of consciousness, 
sound is fundamental in the process of appropriation of the text and the affirmation of identity. 
To read a text is to pronounce, to utter, to articulate audibly or silently(2i). In contrast to Derrida, 
the aim in this analysis is to show that although the linguistic sign system of the text is primary, 
the role of sound in the act of reading is key to the affirmation of narrative identity and, 
consequently, conceptual unity. 
The statement that reading involves the audible or silent pronouncement of words may appear 
to ignore that it is the visual, imaginative, cognitive faculties which seem to predominate, 
prompted by the semantic structuring of cognition and consciousness, and drawing upon the 
memory of past experience and particular meanings where the conscious act of interpretation 
is called for. It may be argued that sound indeed plays a fundamental part in the Saussurean 
sense of difference, but as a linguistic structuring that, for the most part, is a kind of background 
which does not impinge upon the conscious act of reading. That is, the reader does not need, 
audibly or silently, to pronounce the words in order to appropriate the text in terms of 
interpretation and understanding. This may seem to be particularly the case with rational, 
discursive texts of an abstract nature. But even if this view were considered to be too extreme, 
and it be acknowledged that all reading involves a level of pronouncement, that sound is an 
intrinsic part of reading, it may still be claimed that it is secondary in the act of appropriation(22). 
What this analysis aims to demonstrate is that the poetic mode of the text, which includes poetry 
and narrative discourse, reveals that sound is fundamental in the appropriation of the text based 
upon the hermeneutical understanding that appropriation is defined in terms of inhabiting the 
world, the Lebenswelt of the text. Furthermore, that all rational, discursive texts are grounded in 
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a Lebenswelt mediated through narrative identity. To this end, it is first necessary to look more 
closely at the part played by sound in relation to the text. 
Prose Rhythm 
In their work on Mimesis(23), Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf examine the way the role of 
the voice was dominant in ancient Greek society and culture, and the continuing influence of this 
view since that time, in particular referring to the anthropological investigation of Jesper Svenbro 
in his Phraseikleia(24). They write, 
In terms of the early Greek attitude toward writing, which regards what is written but not spoken, 
the unread text, as incomplete, the structural linking of writing with the act of reading is constitutive 
for the text: the reading is part of the text. "... From this point of view, the text requires the reader's 
temporal investment; reading is not a private process, but belongs to the reader and to the text. "If he 
lends his voice to these mute signs, the text appropriates it: his voice becomes the voice of the written 
text. "... 
According to Svenbro, the innovation of silent reading can be traced back to the experience of the 
theatre in Greece of the fifth century B. C. "Extensive reading seems... to have been the outcome of a 
qualitative innovation. "... The mute receptive attitude of the spectator is a result of the appellate character 
of the theatrical performance, which no longer summons one to read aloud but charms the spectators into 
focusing their concentration exclusively on watching and listening... 
Thus, in the experience of watching in a theater, does the play become a text that one can read in its 
public performance. Inversely, written characters, after silent reading has become widespread, appear 
in a fashion that is comparable to the play: they are passively read and internally "performed. " The 
text, now becomes autonomous, no longer needs to be read aloud; it "vocalizes" itself. 
Mimesis, p. 201 - 202 
It is this understanding of the voice, of sound in the act of reading, that needs careful 
examination with respect to the appropriation, the habitation of the Lebenswelt of the text 
through the 'grasping' of the mimetic configuration of the plot. 
Northrop Frye identifies an important characteristic of the relationship of sound to the text in 
what he calls, prose rhythm(zs). In his Anatomy of Criticism, he proposes that there is a 
fundamental relationship between event and idea, between verbal imitations of actions and 
thought with respect to literature; in Aristotelean terms, between ethos and dianoia(26). 
According to Frye, this is the first aspect of the diagrammatic framework that has been used in 
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poetics since the time of Aristotle. He writes, 
The world of social action and event, the world of time and process, has a particularly close association 
with the ear. The ear listens, and the ear translates what it hears into practical conduct. 
Anatomy of Criticism, p. 243 
With respect to poetry, drawing upon the list of elements of poetry in Aristotle's Poetics(27), he 
proceeds to examine the second or rhetorical aspect of literature: 
Considered as a verbal structure, literature presents a lexis which combines two other elements: 
melos, an element analogous to or otherwise connected with music, and opsis, which has a similar 
connection with the plastic arts. The word lexis itself may be translated "diction" when we are 
thinking of it as a narrative sequence of sounds caught by the ear, and as "imagery" when we are 
thinking of it as forming a simultaneous pattern of meaning apprehended in an act of mental 
"vision". 
ibid p. 244 
The relationship of sound to image will be taken up later in the analysis when developing the 
role of the imagination. The reason for referring to Frye's work is to take his significant 
contribution in an attempt to understand the role of sound in the act of reading as a way into a 
more detailed analysis. 
Frye's notion of prose rhythm is a development of poetic rhythm. He writes, 
In every poem we can hear at least two distinct rhythms. One is the recurring rhythm, which we 
have shown to be a complex of accent, metre, and sound-pattern. The other is the semantic rhythm 
of sense, or what is usually felt to be the prose rhythm... We have verse epos when the recurrent 
rhythm is primary or organizing one, and prose when the semantic rhythm is primary. 
ibid p. 263 
Prose rhythm in contrast to the recurring rhythm of poetry, is a transparent medium. It is at its 
best 'when it is the least obtrusive and presents its subject-matter like plate glass in a shop 
window. ' As examples of this, Frye sites the long sentences of the later novels of Henry James, 
and the working backwards and forwards of Joseph Conrad's writing as the way the melos, the 
prose rhythm is designed to shift the attention from listening to looking at the central situation 
through a visual metaphor. The process is reversible in, for example, according to Frye, the 
dislocations of the narrative in Tristram Shandy which have the effect of taking the attention 
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away from looking at the external situation to listening to the process of its coming into being 
in the author's mind. 
Habitation of the narrative is when the conscious perception of the reader is structured by the 
ontological perspective of the world of the narrative. The reader imaginatively inhabits that 
world. It is a unified perspective because it is a world; one world which gives unity to an 
experience of time and space(28). The analysis of this experience will be developed in greater 
detail with regard to mimetic configuration in the next chapter. It is the crucial role of sound in 
this act of habitation, in terms of Frye's notion of prose rhythm, that provides the grounding of 
this act as the essential mediation of activity in this process of habitation. According to Frye, 
sound is the melos, the element of diction which translates practical conduct(29). The world of the 
narrative is a state of activity, and to inhabit that world is actively to appropriate its 
ontological unified perspective. This includes particular activity in terms of characters and the 
unfolding plot; incidents, events and behaviour. Through habitation, the reader is there in the 
world alongside or inside the characters, actively engaging with their world. Although subsidiary 
to the plot (mythos), perhaps more fundamentally it is the ethos in terms of atmosphere, mood, 
tone and tenor of the world which is the active grounding of the habitation(3o). For it is this ethos 
which is the active disturbance of the reader's consciousness existentially expressed in terms of 
emotional states of being. For example, the ethos of the first chapter of Thomas Hardy's Return 
of the Native in the powerful description of Egdon Heath which remains as the perspective of 
the whole novel. Or the description of Lincoln Cathedral in chapter seven of D. H. Lawrence's The 
Rainbow. It is extremely difficult to separate the effect of the prose rhythm from the figurative 
visual images, and perhaps impossible since it may be shown that the former, as will be 
attempted below, is a critical integral influence upon the latter. Furthermore, as Frye claims, 
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prose rhythm is most effective when it is the least obtrusive. 
Among the characteristics of prose rhythm(31) there are, for example, in Hardy's description of 
Egdon Heath, the intensity of a rhythm mediated by the long vowels sounds, and the stress that 
has a propensity of a downwards tonal direction. For example, 
The face of the heath by its mere complexion added half an hour to the evening; it could in like manner 
retard the dawn, sadden the moon, anticipate the frowning of storms scarcely generated, and intensify 
the opacity of a moonless midnight to a cause of shaking and dread. 
Return of the Native, p. 33 
In contrast, Lawrence's description stresses a tonal uplift, combining the effect of the rounded 
vowel with the short vowel to mediate a sense of inhabiting Will Brangwen's active state of 
being as he enters the cathedral: 
Here the stone leapt up from the plain of earth, leapt up in a manifold, clustered desire each time, up, 
away from the horizontal earth, through twilight and dusk the whole range of desire, through the 
swerving, the declination, ah, to the ecstasy, the touch, to the meeting and the consummation, the 
meeting, the clasp, the close embrace, the neutrality, the perfect, swooning, consummation, the 
timeless ecstasy. There his soul remained, at the apex of the arch, clinched in the timeless ecstasy, 
consummated. 
The Rainbow, p. 202 
Other characteristics of prose rhythm include the descriptive interactions in terms of a resonance 
that mediates an actual effect in for example Joseph Conrad's The Heart of Darkness. In his 
critical study of this novel in The Great Tradition(32), F. R. Leavis attempts to demonstrate the way 
the same vocabulary that Conrad uses to convey the mysteriousness of the Congo, also applied 
to the evocation of human profundities and spiritual horrors. In particular, with respect to the 
passage when Marlow is startled by being suddenly confronted with shrunken heads on stakes, 
symbolic of the invasion of the wilderness in the darkness of Kurtz's heart. Leavis writes, 
The essential vibration emanates from the interaction of the particular incidents, actions, and 
perceptions that are evoked with such charged concreteness. The legitimate kind of comment, 
that which seems the inevitable immediate resonance of the recorded event, is represented 
here: 
The Great Tradition, p. 205. 
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The passage he then quotes begins, 
And then I made a brusque movement, and one of the remaining posts of that vanished fence leaped 
into the field of my glass... (47) 
This, of course, is an example of a novel which is dominated by the mood and oppressive 
atmosphere of the natural and psychological or spiritual darkness. For this reason, it may be 
thought that the writer employs sound in terms of prose rhythm in ways that would be 
inappropriate with other types of novels. 
The elements of prose rhythm, however, include a range of linguistic characteristics each having 
the particular effects dependent upon the way in which they are employed in the text. Even when 
a novel is translated from one language to another, depending upon the ability of the translator 
to be able to critically listen in both languages, the prose rhythm may, for example, through the 
structure of sentences and discourse, create the same relevant effects in terms of inhabiting the 
Lebenswelt of the narrative(33). The continual diversions and meandering discourse of Marcel 
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu, with its convoluted sentences and multiple subordinate 
clauses, has the effect of a rhythm insistently prompting the reader to inhabit the world of the 
hero and the narrator in which the exploration and search in time and memory along Swann's 
Way and The Guermantes Way evokes their resolution in'Time Regained'. It is a prose rhythm 
that grounds what Gilles Deleuze calls, an 'apprenticeship to signs'(34) in an ontological resonance 
which, for example, roots the visual image of the 'madeleine cake' in the particular activity of 
hero's childhood, and the way the constant presence of that activity resonates and decisively 
influences his search in time and memory(35). 
Prose rhythm is what the reader hears in a way similar to the background noises of human 
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activity in the habitation of a social world. It is this background which is the ontological setting 
for particular conscious activity. It is in relation to this background that the experiences of 
distress and hope, insecurity and belonging, anxiety and peace are expressed. In reading, there 
is a listening that has a focus of attention effected by the acoustical background, which may be 
compared to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the configuration of perception(36). This is set up 
in the act of appropriation in the way that sound patterns of the prose rhythm are animated 
through the visual element of appropriation: the sight of the textual signs initiates the process 
of listening creating the acoustical background of the reader's consciousness. That is, the reader's 
visual and acoustical response to the text animates the prose rhythm which is the manifestation 
of his sonorous condition of being in the process of inhabiting the Lebenswelt of the narrative; 
an active condition of being that is phenomenologically expressed in the acoustical resonance 
affecting the whole of the 'lived' body. 
Prose Rhythm as Phonic Texture 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of perception provides a valuable way of 
understanding this habitation. For Merleau-Ponty the body is not simply an objective organism 
among others in the world. It is the phenomenological medium of consciousness whereby the 
self is incarnated in a Lebenswelt(37). The appearance of the Lebenswelt is a process of habitation 
whereby the body is the medium of external perception. He writes, 
The thing, and the world, are given to me along with the parts of my body, not by any'natural 
geometry, but in living connection, or rather identical, with that existing between the parts of 
my body itself. 
Phenomenology of Perception., p. 205 
For example, when the right hand grasps the left hand, the latter is perceived objectively through 
the medium of touch of the former which may in'the blink of an eye' be reversed. In Merleau- 
Ponty's view, this is a basic dialectic of the interdependence of subjectivity and objectivity within 
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the consciousness of the habitation of the 'lived' body(38). 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is his understanding of habitation with respect to language 
which is particularly important. To inhabit the world is to inhabit language understood as an 
expressive texture of phonetic gesture whereby the phenomenal body is aroused by the voice(39). 
He writes, 
Speech always comes into play against a background of speech; it is always only a fold in the 
immense fabric of language. To understand it, we do not have to consult some inner lexicon 
which gives us pure thoughts covered up by words or forms we are perceiving; we only have 
to lend ourselves to its life, to its movement of differentiation and articulation, and to its 
eloquent gestures. 
Signs, p. 42 
This does not take account of prose rhythm, and approaches the fabric of language in terms of 
living speech rather than the written text. It is, however, Merleau-Ponty's understanding of 
phonetic gesture that may provide the way of understanding the phenomenological and 
ontological role of phonicity in the appropriation of the text by the reader. He writes, 
The phonetic 'gesture' brings about, both for the speaking subject and for his hearers, a certain 
structural co-ordination of experience, exactly as a pattern of my bodily behaviour endows the 
objects around me with a certain significance both for me and for others. The meaning of the 
gesture is not contained in it like some physical or physiological phenomenon. The meaning of 
the word is not contained in the sound. But the human body is defined in terms of its property of 
appropriating, in an indefinite series of acts, significant cores which transcend and transfigure its 
natural powers. The act of transcendence is first encountered in the acquisition of a pattern of 
behaviour, then in the mute communication of gesture: it is the same power that the body opens 
itself to some new kind of conduct and makes it understood to external witnesses. 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 193 
As mentioned above, this is an understanding of the fabric of language as a phonetic system as 
the structure of habitation through which the phonetic gesture is made. The problem with this 
is that sound in itself cannot be the linguistic givenness of the sign system. Although the notion 
of duration is important with respect to prose rhythm and the problem of temporality which will 
be given closer consideration in relation to mimetic configuration, sound is derivative of the 
givenness of the text in terms of the written sign system, or trace. That is, the historical 
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continuity of the givenness of the trace(ao). 
Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the phonetic characteristic of language is, nevertheless, valuable in 
understanding the role of prose rhythm. Reading involves listening to the phonetic texture that 
is animated by the imaginative activity of the Lebenswelt of the narrative mediated through the 
written sign system. Appropriation of the narrative in terms of habitation involves a resonance 
of prose rhythm arising from a change in state of being; a resonance which permeates the active 
'lived' body. It is this resonance which is imaginatively translated into the background activity 
of the inhabited Lebenswelt; and which makes possible the phonetic gesture of those particular 
activities which are the focus of attention. To inhabit a text is to appropriate a phonetic texture, 
a prose rhythm which is the manifestation of a sonorous state of being. It is a state of being 
arising from a hidden ontological power effected by the primordial dialectic of self and other in 
the process of reading. As already mentioned, this dialectic will be the subject of chapter six. 
Second Ontological Issue: Sonority and Narrative Identity. 
Corporeal Intentionality 
The concern here is to develop the analysis of prose rhythm as the phenomenological sonorous 
manifestation, mediated through the 'lived' body, of the hidden ontological power. In particular, 
to consider the way this sonorous texture is the vehicle for the process of mimetic configuration 
of the world of the text. This is a development of the first ontological issue of the grounding of 
affirmation with respect to narrative and narrative identity. That is, the development of the 
notion of prose rhythm as the critical linguistic characteristic of the mediation of this grounding 
in relation to narrative and narrative identity; and is directly related to the resonance of the'lived' 
body with respect to, what Merleau-Ponty calls, corporeal intentionality. This notion is critical 
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to the analysis of the second ontological issue of the mediation of the hidden ontological power 
through narrative identity which gives rise to corporeal intentionality as the dynamic grounding 
of mimetic configuration resulting in the unity and affirmation of that identity. 
Reading a narrative is to corporeally inhabit its Lebenswelt in which there is a bodily resonance 
set up by appropriation of the prose rhythm of the text. It is this resonance that is the medium 
of the reader's condition of being in the process of habitation effecting an ontological hidden 
power expressed through corporeal resonance in terms of dynamic convergence(41). Following 
Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the 'lived' body in phenomenological terms, that is, corporeal 
levels of consciousness(42), this dynamic convergence is called corporeal intentionality. Relating 
this notion to the act of reading, the 'lived' body is engaged in the reader's grasp of the narrative. 
Corporeal intentionality is fundamental to understanding the meaning of the text, and, therefore, 
as will be demonstrated below, of appropriating narrative identity. 
'Operative' and 'Particular' Intentionality 
Prose Rhythm is, however, only one feature of corporeal intentionality. It is the background to 
the reader's habitation of the text. It is the sound which the reader may be relatively unaware of 
as he follows the narrative plot. His attention is given to the particular action which is the focus 
of intentional convergence. But, according to Merleau-Ponty, this focus, the grasping of the 
meaning of the particular action is made possible by the background which he calls operative' 
intentionality in contrast to particular intentionality(43). It is the dialectical relationship of these 
two which is corporeal intentionality. In Phenomenology of Perception, he defines perception 
as'the background against which all acts and interpretations stand out'. Perception is the way the 
world is inhabited in terms of consciousness. It is the totality of conscious experience including 
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all that is received through the senses. Developing this view, he draws upon Gestalt theory of 
psychology. He writes, 
The Gestalt psychologists have shown... the world presents itself at each instance as a meaningful 
totality in which moments possess their sense as they function in the whole spectacle to which 
they contribute. 
Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Reason,. Thomas Langan, p. 29 
For example, attention given to a book lying on a table is to be conscious of its being a book in 
terms of its shape, colour, size, title, etc. But for this conscious attention, when a particular 
object appears as an object in consciousness, there must be a background - the room which is 
not directly experienced, at the moment of attention on the particular object, as, for example, 
individual colours, shapes, lines, etc., but is nevertheless part of consciousness. The attentive act, 
particular intentionality , is made possible by operative intentionality which structures the 
whole. The whole of conscious awareness which, other than the particular focus of attention, 
makes this attentive focus possible; it is operative in the sense that the particular object and 
activity dynamically emerge from this background. The book is not an isolated object; it lies on 
the table which may be viewed from many different perspectives in the room where the table is. 
Each perspective is contextual and determines the appearance of the book. Each perspective is 
operative with respect to an intentionality that makes the particular intentionality possible. 
With respect to the written text and reading, corporeal intentionality defined as the dialectical 
relationship between particular and operative intentionalities, will be analyzed below, and in 
greater detail in chapters six and seven, in terms of mimetic configuration and the creative 
imagination But first the concern is to show that sound, particularly its fundamental relationship 
to temporal activity in the reader's habitation of the Lebenswelt of the narrative, is critical to 
understanding the dialectic between particular and operative intentionalities. The aim is to show 
how prose rhythm is operative, with respect to the reader's habitation of the narrative, as a 
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medium of temporal activity. In other words, prose rhythm is the medium whereby the reader 
experiences, what Ricoeur calls, the 'human' time(44) of the narrative. It is this experience, 
mediated through prose rhythm and corporeal resonance, that makes it possible for the reader 
to appropriate, through his attentive reading, the particular action mediated through the phonic 
texture of particular words and sentences. 
Particular Intentionality and Metaphoric Phonicity 
The most effective parts of the texts, with regard to the reader's grasp of narrative identity 
through particular intentionality, is the phonicity of the metaphoric features of the narrative. 
Sound here grounds the reader's attention in particular concrete actions since the phonicity of 
the iconic moment of metaphor is dominant in contrast to the conceptual syntax of the 
descriptive passages(45). It is therefore a more direct mediation of particular actions. Like the beat 
of a drum which is immediately translated into bodily movement, so the phonicity of the iconic 
moment of metaphor is translated into corporeal resonance effecting habitation of the particular 
actions whereby the reader is conscious of these actions in a concrete mode. This must be 
examined more closely especially in the way this particular intentionality is made possible by 
the temporal structuring of the reader's consciousness through the mediation of the background 
of prose rhythm. 
Prose Rhythm and Metaphoric Sonority of 'The Cathedral' in The Rainbow by 
D. H. Lawrence 
For this purpose, it may be helpful to take the example of reading Will and Anna Brangwen's 
experience of Lincoln Cathedral 
in D. H. Lawrence's The Rainbow. This selected chapter should 
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not of course be separated from the whole novel, and a more detailed criticism would take 
account of this. The focus upon the relationship of Will and Anna in their experience of the 
Cathedral must be understood with regard to the theme of the psychological exploration of 
marriage across three generations in which the Lebenswelt of the novel has many facets(46). 
Nevertheless, the appropriation of each facet may be examined in terms of habitation and the 
particular and operative aspects of corporeal intentionality. Particular intentionality relates to 
the reader's focus of attention with respect to the cathedral as experienced by Will and Anna. 
This focus is not static but moves through the chapter with the reader at times alongside them, 
and at critical moments within one or the other. Habitation means that the reader appropriates 
a focus of attention through the description of the experience of the particular characters. For 
example, the reader appropriates the sight of the cathedral in the distance through Will's 
experience: 
When he saw the cathedral in the distance, dark blue lifted watchful in the sky, his heart leapt. 
It was the sign in heaven, it was the Spirit hovering like a dove, like an eagle over the earth. He 
turned his glowing, ecstatic face to her, his mouth opened with a strange, ecstatic grin. 
The Rainbow, p. 200 
Because the particular focus is part of the unfolding narrative, it may include different levels of 
the reader's critical awareness. Will and Anna's experience of the cathedral is a critical moment 
in the psychological exploration of the relationship, and their failure, from the perspective of the 
novel, to achieve individual fulfilment. For Will, who seeks fulfilment in his security and 
comfort in Anna and his work, and is afraid of the unknown, the cathedral is the symbol of 
everything which he holds valuable in life(47), but for Anna 
it was the ultimate confine ... The altar was barren, its lights gone out. God burned no more in 
that bush. It was dead matter lying there. She claimed the right to freedom above her, higher 
than the roof. 
ibid p203 
These narrative interpretations are part of the novel's exploration that the reader appropriates in 
the imaginative act of inhabiting its Lebenswelt which will be dialectically related to the reader's 
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self identity in everyday life. Inhabiting the experience of Will and Anna in which there are 
critical levels of awareness appropriated from the narrative creates a critical tension in the 
dialectic between the narrative and the reader's self identity. In other words, the narrative may 
cause the reader to reflect upon principles, values and meanings which have been accepted as 
the basis for his or her self identity(48). This important issue will be the subject of the next 
chapter. The concern here is with the reader's focus of attention in the process of habitation. 
Although the focus of attention is held by the descriptions of Will and Anna's experience of the 
cathedral, it is given particular intensity in terms of an imaginative concreteness of their 
experience in the metaphoric characteristic of these descriptions. For example, 
Then he pushed open the door, and the great, pillared gloom was before him, in which his soul 
shuddered and rose from her nest. His soul leapt, soared up into the great church. His body stood 
still, absorbed by the height. His soul leapt up into the gloom, into possession, it reeled, it swooned 
with a great escape, it quivered in the womb, in the hush and gloom of fecundity, like seed of 
procreation in ecstacy. 
ibid p. 201 
The metaphors which express Will's experience, with respect to the condition of his soul as he 
enters the building, give an imaginative concreteness to the appropriation of that experience. 
That is, the reader's experience of the cathedral through an imaginative appropriation of the 
narrative description is not that of a passive observer but as one who inhabits the condition of 
Will's soul. 'Shuddered', 'leapt', 'soared', 'reeled', 'swooned', 'quivered' give to the imaginative 
focus of attention a concrete experience of the cathedral. 
The habitation of the reader is intensified. His condition of Being is affected by an ontological 
vehemence in the imaginative appropriation of the metaphorical images giving rise to a 
hidden 
power expressed in the dynamic of a phenomenological convergence, an intentionality with 
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respect to the focus of attention. Closer attention to this process of habitation in terms of mimetic 
configuration and narrative identity is given in the next chapter drawing particularly upon 
Ricoeur's theories. The concern at this point is the crucial significance of sound in this process, 
and Merleau-Ponty's notion of corporeal intentionality. 
Appropriation of the phonicity of the metaphoric iconic moment was discussed in chapter two 
in relation to the symbolic image which is fused with the sound. Sound and image are dominant 
in metaphor because it is the intuitive perception of the similarity of dissimilars(49). The 
imaginative grasp is immediate, not mediated through cognition but structuring conscious 
appearance through the mediation of linguistic acoustical modulations which are the objective 
materiality of the linguistic image. 'His soul leapt, soared up into the great church'. The reader's 
attention is given to the imaginative perception of the interior of the cathedral through the 
particular experience of Will Brangwen expressed in the metaphors, 'leapt' and 'soared'. The 
sound of these metaphors is the expression of the concrete experience which shapes the image 
of the building at the particular moment of the reader's attention. The sound is immediate and 
draws upon the phonic texture of the cultural linguistic structure of the reader's Lebenswelt 
grounded in the symbolic structuring of cultural human activity(so). The phonicity of the 
metaphors 'leapt' and 'soared' have cultural associations with a sense of being lifted up, of 
overcoming, of expansiveness, of transcending the everyday affairs of life. Therefore, the sight 
of the interior of the cathedral through Will's particular experience is an image of awe, wonder 
and spiritual inspiration. 
In contrast, the reader's attention is taken through the experience of Anna by means of metaphors 
which resonate with a different sound, and the cathedral is changed in the concrete perception 
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of the reader: 
The altar was barren, its lights gone out. God burned no more in that bush. She claimed the right 
to freedom above her, higher than the roof. She had always a sense of being caved in. 
ibid p. 203 
In the continuing counterpointing of these contrasting experiences, the reader's focus of attention 
is led by the metaphorical structuring of the narrative to grasp the concrete image of the chapter's 
ultimate moment of activity, and to understand how their shared experience of the cathedral had 
affected their relationship: 
As he sat sometimes very still, with a bright, vacant face, Anna could see the suffering among the 
brightness. He was aware of some limit of himself, of something unformed in his very being, of 
some buds which were not ripe in him, some folded centres of darkness which would never develop 
and unfold whilst he was alive in the body. He was unready for fulfilment. Something undeveloped 
in him limited him, there was a darkness in him which he could not unfold, which would never 
unfold in him. 
ibid p. 210 
Although the passage is saturated with metaphor, 'bright, vacant face', 'suffering among the 
brightness' and 'folded centres of darkness' are the most vivid and resonate with a greater 
intensity. The dissonance between'bright' and 'vacant', and 'suffering' and 'brightness' resonates 
with a sense of stifled vitality; and 'folded... darkness' is an experience of the disturbance of 
repressed power. The passage reveals the way the focus of attention of particular intentionality, 
of Will sitting in a chair at the end of the day, is at the centre of a convergence of concentric 
circles of phonicity. Because the other metaphors are less vivid, less surprising, more 
conventional, the sounds have a tendency to 'fall away' into the background of the phonicity of 
the conceptual descriptive syntax as part of the prose rhythm. For example, 'some buds which 
were not ripe in him' is clearly a metaphor, but has a conventional familiarity which makes it 
sound more integrally part of the description, 
He was aware of some limit of himself, of something unformed in his very being, of some 
buds which were not ripe in him... 
ibid p. 210 
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Prose Rhythm and Temporal Experience 
To appropriate the particular actions of the passage, to inhabit the experience of Will and Anna 
and grasp the meaning of that experience, the reader must inhabit the time of the narrative. This 
is not simply clock time, the passage of minutes and hours, but the 'human' time of Will and 
Anna. What does 'human' time mean? Firstly, it is a time of activity. In the words of the 
preacher, 
a time to be born, and a time to die; 
a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted; 
a time to kill, and a time to heal; 
a time to break down, and a time to build up; 
a time to weep, and a time to laugh; 
................. 
a time for war, and a time for peace. 
Ecclesiastes 3.2 -9 
'Human' time is defined in terms of activity. Even stillness is activity. When stillness becomes 
'the still point of the turning world' 'where past and future are gathered' motion can only be 
conceived in relation to stillness as the eternal reference point(si). To claim that 'human' time is 
transcended at this point is to move into metaphysical speculation. 
Secondly, 'human' time is always time that is experienced. For example, it may be experienced 
as short, or fleeting in times of pleasure, joy and happiness; or it may be experienced as long and 
delayed in times of sadness or frustration, such as waiting to be discharged from hospital. 
'Human' time is an emotional experience: there is a time of ecstacy, a time of distress, a time of 
peace, a time of anxiety, a time of satisfaction, a time of disappointment. There is never any 
'human' time when the emotions are not affected in one way or another. Furthermore, emotional 
experience is expressed in bodily activity. The body resonates with emotional experience and 
is readily and spontaneously translated into sound and vice versa. This is why music is an 
expression of mood and emotion, and involuntarily precipitates bodily activity. 'Human' time is 
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a corporeal resonance of emotional experience. 
Appropriation of the 'human' time of the cathedral chapter is a habitation of its mood which is 
an experience of its temporality. As mentioned above, the ubiquitous long vowels with the 
predominance of tonal uplift, particularly with respect to Will's experience, express a patterned 
phonicity that is translated into corporeal activity which mediates his experience. In contrast to 
Will, and as a counterpoint, Anna's experience is mediated through vowel sounds that are 
shortened and the tone lowered; but the counterpointing makes the sounds of the total mood 
more subtle mediating a complex experience of their relationship which includes a deepening of 
mutual understanding combined with frustration and struggle. This interpretation, of course, to 
some extent, benefits from reflection upon the images and descriptive passages. Nevertheless, 
such reflection reveals the critical part played by the prose rhythm in appropriating the 'human' 
time of the chapter. It is this appropriation which gives the focus of attention of particular 
intentionality the dynamic convergence necessary for establishing a dialectical relationship 
between the reader and the unity of the narrative, between the reader's self identity and the 
narrative idenity, between self and other. 
Inhabiting 'human' time is an appropriation of the unity of temporal experience. The chronology 
of the narrative may, of course, unfold in different ways. For example, in linear fashion of clock 
time whether on a daily basis or longer periods; or from multiple perspectives of a particular 
character; or perspectives upon the experiences of different characters. Nevertheless, the 
Lebenswelt of the narrative is one; and it is this unity that the reader appropriates , because 
it is 
this unity that determines the basis of the plot Analogous to the conscious awareness of the room 
by which the attentive perspectives upon a book are made possible, the unity of temporal 
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experience of the narrative's Lebenswelt makes possible the attentive perspective, the particular 
intentionality focused upon the experience of particular activity in the narrative. It may be shown 
that this is true for all narratives, even those whose temporal experience is expressed and 
described in a diffuse and kaleidoscopic manner; for example, the 'stream of consciousness' 
novels such as James Joyce's Ulysses (52). It may not be true of recent experimentation of post- 
modern fragmentary writing in, for example, John Fowles experiment with alternating realities 
in The Magus, and alternative endings in The French Lieutenant's Woman. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis critically to analyze this experimentation, but the concern with unity and 
affirmation will raise critical questions by implication(53). 
The experience of temporal unity in the process of habitation by the reader is mediated through 
the operative intentionality of prose rhythm, but this is not the source of this unity. Merleau- 
Ponty claims that the unity of the objective world is constituted by the mind based upon the 
consciousness of the phenomenal activity of the 'lived' body which mediates a "pre- 
constituted". world The body, he writes, '... must teach me to comprehend what no constituting 
consciousness can know - my involvement in a "pre-constituted" world. '(54) It is the active 
habitation of the 'lived' body in the world which gives a phenomenological unity to the body 
prompting the mind to re-constitute this unity in reflection. Obviously, this is a movement into 
the Heideggerian ontological notion of Being-in-the world, but does not resolve the problem of 
ontological unity stated earlier. As stated above, a primary aim of this thesis is to show that the 
source of this unity is the hidden ontological power that is released in the appearance of Being 
with respect to the primordial dialectic between self and other. In terms of reading the textual 
narrative, it is the dialectic between the self identity of the reader and the other, or who of the 
narrative. Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity provides the means for a critical examination of 
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the latter. 
Prose rhythm is the mediation of this primordial dialectic. The reader's appropriation of the 
temporal experience of the Lebenswelt is corporeally grounded in the patterned sonority of the 
prose rhythm which is intentionally operative in relation to his particular intentionality with 
regard to inhabiting the narrative perspective of particular activity. It is this perspective which 
is the'position' of the who of the narrative, the narrative identity. In the next chapter, the analysis 
must now take up this notion in relation to the primordial dialectic between self and other, 
between self identity and narrative identity. 
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Chapter Five 
The Primordial Dialectic and Temporal Perspective 
In chapter four, reading a narrative was defined in terms of the process of appropriation and 
habitation of the lifeworld of the text. The reader appropriates the temporal perspective of the 
narrative and imaginatively inhabits the activity of its Lebenswelt. It was attempted to show that 
this appropriation and habitation is made possible by the sonority of the text as the mediation 
of the temporal perspective which effects a corporeal activity with respect to the textual 
patterned sonority, or prose rhythm. That is, it is through the bodily resonance set up in the 
process of reading that the temporal activity of the narrative's Lebenswelt is appropriated and 
inhabited. 
An important aspect of this sonority is its phenomenological and objective nature with respect 
to the duality of the body in terms of mediation of conscious appearance, and as an object in the 
world. The appropriation of the narrative may be seen to retain the givenness of the objective 
nature of the text in the process of reading in terms of its prose rhythm directly effecting an 
objective corporeal resonance. The reader objectively appropriates the temporal perspective of 
the narrative. Furthermore, the patterned resonance of this perspective is manifested in a 
convergence as the mediation of temporal unity. Analogous to a symphony, the prose rhythm 
converges upon an insistent theme that mediates a temporal unity of the 'human time' of the 
narrative which makes possible the reader's habitation. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of corporeal intentionality, prose rhythm is objectively operative in the reader's appropriation 
of the temporal perspective. 
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Third Ontological Issue: Sonorous Being and the Primordial Dialectic 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the third ontological issue of the primordial dialectic 
identified in chapter four. To this end, the aim will be to analyze the temporal perspective as the 
unifying perspective of the who, or Other, of the narrative which becomes, in the process of 
appropriation, the Other of the reader's self in a dialectical relationship between Self and Other. 
That is, the act of reading, with regard to narrative, involves an appropriation of the temporal 
perspective, being the implicit or explicit viewpoint of the 'implied author'(r) which precipitates 
a dialectical relationship with an interrogative stance of the Self. The reader's imaginative 
habitation of the narrative's Lebenswelt provides the temporal 'space' for a critical stance of the 
Self in terms of who, why, where, how, when and what. Since the Self brings to this imaginative 
world its own identity, the critical stance becomes a process of self reflectiong). Reading a story 
can and does change a person's self identity through a dialectical relationship between the 
appropriation of the temporal perspective of the'implied author', the narrative's identity, the who 
or Other of the text, and self reflection arising from the interrogative stance. Since the former 
calls for a letting go of Self identity in an appropriation of the identity of the Other through 
openness, trust and risk(3) it has a propensity towards affirmation of the latter's identity; whereas, 
the interrogative stance, based upon unresolved questioning, has the propensity towards 
suspicion of identity per se(a). The primoridal dialectic is therefore between affirmation and 
suspicion, between Other and Self. What follows is an attempt to provide a detailed analysis of 
this primordial dialectic. 
Temporal Perspective: Prose and Poetic Rhythm 
The basis of this analysis is the examination of the temporal perspective with respect, first, by 
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developing the analysis of prose rhythm in its relationship with poetic rhythm to reveal the 
ontological grounding of the act of configuration as the imaginative 'grasp' of the narrative's 
temporal unity. Second, by analyzing the act of configuration as the temporal perspective of the 
Other of the narrative in terms of narrative identity. This analysis will draw upon Ricoeur's 
theory of narrative in volume one of his Time and Narrative, and his further work on narrative 
identity in The Self as Another. Third, by developing the analysis of the above in relation to the 
dialectic between Self and Other taking Ricoeur's three stages of mimesisi, mimesis2 and 
mimesis3, that is, figuration, configuration and re-figuration, as the structure of this analysis. The 
aim is to show how the temporal perspectival understanding, grounded in an ontological unity 
of sonorous Being in relation to the primordial dialectic, creates the temporal 'space' for rational 
interrogation and explanation. 
To analyze the relationship of prose rhythm and the configuration of narrative in an attempt to 
reveal the temporal perspective as the manifestation of the primordial dialectic of Self and Other 
in the process of reading, it will be helpful to develop the analysis of prose rhythm begun in the 
preceding chapter. Taking the poetic mode of the text, as defined by Ricoeur, the fundamental 
characteristic of this mode embraces a spectrum including poetry and narrative(s). There is a 
difference between these, which will be considered below, but there is not a radical difference, 
even with regard to 'rhythm'. The concern here is to examine a key characteristic of poetic mode, 
defined in terms of particular intentionality, to provide a critical understanding of prose rhythm 
in terms of operative intentionality. With respect to the temporal perspective of narrative, the 
aim is to consider a spectrum of rhythm in which there is a conscious critical awareness, 
particularly in direct relationship with the iconic moments of metaphor, set against a background 
of prose rhythm 'operative' at the 'edge' of consciousness. 
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Rhythm, with regard to language, may, in general terms, be defined as the sonorous rise and fall 
of words and phrases caused by the alternation of accented, or stressed, and unaccented syllables. 
The analogous relationship with music and dancing would seem to reveal a significant influence 
upon the mind and body by the effect of a regular beat. It is the regularity of the beat which 
appears to determine its corporeal effect. I. A. Richards writes, 
Rhythm and its specialized form, metre, depend upon repetition, and expectancy. Equally where 
it fails, all rhythmical and metrical effects spring from anticipation. As a rule anticipation is 
unconscious. Sequences of all syllables both sounds and as images of speech-movements leave 
the mind ready for certain further consequences rather than others. Our momentary organization 
is adapted to one range of possible stimuli rather to another. 
Principles of Literary Criticism p 103 
Before addressing the question of image, the importance of Richards' view expressed above is 
the grounding of the anticipation of rhythmic beat in the physical body. According to this view, 
there is an expectancy of an ordered effect of sonorous patterns in the objective 'flesh'. Richards 
writes, for example, about the understanding of metre: 
We shall never understand metre so long as we ask, 'Why does temporal pattern so excite us'? 
and fail to realize that the pattern itself is a vast cyclic agitation spreading all over the body, a 
tide of excitement pouring through the channels of the mind. 
ibid. p. 107 
It is not the aim in this thesis to pursue this effect in relation to, for example, the neurological 
system, or any other way of defining and describing the'flesh'(6). In terms of the philosophical 
purpose of this analysis, it is the claim that order, and therefore unity, is manifested in the 'flesh'. 
In other words, an ontological propensity towards unity is revealed in the physical resonance and 
activity of the body in relation to its evident anticipation of a sonorous rhythmic order. 
Poetic Rhythm: Regular Beat 
Traditional nursery rhymes and folk songs would seem to provide material for this evidence. For 
example, the Mother Goose collection is based upon patterns of sound that have a greater 
mnemonic role than the visual images or meaning. Every child would seem to learn Jack and Jill, 
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Baa, baa, Black Sheep, Little Boy Blue, etc., by an mnemonic anticipation of the sound which 
resonates in the physical body. This is close to the rhythmic patterns of music and song when it 
is important to learn the rhythmic pattern of a melody as the foundation for the appreciation of 
the phenomenological effects of sound and image in the words and phrasing of the song(7). In the 
same way, it is the physical ordered beat of nursery rhymes that objectively manifest an 
ontological grounding of a propensity towards unity. The 'flesh' resonates in anticipation of 
rhythmic order that is not grounded only in consciousness but the physical body. 
This does not mean that the 'flesh' can be abstracted from consciousness in relation to this 
ontological propensity. The duality of the body in terms of its phenomenal and physical aspects 
is an inseparable duality. It has been made clear in earlier chapters that because of the 
fundamental metaphysical problematic of Cartesian duality(8), the latter duality is rejected in 
favour of an attempt to define rational consciousness grounded in the objectivity of the given. 
This attempt will be developed in chapter seven in demonstrating the way the Kantian notion of 
the productive imagination may be analyzed, re-interpreted and developed in terms of the 
significance of corporeal sonority as the ontological grounding of this production, and the 
phenomenal auditory and visual effects as the key characteristics of the Kantian schema of the 
cognitive manifold(g). The aim will be to interpret the schema in terms of the temporal 
perspective creating the 'space' for rational discourse and reflection. 
The aim at this stage is to pay careful attention to the anticipation and expectancy of rhythmic 
order, particularly as this may be revealed in prose rhythm. It is evident in the simple verse form 
of traditional nursery rhymes, and folk ballads that the regular beat has a mnemonic effect which 
meets the corporeal response of anticipation and expectancy. In more developed forms of poetry, 
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this primitive, or rather primordial, grounding may be discerned in the complexity of metrical 
forms. The complexity is not only derived from more sophisticated rhythmic patterning, but the 
structuring of the linguistic mediation of emotional and imaginative expression. To this end, the 
mnemonic characteristic of the rhythm is combined with feeling and visual response. For 
example, the use of the iambic pentameter in Gray's Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard 
expresses the feeling of quiet and peace, as well as stimulating the images of the churchyard and 
countryside. But the regular iambic metre with the stress on the second syllable plays a 
fundamental role in this effect: 
The curfew tolls the knell of parting day, 
The lowing herd winds slowly o'er the lea, 
The ploughman homeward plods his weary way 
And leaves the world to darkness and to me. 
A variety of traditional metric forms including the trochaic, dactylic and anapaestic in addition 
to the iambic, each based upon two or three syllables having one stress, or accent and no more, 
have been used to create a range of moods and feelings grounded in an insistent regular beat. An 
example of the trochaic form, based upon two syllables with the stress on the first, is Charles 
Wolfe's The Burial of Sir John Moore, 
Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note, 
As his corse to the ramparts we hurried; 
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot 
O'er the grave where our hero we buried. 
The regular trochaic beat conveys a mood of solemnity combined with the sense of the slow 
march of the soldiers. 
These are of course examples of a fixed rhythm that is held, with slight variations, throughout 
the poems. They are frequently also combined with a regular abab rhyming structure(io). In the 
long development of poetic rhythm, the regularity often becomes more complex and subtle in not 
only the rhythmic patterns and rhyme structure, but the verse forms and also the use of 
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alliteration, assonance, dissonance, onomatopoeia and other poetic techniques. Although in some 
poems, particularly the modem development of vers libre(li), it may be difficult at first reading 
to discern the regular rhythmic pattern, it is a fundamental characteristic of all poetry. For 
example, the enormously complex structure of T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets may be discerned as 
symphonic composed in turn of specific movements(i2). 
In the longstanding debate regarding the difference between poetry and prose, a central issue is 
the part played by rhythm in each. With regard to anticipation and expectancy arising from 
rhythm, I. A. Richards writes, 
Both prose and verse vary immensely in the extent to which they excite this 'getting ready' 
process, and in the narrowness of the anticipation which is formed. Prose on the whole, 
with the rare exceptions of a Landor, a De Quincy, or a Ruskin, is accompanied by a very 
much vaguer and more indeterminate expectancy than verse. In such prose as this page, for 
example, little more than a preparedness for further words not all exactly alike in sound and 
with abstract polysyllables preponderating is all that arises. In short, the sensory or formal effect 
of words has very little play in the literature of analysis and exposition. But as soon as prose 
becomes more emotive than scientific, the formal side becomes prominent. 
op. cit.. p. 103 -4 
In other words, in the terms defined in this thesis, as soon as prose becomes, interalia, narrative 
and not rational, abstract discourse, anticipation and expectancy become effective arising from 
a rhythmic pattern. 
Difference between Poetic and Prose Rhythm? 
The difference between poetry and prose is made more questionable in the developments of 
poetic forms that appear to obscure the distinction. For example, the early appearance of blank 
verse, particularly in the Shakespearean dramatic form, may convey the impression that although 
the author's intention is to heighten human experience, particularly with respect to passion and 
the emotions, within the structure of the plot, and theatrical performance, the aim is also to 
capture the speech expressions and rhythms of commonplace, prosaic language. Such an 
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impression of course fails to discern the rhythmic iambic pentameter of blank verse which would 
seem to separate it from prose form. Certain poets have, nevertheless, made explicit an intention 
to combine the poetic form with ordinary speech. Wordsworth, for example, rejecting the 
stylized, classical forms of the eighteenth century in such poets as Dryden and Pope, wrote in his 
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
The principal object, then, proposed in these Poems was to choose incidents and situations 
from common life, and to relate or describe them, throughout, as far as was possible in a selection 
of language really used by men... 
And later in the Preface, in relation to the distinction between poetry and prose, particularly with 
respect to metre, in a footnote he writes, 
I here use the word 'Poetry' (though against my own judgement) as opposed to the word Prose, 
and synonymous with metrical composition. But much more confusion has been introduced into 
criticism by this contradistinction of Poetry and Prose, instead of the more philosophical one 
of Poetry and Matter of Fact, or Science. The only strict antithesis to Prose is Metre; nor is this, 
in truth, a strict antithesis, because lines and passages of metre so naturally occur in writing prose, 
that it would be scarcely possible to avoid them, even were it desirable. 
Poetical Works, ed. Thomas Hutchinson and revised by Ernest De Selincourt. 1936, rep. 1971, p. 736, 
footnote 1. 
But Wordsworth's apparent concern to establish a close interdependence between poetry and 
prose is criticised by his friend who otherwise endorses the main theme of the Preface in giving 
importance 'to action and situation rather than action and situation in relation to feeling' (ibid. 
p. 735). In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge claims that the difference lies in the combination of 
two conditions with respect to metrical composition in writing poetry: 
First, that, as elements of metre owe their existence to a state of increased excitement, so the 
metre itself should be accompanied by the natural language of excitement. Secondly, that as 
these elements are formed into metre artificially, by a voluntary act, with the design and for 
the purpose of blending delight with emotion, so traces of present volition should throughout 
the metrical language be proportionately discernible. 
Coleridge: Selected Poetry, Prose and Letters, ed Stephen Potter, 1962, Biographia Literaria, p. 278 
According to Coleridge, in poetry, there must be a partnership of a spontaneous impulse of 
passion and emotion, and a voluntary act of the will in the creation of the metrical form. This 
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is not appropriate for prose which aims to fulfill a representative function of 'Good Sense'a3). 
From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty's notions of operative and particular intentionalities 
applied to prose, as outlined above, the views of Wordsworth and Coleridge may be seen to be 
complementary not contradictory. The former is concerned to show that rhythm and metrical 
form may be discerned in prose, whereas the latter argues that the main purpose of poetry is a 
conscious act to write in metre to express the emotions of spontaneous impulse. That is, to give 
particular attention to the metrical form. Although, for the most part, prose composition does not 
consciously attend to the rhythmic structure, it may be revealed in a process of critical analysis. 
The qualification 'for the most part' is made particularly in relation to the traditional disciplines 
of'Rhetoric'. In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle writes, 
The form of diction should be neither fully metrical nor completely without rhythm; the former 
is unconvincing (as it is thought to be artificial), and at the same time it is distracting; for it makes 
one expect the recurrence of a similar rhythmic pattem... On the other hand, the rhythmless is 
unlimited, and the speech should be circumscribed but not by metre; for what is unbounded is 
unpleasant and unrecognizable. All things are bounded by number, and the number of the form of 
diction is rhythm, of which even metres too are divisions. So the speech must have rhythm, but not 
metre; otherwise it will be a poem. 
The Art of Rhetoric Chapter 3.8 p. 230 
Since rhetoric is conceived by Aristotle in terms of oral persuasion, this appears to raise the 
question whether there is a difference between prose for the purpose of public speech, and that 
written for the purpose of reading. But if sound is a key characteristic in the narrative mode of 
the written text, as proposed in this thesis, 'persuasion' may be appreciated as an important 
element in written prose of this mode(14). 
In the developments of poetic technique in the later nineteenth century, particularly in the work 
of Gerard Manley Hopkins, and in this century, experiments have been made with regular and 
irregular patterns of stress and accent as the structure of rhythm instead of metrical forms. One 
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important aspect of this development is the attempt to capture the prose rhythms of ordinary 
speech with the critical awareness that the rhythm of stress and accent seem to be basic to this 
natural expressive mode of language(is). Gerard Manley Hopkins experimented with a new 
rhythm in the sense that he consciously worked at a pattern of stress or accents alone, which he 
called'sprung rhythm', as a counterpoint to a more conventional verse structure based upon the 
traditional Common English Running Rhythm. That is, the metrical forms of poetic rhythm 
referred to above. In a letter to R. W. Dixon, attempting to describe 'Sprung Rhythm' he writes, 
To speak shortly, it consists in scanning by accents or stresses alone, without any account of the 
number of syllables, so that a foot may be one strong syllable or it may be many light and one 
strong. 
Poems and Prose Selected and ed. by W. H. Gardner, p. 187 
Many examples of this rhythm can be found in Hopkins' poetry. Although, in addition to the 
effect of counterpointing he uses such techniques as alliteration, assonance and idiomatic 
peculiarities of diction, the flexibility and patterns of irregular stress of 'sprung rhythm' are 
intended to express the prose rhythms of ordinary speech. In his Preface to his Collected Poems, 
Hopkins writes, 
... Sprung Rhythm is the most natural of things. For... it is the rhythm of common speech and of 
written prose, when rhythm is perceived in them. 
ibid. p. 11 
The qualifying clause seems to reveal a hesitation as to the extent of rhythmic structure, but the 
statement asserts a conviction based upon considerable study and experimentation that prose does 
have, at the very least, patterns of rhythm. 
Increased development and experimentation, particularly following the work of T. S. Eliot, has 
been in the form, referred to above, of vers libre. This has ranged from Eliot's eclectic use of 
traditional resources within a form which Philip Hobsbaum, in Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form, 
characterizes as free blank verse based upon a definite five-stress rhythm(16), and, quoting Paull 
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F. Baum in The Principles of English Versification, to certain kinds of free verse which 
... do not aim to 
be more than ordinary prose printed in segments more or less closely corresponding 
with the phrase rhythm or normal sound rhythms of language. 
Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form, Philip Hobsbaum, 1996, p. 89 
In the development of free verse, the Bible and Elizabethan prose influenced such poets as Walt 
Whitman and, subsequently, D. H. Lawrence and others(»). But, according to Hobsbaum, 
... free verse proper came into its own with the modernistic school of the early twentieth century. Though often written badly , and better considered as chopped up prose, in the hands of a 
master such as Wallace Stevens, free verse proper becomes a recognizable form. 
ibid. p. 112 
This recognizable form is not syllabic, or line length, or metrical rhythm, but the rhythm of 
cadence and stress which relates to the feeling and activity of the poem. It excites and animates 
the imagery so that the reader imaginatively appropriates the concrete situation and lived moment 
of the poem's theme. It is a controlled rhythm in which the stressed rhythm is the focus of 
particular intentionality employing a variety of techniques. As Coleridge observed with respect 
to metrical form, the rhythm of vers libre based upon cadence and stress is the creation of a 
voluntary act with the purpose of 'blending delight with emotion'; or to stimulate a controlled 
and yet spontaneous emotional response, in addition to visually animating the image in a state 
of activity(is). 
Relationship between Poetic and Prose Rhythm in Prose 
The purpose of the above outline of the development and experimentation in the relationship 
between rhythm in poetry and in prose is to show how the former may provide access to a critical 
understanding of prose rhythm. It is to demonstrate that the rhythms of poetry may appear in 
prose, particularly in the narrative mode, as the parts of the text which may be defined in terms 
of particular intentionality in relation to the background to particular activity and emotional 
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stimulus in terms of operative intentionality. It is especially the case with respect to metaphor, 
which plays a key role in poetry, that the rhythmic structure comes to the forefront of 
consciousness, and seemingly fades into the background at the 'edge' of consciousness in 
description and dialogue. In other words, rhythm plays a key role in the expression of activity 
and emotion in relation to particular concrete situations in terms of 'grasping' and animating a 
metaphoric image, or iconic moment, and 'withdraws' to the 'edge' of consciousness in the 
'distancing' of reflective consciousness in response to discursive prose; and, as will be considered 
in detail below, plays a significant role in'grasping' or emplotment(iv), to use Ricoeur's term, of 
narrative. For the most part, the prose rhythm of the latter expresses activity and emotion in 
terms of mood, ambience and atmosphere. Examples of this were given in chapter four from 
D. H. Lawrence and Thomas Hardy in drawing attention to the effect of vowel sounds and 
modulations. 
Every narrative may be analyzed with regard to rhythm based upon cadence and stress. An 
illuminating example is F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby. In this, the mood and atmosphere 
of the American rich society in the twenties is mediated through the prose rhythm of the narrator 
Nick Carraway. A crucial passage is the meeting of Gatsby, a wealthy man with a mysterious 
and suspicious background, with Daisy, a young woman married to a rich and stupid man, who 
had become the impossible object of Gatsby's overpowering romantic dream. 
Gatsby, his hands still in his pocket, / was reclining against the mantelpiece / in a strained 
counterfeit ofperfect ease / even of boredom. / His head leaned back so far / that it rested 
against the face of the defunct mantelpiece clock, / and from this position / his distraught eyes 
stared down at Daisy, / who was sitting, frightened but graceful, / on the edge of a stiff chair. 
The Great Gatsby p. 93 (my italics) 
The passage is marked to indicate the rhythm of the concerned, empathetic observation of an 
aspiring but melancholic young writer living in a bored society, lacking real passion. Reading 
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this passage, as it should normally be read, without any overt critical attention to its prose 
rhythm, the metaphor 'strained counterfeit' nevertheless is the phrase which has rhythmic 
predominance. In the era of prohibition and mob gangsters, counterfeiting was widespread, and 
the word was part of the vernacular. In this passage, employed metaphorically, it predominates 
because there is a concentration upon an image actively mediating a concrete visual awareness 
of the essential characteristics of Gatsby, not only in the way 'counterfeit' resonates with 
connotations of his mansion and parties, but also the society which has corrupted him and which 
he hopelessly attempts to rise above. The poetic rhythm of feeling and activity in this iconic 
moment is reflected in the prose rhythm of the passage, and throughout the novel. 
In any full analysis, it would be worthwhile making comparison with other novels. Simply to read 
the beginning of two or more immediately stimulates an awareness of different moods mediated 
through the language. It is to be aware of inhabiting different lifeworlds. For example, to 
compare Scott Fitzgerald's Great Gatsby with two other American novels, William Faulkner's 
Absalom, Absalom! and Ernest Hemmingway's Farewell to Arms, is to be aware of the very 
different world of Faulkner's fictional Yoknapatawpha County in the long, lyrical sentences, and 
the gritty, insistent determination expressed in Hemmingway's clipped, staccato, journalistic style 
prose. 
Narrative analysis may reveal the forms of prose rhythm by focusing attention on the metaphoric 
features where there may be the use of poetic techniques of various metrical forms, but 
particularly the cadence and stress patterns which fade into the background of mood and 
ambience in the discursive prose. To this end, the study of poetic techniques in the range and 
development of poetry outlined above, in terms of the poet's attempts to listen critically to the 
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acoustics of prose, may inform a critical analysis of the prose rhythm of the creative writer. In 
attempting to attune the ear in this manner, it is important to appreciate that the prose of the 
narrative mode is not equivalent to ordinary speech(2o). Narrative is the creation of form and 
structure in which prose rhythm plays a key role in terms of ontological grounding. It will also 
be made clear below that this critical awareness is important in relation to narrative identity and 
self identity. 
Rhythm and Temporality 
Returning now to what may be considered the fundamental issue running through the above 
analysis of rhythm is the claim made by I. A. Richards that anticipation and expectancy are the 
effects of the regular beat or stress. Also, that these are the effects of bodily activity or resonance. 
Phenomenologically, the rhythm is mediated in terms of feeling and activity in relation to 
figuration. What does this mean? Anticipation and expectancy are the mediation of temporality; 
and feeling and activity in relation to narrative take place in 'human' time. Rhythm is not simply 
the mediation of Bergsonian durationRI), but of the Heideggerian triadic 'ekstases' of coming-to- 
be, having-been and being present. Heidegger's anticipatory resoluteness in the face of being- 
towards-death is here qualified by a rhythm of hope(22)That is, prose rhythm, in terms of the 
resonance of the'flesh', is the ontological disclosure of the temporality of Dasein. Or, to put it 
another way, it is the ontological disclosure of the propensity, or dunamis, of sonorous Being 
towards temporal order or unity. But such novels as Marcel Proust's A la recherche du temps 
perdu, James Joyce's Ulysses, and Virginia Woolfs To the Lighthouse, among many other 
modern novels which are devoted to a subjective exploration of'human' time(23), disclose, to use 
a spatial metaphor, a'multi-dimensional' temporality which suggests a more flexible horizon of 
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temporal being than Heidegger's triadic ekstases. 
The conclusion of the above analysis of prose rhythm is that the phenomenological temporal 
perspective of narrative, in terms of the mediation of feeling and vision, is ontologically 
grounded in sonorous Being. Also, the dynamic of the act of configuration with respect to 
'grasping' the temporal perspective of the narrative is the ontological propensity, or dunamis of 
sonorous Being towards unity mediated through the resonance of the 'flesh' with respect to 
prose and poetic rhythm. These rhythms are the ontological dynamic of temporal perspective 
defined in terms of operative and particular intentionalities respectively. That is, the ontological 
dynamic of the act of configuration whereby the reader appropriates the temporal perspective as 
the means of habitation is mediated through the rhythmic structure of the text. 
Configuration and Rhythm 
The second aim of this chapter is to analyze the way this rhythmic structure relates to the act of 
configuration drawing upon the threefold formation of Ricoeur's theory of narrative. The 
phenomenological mediation of emotion and activity is temporally structured. Emotion in terms 
of the expressions of hope, despair, joy, sadness, anxiety, peace, frustration, satisfaction, and 
activity perceived as image and figure, in terms of narrative, are clearly set within 'human' time. 
There are implicit, if not explicit, temporal horizons for all emotion and activity as part of 
narrative. They are grounded in anticipation and expectancy of the 'flesh' as the mediation of 
sonorous Being. The act of 'grasping' the narrative by means of its temporal perspective is 
therefore the act of configuring the linguistic mediation of emotion and activity grounded in the 
ontological sonority of prose rhythm. Ricoeur compares this act to the Kantian productive 
imagination. He writes, 
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I cannot overemphasize the kinship between "grasping together", proper to the configurational 
act, and what Kant has to say about the operation of judging. It will be recalled that for Kant the 
transcendental meaning of judging consists not so much in joining a subject and predicate as in 
placing an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept. The kinship is greater still with the 
reflective judgment which Kant opposes to the determining one, in the sense that it reflects upon 
the work of thinking at work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and in teleological judgment 
applied to organic wholes. The act of emplotment has a similar function inasmuch as it extracts 
configuration from a succession. 
Time and Narrative Vol. 1 p. 66 
This will be examined more closely in chapter seven. The purpose of this quotation is to identify 
a fundamental issue in Ricoeur's comparison between Kant's notion of the productive imagination 
and the act of configuration with respect to Ricoeur's notion of emplotment. That is, the issue of 
an ontological grounding, in contrast to a transcendental understanding, of the productive 
imagination and act of configuration. Although Ricoeur's analysis of configuration in mimesis2 
attempts to ground this act in the symbolic structuring of mimesisi, he does not appear to give 
enough attention to phonicity, and consequently seems to lack a clear understanding of the 
ontological foundation of this act(24). In his analysis of the act of configuration, he places 
considerable emphasis upon the ability to follow a story as the basis of the extraction mentioned 
in the above quotation. He continues, 
To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and peripeteia under the 
guidance of an expectation that finds fulfilment in the "conclusion" of the story. This conclusion 
is not logically implied by some premises. It gives the story an "end point, " which, in turn, furnishes 
the point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole. 
ibid. p. 66-7 
This seems to imply that this ability to follow a story is grounded in a transcendental, 
phenomenological act of perception. Although this conclusion does not take account of Ricoeur's 
notion of narrative identity and ontological view set out in the tenth study of Oneself as Another, 
by which he seems to escape the accusation of transcendental subjectivism(2s), there are critical 
ontological questions which may only be resolved by the role played by prose rhythm. These will 
be addressed in the course of this analysis. 
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The aim of Ricoeur's theory of threefold mimesis is to analyze and clarify the task of 
hermeneutics. He writes, 
It is the task of hermeneutics... to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself 
above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to readers who 
receive it and thereby change their acting. For a semiotic theory, the only operative concept is that 
of the literary text. Hermeneutics, however, is concerned with reconstructing the entire arc of 
operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors and readers. It does 
not confine itself to setting mimesis2 between mimesisl and mimesis3. It wants to characterize 
mimesis2 by its mediating function. What is at stake, therefore, is the concrete process by which 
the textual configuration mediates between the prefiguration of the practical field and its 
refiguration through the reception of the work. 
Time and Narrative Vol. 1 p. 53 
The notion of refiguration with respect to mimesis3 will be examined more closely in relation to 
the fourth ontological issue of Self and Other in the next chapter. What is significant here with 
regard to the ontological relationship between prose rhythm and configuration is the way Ricoeur 
attempts to ground the latter in the prefiguration of the practical field of human experience. This 
grounding, or'anchorage' to use Ricoeur's term(26), is defined in terms of three features: structural, 
symbolic and temporal. Although the ontological dimension is taken into account, the analysis 
does seem to be lacking in making clear the phenomenological grounding in the state of being-in- 
the-world. In examining these features it may be shown that prose rhythm provides the clarity 
that is lacking. 
Practical Field of Human Experience 
The first feature is based upon an understanding of the way action is given meaning in relation 
to a whole conceptual network which is paradigmatic with respect to the regular and familiar 
patterns of human activity. That is, there is a linguistic prefiguration which Ricoeur claims 
potentially and actually gives rise to the syntagmatic order of narrated discourse; all actions have 
agents which are subject to the questions about "what, " "why, " "who, " "how, " "with whom, " or 
"against whom"(27). This gives a temporal character to this fundamental linguistic network or 
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texture which may be compared with Merleau-Ponty notion, Prose of the World(28). In'Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence' he writes, 
Speech always comes into play against the background of speech; it is always only a fold in the 
immense fabric of language. To understand it, we do not have to consult some inner lexicon which 
gives us pure thoughts covered up by words or forms we are perceiving; we have only to lend 
ourselves to its life, to its movement of differentiation and articulation, and to its eloquent gestures. 
Signs, Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence', p. 42 
But, as in Ricoeur, this is not simply a synchronic system of Saussurean sign structures; it is 
diachronic in its setting of human history. The pressing question is, however, what is the 
ontological characteristic of this anchorage in the practical field of temporal existence? What 
Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty seem to describe is the phenomenological characteristics of the 
linguistic network or sedimentation in which narrative discourse is rooted. 
The second anchorage of configuration in the practical understanding is provided by the symbolic 
resources of this field. Drawing upon the work of Ernst Cassirer, in his Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms(29), Ricoeur agrees that symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience. 
That is, symbols underlie human action and constitute its first signification before symbolic 
wholes become detached through speech and writing. This understanding of symbols moves the 
analysis closer to an ontological viewpoint in the way Ricoeur attempts to make clear that 
symbols are not in the mind but are incorporated into action which is consequently decipherable, 
or readable by other actors in the social interplay. This is particularly evident in ritual acts. He 
writes, 
Before being a text, symbolic mediation has a texture. To understand a ritual act into situate it 
within a ritual, set within a cultic system, and by degrees within the whole set of conventions, 
beliefs and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture. 
Time and Narrative Vol. 1 p. 58 
The objective nature of Ricoeur's definition of symbols was considered in chapter two with 
respect to the iconic moment of metaphor. But, as was noted, he does not pursue the sonorous 
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characteristic of this iconic moment, and, therefore, fails to take account of its ontological 
implications. 
Rhythm and the Field of Human Experience 
The rhythmic pattern of this sonority in relation to the structure of the linguistic conceptual 
network, or Prose of the World, and the texture of symbolic mediation may be defined as the 
ontological manifestation of their grounding in sonorous Being which may be termed the Prose 
Rhythm of the World. That is, Prose Rhythm is the ontological centripetal dynamic of symbolic 
mediation, and narrative configuration. In this sense, action may not only give rise, through 
human competence of signification, to conceptual networks, and the symbolic texture of 
mediation, but resonates with rhythm that is integrally part of these networks and texture. 
It may also be considered significant that certain rhythmic patterns of human action are related 
to the seasons, to day and night, and other terrestial rhythms which may appear to influence and 
shape the rhythms of temporal existence. Furthermore, the corporeal rhythms of breathing and 
cardiac pulsation directly relate to the patterns of human activity. Ritual acts and social patterns 
of behaviour are permeated with rhythm which may be understood as the anchorage of linguistic 
prose rhythm in the practical field of temporal existence; and, therefore, the manifestation of the 
ontological grounding of the conceptual networks and symbolic texture which underlie narrative 
configuration. 
The phenomenological, acoustical disclosure of prose rhythm has been analyzed above, and in 
the previous chapter. Also, visual appearance was considered in relation to the iconic moment 
of metaphor. That is, corporeal rhythm is phenomologically disclosed in sound and sight. In 
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other words, bodily rhythm is expressed in sound patterns and figuration. This is evident in ritual 
acts in the part played by music and symbolic figuration. In dance, the body not only expresses 
the musical rhythms but is expressed by them(3o). So too, bodily rhythm is expressed in the 
figuration of dance. This understanding of the phenomenological disclosure of corporeal rhythm 
may give meaning to the behavioural patterns of the practical field of human experience, and the 
cultural configuration of a Lebenswelt, and the anchorage of the linguistic phonic gestures in 
prose rhythm. 
Ontological Disclosure 
But does this mean that it is only in this disclosure that the ontological nature of prose rhythm 
is made known? If so, is it not speculative to propose that prose rhythm is the ontological 
manifestation of sonorous Being? Consequently, does not the transcendental subject remain to 
confound the analysis? Is not all phenomenological disclosure subject to intentionality and the 
Selfs rational attempt to wrest the appearance from the Other and enfold it in the realm of the 
Same? But if, for example, the figure does indeed appear, is it possible to trace its contours as 
the structuralist attempts to do in the realm of the Same? (31) It is the poet who seems to be more 
keenly aware of this problematic. W. B. Yeats writes, 
O body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 
Among School Children 
Ricoeur's analysis in Time and Narrative attempts to address these ontological issues but, for the 
most part, to show how temporality is grounded in the ontological dynamic of human action 
which gives rise to the creative act of emplotment and configuration. For example, in his analysis 
of the third feature of mimesisi, he draws upon Heidegger's notion of 'Within-time-ness' in 
relation to the thematic concept Care(Sorge)(32). Here, he is concerned to show how'Within- 
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time-ness', which is defined by the basic characteristic of Care, provides a bridge between the 
linear representation of time and the temporal order of narrative. Referring to Heidegger's 
analysis he comments, 
At first glance, the relation between this analysis of with-time-ness and narrative seems quite 
distant. Heidegger's text... seems to leave no place for it inasmuch as the tie between history 
and time occurs, in Being and Time, at the level of historicality, not at that of within-time-ness. 
The advantage of his analysis of within-time-ness lies elsewhere. It lies in the break this analysis 
makes with the linear representation of time, understood as a simple succession of nows. An 
initial threshold is thereby crossed with the primacy of Care. With the recognition of this threshold, 
a bridge is constructed for the first time between the narrative order and Care. Narrative 
configurations and the elaborated forms of temporality corresponding to them share the same 
foundation of within-time-ness. 
ibid. Vol. 1p 63-64 
That is, according to Ricoeur, Heidegger's ontological notion of 'within-time-ness' may provide 
a way of bridging the temporal perspective and configurations of the narrative order with the 
linear successions of 'nows' in the chronological order of time. In other words, this is a way of 
bridging the ontological dynamic of figuration as the mediation of human activity with linear 
descriptions of time in the realm of the Same. Taking the analogy of the Dance: a way of bridging 
an understanding of the Dance - the figure of the Dance - with a description of the Dance; a way 
of appropriating and inhabiting the Dance and describing the Dance. With respect to narrative, 
a way of appropriating and inhabiting the temporal perspective and configuration of a narrative 
and rationally reflecting upon the descriptions and events of the story. 
Although Ricoeur's analysis addresses the above critical ontological questions and provides a 
valuable interpretation of Heideggerian ontology, he does not go far enough with respect to the 
critical issue of disclosure. It is a question of defining the dynamic of configuration, or rather 
the dynamic of 'emplotment', to use Ricoeur's term, as the imaginative creative act of 
configuration, in terms of phenomenological disclosure. If configuration is indeed understood 
as an ontological disclosure, if narrative configuration is the appropriation of a lifeworld, an 
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active condition of being-in-the-world, what is the nature of this disclosure as an act of 
appropriation? 
In his later writings, particularly in The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger begins to explore 
disclosure in terms of the figure. Developing the notion of a rift as the opening up of the world 
in a setting forth of truth, he writes, 
The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus fixed in place is 
the figure (Gestalt). Createdness of the work means truth's being fixed in place of the figure. 
This composed rift is the fugue of truth's shining. What is here called figure (Gestalt) is always 
to be thought in terms of the particular placing (Stellen) and enframing (Ge-stellen) as which the 
work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth. 
The Origin of the Work ofArt Basic Writings p. 189 
Heidegger's interest and study in poetry, and especially in the work of Hölderlin may be 
considered helpful in understanding figurative language as the disclosure of being. In Miguel de 
Beistegui's recent work on Heidegger, commenting on under-standing of being in The Origin of 
the Work of Art, he writes, 
Man: the (under)standing being. Yet this understanding, originally understood, is poetic: being 
gives itself in language. Language has this poietic power... 
... whenever there is language, whenever language takes form and figure, there is a world and beings come to be disclosed in their truth... 
Heidegger & the Political p. 92 
It would be inappropriate, however, to assume that Heidegger's understanding of figure may be 
equated with that which is set forth in this study, particularly with respect to prose rhythm. For 
example, he is concerned that poetry, or rather primal poesy should not be understood simply in 
terms of language, 
Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, poesy propriates in language because 
language preserves the original essence of poetry. 
The Origin of the Work ofArt p. 199 
Heidegger's work on poetry and the disclosure of being in the figure has an enigmatic quality 
which is reason for circumspection in any attempt to assign it a place in terms of the analysis 
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attempted in this study. The purpose of this reference is to indicate a possible significant 
extension of Ricoeur's ontological interpretation of Heidegger in relation to the third feature of 
mimesisi with regard to the disclosure of being, and an approach to an analysis of figuration and 
configuration in terms of sonority and prose rhythm. 
If the ontological disclosure of being is the figure(Gestalt), what is the nature of this 
phenomenological disclosure by which it is not ensnared in the realm of the Same? To put it 
another way, is it possible for the figure to be both present and absent? For example, is it 
possible for the figure of the iconic moment of metaphor to be subject to particular intentionality 
and yet to lie beyond its attention? Is it possible that any attempt to trace the contour of the 
figure is an illusion? And yet, the figure appears! Or, is it that which is circumscribed by the 
figure that appears? For example, the profile of a three-dimensional figure is never the line of 
the contour. Because the visual appearance is only possible from one of an infinite possibility 
of perspectives, the contour of any profile is an abstraction, and the figure never appears. And 
yet, that which is circumscribed by the elusive figure does appear. It is partial, and may 
seemingly be distorted, but it appears as the effect of the centripetal dynamic of the figure. If 
temporality and activity is added to this three-dimensional figure, it may be understood that the 
dynamic of the figure is the rhythmic resonance as the effect of sonorous Being. In this sense, 
the figure is both present and absent, it invokes affirmation and suspicion. 
The act of appropriation of a narrative is the 'grasping' of the configuration of the Lebenswelt, the 
'bringing together', the con-figuring of the totality of narrative's temporal activity in terms of its 
characters and events. Appropriation may be defined in terms of particular and operative 
intentionalities which resonate with poetic and prose rhythm. With respect to the latter, in relation 
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to operative intentionality, prose rhythm is at the edge of consciousness and beyond. 
Configuration may, therefore, be understood to be both present and absent. It invokes affirmation 
of narrative unity, but also suspicion because any attempt to abstract the configuration as a way 
of explaining the lifeworld, or any feature of it, must remain open to endless interpretation. That 
is, appropriation is the possibility of affirming narrative unity, or identity, as the mediation of the 
Other, in a dialectical relationship with reflection, in terms of a continuing provocation of Self 
reflection in the realm of the Same. (33) This calls for closer analysis in the remainder of the 
chapter, and particularly from a Kantian perspective in chapter six. 
Narrative Configuration 
Martha Nussbaum provides a valuable and helpful interpretation of the act of appropriation, of 
'grasping' a narrative configuration in her essays on philosophy and literature under the title 
Love's Knowledge. One of her aims is to demonstrate the importance of literature as a source of 
moral understanding. In the creative act of the writer, where moral issues are at stake, according 
to Nussbaum, these are informed by a moral vision that gives unity to the complex and subtle 
multi-faceted characteristics and features of the characters and events of the narrative. 
Consequently, moral issues are not resolved into a set of dicta or clearly defined principles, but 
are'grasped' in a configuration whereby a process of'open' reflection may be conducted. In other 
words, moral vision is affirmed at the same time that the attempt to complete moral definitions 
is held under suspicion. As an example, Nussbaum takes the novels of Henry James, in 
particular, The Golden Bowl. She proposes that the entire novel is given moral significance and 
unity in a passage taken from Chapter III of Book Fifth in which the father of Maggie makes an 
act of sacrifice in giving her up so that she is free to love her husband. It is the complete image 
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of this passage which evokes a profound sense of moral achievement in configuring the complete 
narrative of the novel. She writes, 
We can say several things about the moral significance of this picture. First, that as a picture 
it is significant - not only in its causal relation to his subsequent speeches and acts, but as a moral 
achievement in its own right. It is, of course, of enormous causal significance; his speeches and 
acts, here and later, flow forth from it and take from it the rightness of their tone... Furthermore, the 
picture has a pivotal role in his moral activity here that would not be captured by regarding it as a 
mere precondition for action. We want to say, here is where his sacrifice, his essential moral 
choice, takes place... here James tells us that sacrifice is an act of imaginative interpretation. 
Love's Knowledge p. 151 - 152 
According to Nussbaum, this moral achievement, which may be interpreted as an act of 
configuration, cannot be captured in paraphrase; it is not, as it were, a two-dimensional 
definition, or even description, of conceptual morality. It is a work of art. 
It is seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is 
taking in what there is there, with imagination and feeling. 
ibid p. 152 
Although she does not explore in detail the importance of prose rhythm, she does make a 
significant and important comment in comparing the original prose with a paraphrase which 
... even when reasonably accurate, does not ever succeed in displacing the original prose; for it is, not being a high work of literary art, devoid of richness of feeling and a rightness of 
tone and rhythm that characterize the original, whose cadences stamp themselves inexorably 
on the heart. 
ibid. p. 154 
It is the unity of the creative act of imagination in configuring the text which can only be 
responded to in an act of appropriation by inhabiting the prose rhythm of the text. To be captured 
by the image, to visualize the moral achievement, or, to discern that which lies beyond this 
achievement in terms of the unity, the identity of the narrative, is to inhabit a corporeal resonance 
which is not present, that is, does not appear, with respect to reflection in the realm of the Same, 
but makes present that which is circumscribed by the configuration. 
In Henry James' Golden Bowl and other novels of moral achievement, the process of reflection 
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in relation to the moral vision is continually provoked by an open horizon of human experience. 
Nevertheless, the unity of this vision does not seem to be threatened by an apparent destruction 
of any hope of ultimate rational resolution. When captured by the unity of the vision there may 
seem to be a profound sense of rational affirmation in spite of an endless provocation of the open 
horizon. The quality of the father's sacrifice in the passage from the Golden Bowl as the key 
image of the entire novel does appear to make sense. It gives meaning to the narrative which does 
not seem to deny a rational explanation of the story even though any such explanation must be 
subject to continuing re-interpretation. 
Configuration, Narrative Identity and Tragedy 
It would seem reasonable to protest, however, that this can never be so with respect to tragedy. 
The tragic images which are confronted in everyday experience, whether at a personal level in 
the painful death of a loved one through cancer, or the horrific images of suffering which are 
mediated by the camera and television screen, seem to defy any attempt at rational explanation, 
even to suggest that emotional distance allowing for rational abstraction and analysis seems only 
to achieve explanation at the cost of excluding vital and fundamental characteristics of the tragic 
image. (34) How is it possible, therefore, for the creative writer to configure such images in a unity 
of narrative identity? How is it possible to write a story in which such tragic images are 'grasped' 
in a narrative unity whereby its meaning may be affirmed at the same time as the narrative 
descriptions seem to defy rational explanation? 
In the tragic novels; for example, Hardy's Mayor of Casterbridge and Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, 
this achievement does appear to have been attained. In the configuration of the novels, the 
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position and interrelationships of a range of images appear to create the effect in an act of 
appropriation and habitation of a convergence in a vision of unity and meaning. For example, 
the counterpointing of images in the above novels, within the totality of the configuration may 
draw the reader towards that affirmation. (35) At the beginning of Hardy's novel, there is the image 
of depravity in Henchard's senseless act of selling his wife, which may be related in a 
counterpoint effect with his pathetic, but profoundly dignified death, particularly in his totally 
negative will which he gives to Abel Whittle who had remained devoted to him in spite of the 
harsh treatment he had received at his hands. Similarly, with respect to the effect of 
counterpointing, the meeting of Anna with Vronsky at the railway station, and the final tragic 
act of Anna's suicide at the same station, is a powerful feature of the entire novel in an 
invocation of affirmation. This may be compared with John Keat's theory of Negative Capability: 
I mean Negative Capability, that is when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, 
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason. 
Robert Gittings p. 261 John Keats 
Fundamental to such configuration of tragedy and any act of appropriation is the habitation of 
the resonance, the prose rhythm of the narrative. It may be claimed that prose rhythm is 
insufficient with respect to tragedy to achieve an affirmation of unity, or narrative identity. That 
what is called for is a much more conscious attention to the rhythm. In other words, only poetic 
rhythm may possess the power to resonate as corporeal intentionality in precipitating an act of 
configuring tragic identity. It would seem that this lies behind George Steiner's comment in The 
Death of Tragedy: 
It is certain that Greek Tragedy, was from the outset, written in verse. It sprang from archaic 
rituals of celebration or lament and was inseparable from the use of language in a heightened 
lyric mode. Attic drama represents a convergence of speech, music, and dance. In all three, 
rhythm is the vital centre, and when language is in a state of rhythm (words in the condition 
of ordered motion), it is verse. In the Oresteia no less than in the Bacchae, perhaps the last 
of the great feats of the Greek imagination, the action of the drama and the moral experience 
of the characters are wholly united to the metric form. Greek tragedy is sung, danced, and 
declaimed. Prose has no place in it. The Death of Tragedy p. 239 
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In the light of Steiner's work, perhaps there is a judgment to be made which cannot be fully 
satisfied without comparable acts of appropriation. Within the limits of this study this is not 
possible. What may be observed is that the role of metaphor in the act of configuration, 
especially with regard to tragedy, is critical in terms of the unity of narrative identity. 
The central question is, how is it possible, reading a narrative which seems to test rational 
explanation beyond its limits, to grasp its meaning in such a way that reason is challenged to 
extend its limits? In other words, reason is not abandoned but provoked by the imagination to 
continually question an understanding resulting from an act of appropriation and habitation of 
the narrative. With respect to such narratives, is it possible for the reader to resist the Scylla of 
relinquishing rational explanation, and the Charyibdis of failing to understand by making the 
apparent limits of reason the ground of such understanding? 
The great tragic writings mentioned above are examples of creative achievements which may 
evoke an affirmation of profound meaning that stimulates rational thought. Other narratives 
seem to present an absurd challenge to reason. An example of this is the biblical story of 
Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. On the one hand, from the point of view that Abraham's love for 
Isaac is absolute, and yet he is prepared to perform the sacrifice, the narrative appears to have 
no rational explanation. Consequently, to grasp the meaning of the story would seem to involve 
an abdication of reason. On the other hand, the narrative is critically important to the Abrahamic 
cycle of stories which have been, and remain central to a tradition of faith which many claim is 
fundamentally rational(36). Perhaps more than any other, Soren Kierkegaard in Fear and 
Trembling has attempted to address this critical issue which is related to the theme of paradox 
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in his Philosophical Fragments: 
... the paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like 
a lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity. But the highest pitch of every passion is always 
to will its own downfall; and so it is also the supreme passion of Reason to seek a collision, 
though this collision must in one way or another prove its undoing. The supreme paradox of 
all thought is to attempt to discover something it cannot think. This passion is at bottom present 
in all thinking, even the thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking, even in the thinking 
individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in something transcending himself. 
Philosophical Fragments p. 46 
It may be contended, of course, that although Kierkegaard's understanding of the relationship 
between reason and passion is significant, paradox, in this sense, does not seem to provide any 
basis for rational explanation. Therefore, is Kierkegaard simply recognizing the limits of reason, 
and exhorting everyone to allow the imagination and feeling to have free reign? Does the passion 
of thought drive thinking to the edge and abandonment of reason? 
In The Gift of Death, Derrida examines the narrative of Isaac's sacrifice in terms of the paradox 
of the concept of duty and absolute responsibility. The concept of duty is a universal that belongs 
to the linguistic medium whereby the order of human duty is subject to rational explanation and 
understanding. According to Derrida, this is not the absolute singularity of responsibility that 
Abraham faces completely alone, and which cannot be shared or understood. Drawing upon 
Kierkegaard, Derrida interprets this act of sacrifice as the absolute instant of decision which is 
an instant of madness. He writes, 
The paradox cannot be grasped in time and through mediation, that is to say in language and 
through reason. 
The Gift of Death. p. 65 
Does this imply that an understanding of the biblical narrative calls for the Kierkegaardian 'leap 
of faith'? (37) And does this mean that the singularity of Abraham's decision is beyond the limits 
of reason in a sphere of experience which cannot be mediated or rationally understood? If this 
decision, from a rational perspective, is indeed an instant of madness, does this mean that not 
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only is reason abandoned at the instant of decision, but it cannot even have a role to play in 
preparation for the leap? If so, then it would seem that reason itself may be ironically a madness, 
and each lifeworld is a'tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury and signifying nothing: (3s) 
Chapter six will address these questions raised by Kiekegaard and Derrida in a detailed analysis 
of the biblical narrative. An attempt will be made to show that the moment of decision may be 
grasped by means of an appropriation and habitation of the written mode of the narrative in 
which prose rhythm plays a critical role. That is, the reader appropriates the perspective of the 
'implied author', the other of the text, by means of an ontological sonority mediated through the 
prose rhythm of the narrative. It is this perspective, this grasping of the configuration of the 
narrative that creates the unified 'space' whereby reason is provoked beyond its existing limit in 
a process of continuing reflection. The reader is motivated by an ontological vehemence, 
generated by the dynamic of the self s appropriation of the other's viewpoint, and the sonorous 
expression of this appropriation mediated through the prose rhythm. 
To this end, it will be shown that the singularity of the decision is mediated through the 
singularity of a particular prose rhythm of a particular biblical text. That is, an appropriation and 
habitation of a particular text which mediates the singularity of Abraham's decision provides the 
means of grasping this singularity whereby reason is provoked in a continuing process of 
questioning and interpretation. In other words, a sensitive response to the prose rhythm of the text 
playing upon an imaginative grasp of its configuration makes possible an understanding of 
Abraham's decision. It is to grasp the particular viewpoint of the'implied author', the other of the 
text, in such a way that reason seeks to explain this viewpoint, this affirmation of understanding. 
Unable to free its explanations from suspicion, reason remains constantly open to new 
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interpretations in a dialectical relationship with the affirmation of understanding. This dialectic 
may be considered as a way of defining the Kierkegaardian paradox(39). The singularity of 
Abraham's decision may therefore be mediated through the written text, not as a universal but 
as a kind of Kantian regulative idea in the Ricoeurean sense(4o). 
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Chapter Six 
Self and Other 
Suspicion and Affirmation 
The Fourth Ontological Issue: The Primordial Dialectic of Self and Other 
(This is the fourth of the ontological issues of sonorous Being identified in Chapter 
Four, Page 89) 
Following the analysis of the sonorous nature of the primordial dialectic in chapter five, what 
follows is a development of this analysis as the dialectic between the relationship of the rational 
identity of self-consciousness and narrative identity as the 'other' of the text; that is, between Self 
and Other. The former being the mode of suspicion, and the latter that of affirmation. This 
relationship is a fundamental issue of this study provoked by the question, how is it possible 
rationally to affirm an understanding of a narrative when it would seem that rational 
explanations cannot escape from suspicion? Or to put it another way, if temporal experience 
subjects the reader to an open horizon of interpretation in relation to the text, how may 
understanding be rationally affirmed when explanations must be continuous and endless in the 
hermeneutical process? Day to day understanding, according to Ricoeur, is based upon language 
as a fiduciary institution(i), whereby explanations are taken as provisional, and may become part 
of a linguistic sedimentation in terms of established, conventional meaning. Suspicion of this 
conventional meaning is not lifted but held in abeyance until such times as it is revealed to be 
inhibiting or damaging in its effects upon human freedom(2). A more profound and disturbing 
consequence is the closure of the hermeneutical process in a failure to question the a priori or 
metaphysical foundations of rational understanding. If rational affirmation is possible it cannot 
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be at the cost of suspending the suspicion of its explanations. 
What follows is an analysis of a particular text in an attempt to show how the relationship of 
suspicion and affirmation is the expression of the primordial dialectic of Self and Other in 
terms of prose rhythm as the mediation of its ontological sonority. 
Selected Narrative: Abraham's Sacrifice (See Appendix) 
At the conclusion of chapter five, consideration was given to those narratives which pose the 
most critical challenge to the relationship between suspicion and affirmation. Tragedies, and 
particularly narratives which seem to present an absurd challenge to reason, raise the issue in its 
most acute form. The Biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, it was proposed, is an 
example of the latter which will be the subject of critical analysis in this chapter. The purpose 
being to attempt to show how it may be possible to understand this seemingly incomprehensible 
act in a way that opens up a hermeneutical process in terms of rational probabilities. That is, an 
understanding achieved by an openness to meaning, unconstrained by the semantic past, which 
vehemently provokes rational explanation into securing innovative probabilities. It is the question 
of grasping the singularity of an act not by means of universal conceptuality but by the mediation 
of a configuration which acts as a schema for the conceptual manifold(s). 
Literary Approach to the Text 
It must be made clear that the analysis will be conducted on the basis of a literary approach(a) to 
the text with respect to the philosophical purpose of demonstrating the possibility of the 
affirmation of rational meaning. For this reason, the Biblical narrative will be treated as a story 
free from any theological presuppositions or exegetical purposes with respect to a community 
145 
of religious faith, and will not address any historical or anthropological issues such as child 
sacrifice(s). Although the text is an integral part of the Biblical written tradition that has been 
subjected to seemingly considerable redaction, which in turn has inspired a critical 
hermeneutical process drawing upon wide ranging studies of archaeological, anthropological 
and other disciplines, it is the story as preserved in a particular text that will circumscribe the 
analysis. What is at stake is the process of inhabiting the lifeworld of the text in terms of 
appropriating the ontological perspective of the Other of the narrative whereby the meaning of 
the story may be understood, provoking uninhibited attempts at rational explanation. 
By means of the analysis, endeavour will be made to show that prose rhythm is a key 
characteristic of such appropriation, and therefore it will be limited to a particular text in a 
particular language and a particular translation. The issue is not whether a particular translation 
accurately mediates the original text, although with respect to the Biblical tradition this is 
obviously very important. It is an ontological issue of habitation involving fundamental 
acoustical and visual characteristics that are peculiar to the prose rhythm of a particular 
linguistic form of the narrative. From this point of view, the issue of translation would concern 
the ability to listen and possess a corporeal sensitivity to the rhythmic resonance of different 
languages(6). It would also raise questions about the comparative merits of particular texts in 
different languages with respect to their rhythmic capacity to promote rational understanding. But 
these questions are not directly related to the purpose of this analysis. 
'Authorized Version' of the Biblical Text 
The particular text selected for the purpose of this analysis is the 'Authorized Version' of the 
Bible first published in 1611 and dedicated to King James. Although it has been criticized with 
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respect to its accuracy as a translation of the original Hebrew and Greek, it has been commended 
for its suitability in sharing the simple, concrete and direct characteristics with the Hebrew 
language(7). According to a number of scholars of the English language, these characteristics 
have informed and influenced its development both with respect to literature and the vernacular. 
For example, Addison wrote, 
There is a certain coldness and indifference in the phrases of our European languages, when compared 
with the oriental forms of speech; and it happens very luckily, that the Hebrew idioms run into the 
English tongue with a particular grace and beauty. Our language has received innumerable elegancies 
and improvements, from that infusion of Hebraism, which are derived to it out of the poetical passages 
in Holy Writ. They give force and energy to, our expression, warm and animate our language, and convey 
our thoughts in more ardent and intense phrases, than any that are to be met with in our own tongue. 
'Spectator; No. 405 quoted in T. R. Henn's The Bible as Literature, p. 35. 
In more recent times, this view has been expressed by T. R. Henn with regard, for example, to the 
cadence, favoured by the Translators, as the metrical pattern marking the final clauses of 
sentences in certain kinds of prose(s). He notes the way this Hebraic aspect has been taken up 
into the'Authorized Version' of the Bible in its development in the English language: 
It passes into English through late Latin, and particularly through the rhythms of the Cranmer prayer- 
book, deriving from the Mass. It appears strongly in the Latin versions of the Psalms, and widely 
dispersed, in the Latin of St. Jerome's Vulgate which was so familiar to the early Translators. 
The Bible as Literature p. 39 
Writing in Peake's Commentary on the Bible, he expresses the view that 
It seems probable that its rhythms are embedded in us (first through the Latin of ritual, and their 
transpositions into English Liturgy) so firmly as to condition our recognition, and response to, 
all other rhythms of a similar nature. 
Peake's Commentary p. 8 
Although this is a debateable viewpoint in relation to a variety of opinions with respect to the 
richness and fluidity of the historical development of the English language, it is evident that the 
'Authorized Version' was the climax of a number of Biblical translations in the age of the 
Renaissance, 1500 to 1650, which played a significant role in linguistic development of what 
has become known as the Modem English Period(9). In the chapter on the Renaissance in The 
History of the English Language, Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable outline the important and 
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key developments whereby the Modem period was established in which, for example, 
vocabulary, grammar, pronunciation, particularly vowel sounds, have maintained a continuity 
of characteristics in the constant changes of historical development. In this context, the 
conviction that the rhythms of the 'Authorized Version' retain an abiding influence in the present 
age are shared by many. Another example is Peter Quennell's view expressed in A History of 
English Literature: 
... unnumbered Englishmen, believers and atheists alike, have felt the Bible's all-pervading influence 
and, consciously or unconsciously, have sought to echo the rhythms of its poetic divagations and of 
its succinct yet always powerful narrative. 
A History of English literature p. 108 
The point being made is that the sedimentations of present day English may not only be identified 
in the conventional meaning of words and idioms, but also in the rhythms which may be traced 
to the Renaissance in which the 'Authorized Version' of the Bible is a crucial influence. 
Consequently, the resonance and sonority which play an important role in the appropriation of 
English prose narratives may be, directly or indirectly, regulated by the Biblical rhythms. A 
regulation that may be understood as a key characteristic of the ontological sonorous condition 
of those for whom English is indigenous to their native lifeworld. This is, as already 
acknowledged, a speculative view, but it does indicate a possibly significant factor in the English 
reader's understanding of the particular Biblical narrative selected for analysis. 
The Problem in Understanding the Narrative 
Before attempting to analyze the narrative with respect to the fundamental role played by the 
particular prose rhythm of the 'Authorized Version', it is necessary to clarify the problem of 
understanding and explaining the passage. Turning to the text in Genesis chapter 22, verses 1 to 
19, it is clear that the apparent problem in an attempt to understand lies in Abraham's seeming 
willingness to sacrifice his son. It is in the relationship of verse 10, with its succinct description 
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of taking the knife to slay Isaac, and verse 2, which states without reservation, in the words of 
God, the love of Abraham for his son, that any attempt to understand the narrative is given its 
sharpest challenge. Although it may be helpful to have some knowledge of the larger Genesis 
narrative of which this sacrifice is part, including the expressions of Abraham's faith and 
obedience, and the divine blessings he and his wife, Sarah, receive, especially the gift of a son 
in their old age, these do not detract from the profound difficulty of understanding the 
relationship between verses 2 and 10. There may be the temptation to suggest that Abraham 
believed that God would withhold his hand at the last moment and provide for the sacrifice. 
Since this is indeed what happens in verse 11 and following, and since Abraham had experienced 
God's blessings in the past, the greatest being the gift of Isaac, then it may seem reasonable to 
explain verse 10 in this way. But there is no basis for this interpretation in verses 1 to 10. 
Furthermore, if Abraham does have this belief, the act itself does not make sense. The narrative 
of God's tempting Abraham must surely mean that he cannot stretch forth his hand to slay his son 
unless he is willing to perform the act. What is so seemingly incomprehensible in this narrative 
are not, primarily, the ways of God, nor any metaphysical speculation about the existence or 
nature of the Divinity, or the covenantal relationship between the Hebrew Deity and the Father 
of its Faith, but the motive of an old man in the act of sacrificing his son(1o). How is it possible 
to appropriate and inhabit the lifeworld of this old man to begin to understand and make sense 
of this act? 
Configuration and Metaphor 
An attempt was made in chapter five to show the importance of the relationship between the 
figuration of the narrative and prose rhythm. For this reason it is helpful to analyze the former 
in attempting to identify the perspective of its 'implied author' or Other. If the narrative may be 
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rationally understood and open to explanation, there must be access to its narrative identity in 
terms of the perspective of its 'implied author'. That is, to be critically aware of the focus of 
configuration which dynamically draws together the total figuration of the narrative. If there is 
such a perspective it must surely be centred upon the moment of the act in verse 10: 'And 
Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay him. ' It is in the figure of this direct, 
pithy description that the reader's imagination is given a viewpoint, a gestalt whereby his 
particular and operative intentionalities are configured. That is, the various figures leading to 
this key moment are formed in relation to the sacrificial act. For example, the imaginative 
perception of Abraham rising early in the morning saddling his ass, with respect to every feature 
and characteristic of his movements and bodily expression, is informed by the impending 
moment when he stretches forth his hand to strike with the knife. The significant aspect of this 
configuration, as noted above, is the interrelationship of the figure in verse 10 with the figure of 
a loving father mediated by the words in verse 2, 'Take thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou 
lovest... ' What is the imaginative perception of this figure from the perspective of the Other of 
the text? 
A closer examination of the relationship between verses 2 and 10 reveals that it involves more 
than an act of configuration. From Ricoeur's work on semantic innovation in which there is a 
close relationship between his theories of narrative and metaphor, the figure in verse 10 may be 
seen not only as the focus of the configuration but also the iconic moment in a metaphor which 
is integrally related to the emplotment of the narrative. This, of course, is drawing upon Ricoeur's 
theory in which the base unit of metaphor is the sentence, and may be, as in this case, the whole 
of the narrative. In other words, the iconic moment is the symbolic mediation which precipitates 
a semantic interactive process throughout the discourse, or narrative. Symbol here being 
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understood as an ontological mediation whereby the metaphoric figure is an ontological 
perspective which initiates a vehemence of semantic interaction within the text(il). It is an act of 
appropriation and habitation with respect to a metaphor which involves semantic innovation born 
out of interaction. 
It is proposed that the Biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice in Genesis chapter 22 may, and 
indeed should be, read as a metaphor. Therefore, to begin to understand and explain this 
seemingly incomprehensible narrative calls for an act of configuration involving a response to 
the symbolic mediation of the metaphor. The key figure of configuration, and the iconic moment 
of the metaphor being verse 10, 'And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay 
his son. ' The cultic act of sacrifice is symbolic(12). The meaning is a'this for that'. But the act 
does not stand for something else(13). The literal meaning as set out in verse 10 is taken up and 
transcended by a new meaning created out of an interaction between verse 10 and the rest of the 
narrative, particularly verse 2. It may be helpful to have some understanding of the cultic practice 
of sacrifice both with respect to the Biblical tradition, and knowledge of contemporary rites and 
rituals. Nevertheless, it is clear in the text alone that the act of sacrifice in verse 10 is symbolic, 
and, in terms of the literary characteristics of the narrative, it is a metaphor. 
To begin to understand the act involves grasping its figuration; to imaginatively perceive this 
moment from the narrative's perspective. Consequently, the figure cannot be grasped on the basis 
of a literal understanding. The figure takes on a symbolic aspect which mediates a meaning 
which may only be revealed, or rather created, since the reader's imagination is involved in a 
creative process, in the rest of the text. Therefore, as a result of the appropriation and habitation 
of the narrative's ontological viewpoint, the perspective of the Other, the literal meaning of 'And 
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Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son. ' vehemently interacts in the 
semantic field of the narrative, particularly with verse 2a, 'And he said, Take now thy son, thine 
only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah'. The meaning of the 
sacrifice may only be understood in terms of the imaginative visual appropriation of the figure 
of Abraham as the loving father of Isaac. A superficial attempt to understand could be that the 
meaning of this sacrifice is Abraham's decision to give up the one who is most precious to him. 
But if Abraham's love for Isaac is completely selfless, then this meaning of the act would not be 
rational since it would be paradoxically selfish, since giving up in this way is aimed at satisfying 
Abraham's personal faith and conviction. In other words, he would be willing to kill his son in 
order to maintain his own existential security(14). 
There have been many attempts at interpretation in which the symbolic and metaphoric features 
have been explicitly or implicitly taken into account. Gerhard von Rad makes the claim, 
There are many levels of meaning, and whoever thinks he has discovered virgin soil must discover 
at once that there are many more layers below that. Such a mature narrator as this one has no 
intention of paraphrasing exactly the meaning of such an event and stating it for the reader. On the 
contrary, a story like this is basically open to interpretation and to whatever thoughts the reader is 
inspired. 
Genesis, A Commentary SCM p. 238 
But the critical question is, can there be any level of meaning discovered in the relationship 
between verses 2 and 10 in the text? For example, in his commentary von Rad suggests, 
It has to do with a road out into God forsakenness on which Abraham does not know that God 
is only testing him. There is thus considerable religious experience behind these nineteen verses: 
that Yahweh often seems to contradict himself, that he appears to remove the salvation begun 
by himself from history. But in this way Yahweh tests faith and obedience! 
ibid p. 239 
Yet this level of meaning is grounded in metaphysical assumptions which, from a philosophical 
point of view, not only challenge rational explanation, but seemingly act as a closure on any 
further attempts at interpretation(Is). This, of course, may not be what von Rad intends, and 
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presumably he would encourage questioning the metaphysical assumptions, but in claiming there 
are levels of meaning discovered in the narrative, he provides no evidence of them other than 
those which are grounded in some a priori foundation. These are meanings subject to suspicion 
without any apparent possibility of rational affirmation. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate 
that there may be such affirmation which opens the horizon of rational explanation so that 
suspicion is not the result of its closure(16). 
The Linguistic Mediation of Singularity 
The problem in its most acute form is presented by Derrida in The Gift of Death. The essay in 
chapter three, 'Whom to Give to (Knowing not to Know)', takes the issue of the individual's 
responsibility and decision, with respect to Abraham's act of sacrifice, as a singularity which 
cannot be linguistically communicated, and therefore cannot be understood by others. The 
understanding of the decision to act is a secret between God and Abraham. He writes, 
To the extent that, in not saying the essential thing, namely, the secret between God and him, 
Abraham doesn't speak, he assumes the responsibility that consists in always being alone, 
entrenched in one's own singularity at the moment of decision. Just as no one can die in my 
place, no one can make a decision, what we call "a decision, " in my place. But as soon as 
one speaks, as soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very singularity. 
The Gij? of Death p. 60-1 
If Derrida is correct, then all linguistic meaning is either based upon a priori assumptions, or is 
conventional, and there is no foundation for rational affirmation other than conventionality(i7). 
If it is not possible to grasp, to have some understanding of the other's singularity in the moment 
of decision in terms of the mediation of language, then there is no possibility of a linguistic 
perspective for a hermeneutical process in which understanding constantly provokes continuing 
explanation. With regard to the Biblical narrative in question, from Derrida's approach, there is 
no possibility of understanding Abraham's decision to sacrifice his son, and therefore the story 
is incomprehensiblem). 
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It is, however, incomprehensible in terms of the possibility of an universal conceptuality of 
Abraham's singularity in the moment of decision. Derrida states, 
We would no longer dare speak of "the universal concept of responsibility" 
ibid. p. 61 
There is of course such a concept, but the point that Derrida is making is that it does not 
communicate the singularity of the moment of decision. In other words, it is a concept that is not 
free of suspicion(i9). With respect to the aim of this study, the question is whether it is a concept 
that may be subject to continuing openness of interpretation in an affirmation of unity of a 
rational 'space' grounded in the singularity of the moment of decision. That is, to appropriate the 
configuration of the narrative, and the iconic moment of the key metaphor, is to affirm an 
understanding that opens the rational 'space' for continual rational explanation. It is to grasp the 
meaning of the singularity of the moment of decision so that it may indeed be linguistically 
mediated in terms of rational explanation. 
Self and Other 
For this to be so, the reader must appropriate a condition of being by a willingness to relinquish 
any sense of finality of meaning by which his or her self reflection may have become 
dependentwo). It is a question of a relationship between Self and Other whereby the Self may 
inhabit the Other's ontological viewpoint which produces a semantic innovation in the process 
of self reflection. The concept of Otherness has been the subject of considerable interest in recent 
philosophical debate, but it is in the work of Emmanuel Levinas that it has been given the most 
critical attention in his philosophy of the Other. It is therefore important to provide some 
explanation about the way this concept is being used, and the significant difference with respect 
to the Levanasian Other. According to Levinas, there is no possibility of understanding and 
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explaining the Other. The metaphysical absolute desire for the Other places it outside self 
consciousnessai). From this perspective, Levinas contends that the history of Western philosophy 
reveals the attempt of the conscious I in seeking to grasp the Other through the mediation of 
appearance and enfold it in the sphere of the Same in terms of rational explanation(22). That is, 
the sphere of cognitive, conceptual mediation which is dependent upon repetition(23) with respect 
to meaning and knowledge, and the continuing identity of the self-conscious I. He writes, 
Our relation with the other (autrui) certainly consists in wanting to comprehend him, but this 
relation overflows comprehension. Not only because knowledge of the other (autrui) requires, 
outside of all curiosity, also sympathy or love, ways of being distinct from impassible 
contemplation, but because in our relation with the other (autrui), he does not affect us in terms 
of a concept. He is a being (etant) and counts as such. 
Basic Philosophical Writings. 'Is Ontology Fundamental? ' p. 6 
Levinas maintains that the relationship of the I with the Other is, more than anywhere else, in the 
face of the other human being, of the stranger. He claims that the position of the I in this 
relationship is not one of an awareness of duty and obligation, it is responsibility through and 
through. In other words, it is an ethical relationship in which the response is not founded upon 
comprehension but unquestionable responsibility. For this reason, he argues that metaphysics, 
in the sense of Ethics as the First Philosophy, precedes Ontology, and is therefore critical, from 
this perspective, of Heidegger's attempt to comprehend Being. He writes, 
If ontology - the comprehension, the embracing of Being - is impossible, it is not because 
every definition of Being already presupposes the knowledge of Being, as Pascal had said and 
Heidegger refutes in the first pages of Being and Time; it is because the comprehension of 
Being in general cannot dominate the relationship with the Other. The latter relationship 
commands the first. I cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, even when I 
consider the Being of the existent he is. 
Totality and Infinity p. 47 
There is a radical dichotomy between the Self and Other in Levinas's philosophy which cannot 
be bridged by any act of comprehension. 
In this thesis, the Other is being considered specifically as the Other of narrative. That is, the 
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'implied author', the ontological perspective which configures the narrative consequently 
structuring the rational 'space' whereby analysis and explanation may be conducted in the sphere 
of the Same. In contrast to Levinas, therefore, it is an attempt to demonstrate that an act of 
comprehension may take place. But this is not an Heideggerian comprehension of Being, it is 
a comprehension grounded upon the perspective of the Being of the Other. What is 
comprehended is not the latter but the Other's viewpoint. The reader is called to act in a process 
of appropriation and habitation of the ontological position of the Other. The act does not bridge 
the radical dichotomy between the Self and Other in terms of comprehension; the Other still 
overflows comprehension in the metaphysical desire of the Self for the absolute Other. What the 
act does achieve is a dialectical relationship between the Self and Other in the way the 
appropriation of the ontological perspective of the Other vehemently provokes semantic 
innovation in the sphere of the Same. 
A critical aspect of otherness identified by Ricoeur in Oneself as Another, and present in the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, is in the duality of the flesh and body(24). Ricoeur defines a 
critical characteristic of otherness in this relationship. Writing on the theme of suffering, he 
describes the otherness of the body, and its radical polarity with the flesh. Here, otherness is the 
passivity of the body as the victim of suffering represented by the experience of one's own body, 
and the flesh as the mediator between self and the world. The purpose is not to reflect upon 
Ricoeur's study of suffering, but simply to draw attention to an important contribution to this 
critical characteristic of otherness. This has already been considered in chapter 5. It now provides 
the link with the act of appropriation and habitation in terms of the important role of prose 
rhythm. That is, the understanding of the Self s appropriation of the Other's ontological 
perspective as the appropriation of sonorous Being mediated by the effect of prose rhythm upon 
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the body as otherness. 
Prose Rhythm and the Biblical Text 
Returning to the 'Authorized Version' of the Biblical text, does the prose rhythm of this text 
reveal the possibility of a sonorous effect which provides a dynamical vehemence in the 
metaphorical relationship between verses 2 and 10, whereby the iconic moment focused upon the 
figure of the act of sacrifice in the latter verse takes into itself the love of Abraham for Isaac in 
the former? Does this particular prose rhythm effect a bodily resonance in the act of reading that 
precipitates an ontological convergence in terms of an operative intentionality beyond the 'edge' 
of consciousness which, in the sense of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, makes possible an act 
of particular intentionality? That is, does the prose rhythm of the 'Authorized Version' make it 
possible to grasp the meaning of this particular act? Is it possible that this particular text 
linguistically mediates the singularity of the act in terms of a teleological, open process of 
rational explanation? 
Some consideration has been given to the prose rhythm of the'Authorized Version' of the Bible 
with respect to the speculative view that this rhythm may be a significant influence in present 
day English language. The English reader may therefore be'tuned' to its rhythm, in the way that 
the cultural indigenous patterns of musical beat may initiate an involuntary response to a rich 
variety of song and dance. The role of these patterns in the convergence of configurations of 
sound and movement in melody and motion is significant. But even if the rhythms of the 
'Authorized Version' were influential in this manner in the sense of playing a significant role in 
understanding the Biblical text, this would be a matter of conventionality. Linguistic 
sedimentation in itself may not be considered as a grounding for rational affirmation. However, 
it is important to recognize that it is an integral part of understanding and explanation, and, with 
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respect to prose rhythm, may be influential in the reader's act of appropriation and habitation. 
In examining the rhythmic patterns of stress in this particular passage, it is important to note the 
very concrete, and direct descriptions of action and place. There are few adjectives, or adverbs, 
or subordinate clauses. Typical of the 'Authorized Version', reflecting the original Hebrew, there 
is, as Henn observes, 'a poverty of connecting participles' resulting in a simple conjunctive style. 
The effect is a dramatic force which carries the narrative along, moving through peaks of action. 
Its simplicity of style tends to place the dominant stress pattern on the verb which focuses the 
reader's attention on the concrete moments of action, and is not distracted by reflection upon the 
descriptive features of the characters and place. In responding to the dynamic of the direct and 
concrete movement of action, the reader's imagination is rooted in the characters in a state of 
activity. The dominant focus, and therefore rhythmic stress, is not upon their thoughts or 
emotions but their actions. Any reflection upon the former is after the narrative has been read. 
Whatever meaning emerges from the act of reading is imaginatively grounded in the 
appropriation and habitation of the concrete actions. 
It is obvious from the text that this grounding is directly related to the figure of Abraham. In the 
first ten verses his name is mentioned ten times. The figure dominates the whole narrative: It is 
the story of Abraham's sacrifice of his son. Significantly, the word 'son' is found eight times in 
the same verses, with the repetition in verse 2; whereas the name Isaac is found only five times. 
There is, therefore, an effect upon the imaginative figure of Abraham in action with respect to 
the relation to his son. It is the figure of the father in the act of killing his son. But this is an act 
of sacrifice, and the purpose, according to the narrative, is to tempt Abraham. The son, therefore, 
in the moment of the act is the means of this temptation. That is, the literal meaning of the son 
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becomes the metaphoric meaning of temptation in the act of sacrifice. Any attempt at interpreting 
this meaning of temptation may be given clarification by drawing upon the wider narrative in 
Genesis, and perhaps the knowledge of ritual sacrifice in the ancient world. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from the narrative that Abraham's relationship with God is being tested. The command to 
perform this sacrificial act is a testing of obedience. Beyond that, the nature of this obedience is 
speculative. What is not speculative is the objective mode of this testing in the son. The son is 
this objective mode of this act of testing. Therefore, the figure of the son in the act of sacrifice 
is a metaphor. More particularly, the figure of the father in the act of sacrificing his son is the 
iconic moment of the metaphor. 
In terms of metaphora, the question is, from whence does this figure of temptation draw its 
meaning? The answer is, from the relationship of the father to the son; particularly, from the 
expression of that relationship in verse 2: 'Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou 
lovest'. The movement of the action is significantly influenced by this metaphoric effect; and the 
semantic interaction precipitated by the iconic moment of verse 10 is imaginatively grounded in 
this central relationship whereby action is insistently rooted in Abraham's relationship with his 
son. So far as this particular text is concerned, the action is not grounded in Abraham's obedience 
to God, although that is obviously important. It is this obedience which is being tested. But the 
focus that generates the semantic interaction, and therefore the meaning, is the relationship with 
his son which is fundamental in grasping the narrative. 
In the 'Authorized Version', and particularly this passage, the rhythmic cadence coming at the end 
of a sentence, where the conjunction is a mark of the sentence structure, mediates a persuasive 
effect that the dramatic movement has meaning(25). The insistent cadence of a downward stress 
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is experienced as an assurance that the narrative will not lead to a sense of fragmentation and 
chaos. This contrasts, for example, with those poets who have attempted to create a sense of 
uncertainty and insecurity. Thomas Hardy produces this effect in his poem, The Voice. The poem 
begins in the style of a swinging ballad that gives way to an unhappy listlessness of movement 
expressive of Hardy's loss and desolation in the breakdown of the verse form in the last stanza(26). 
The pattern of cadence in the movement between verse 2 and verse 10 of the Biblical narrative 
resonates with a seemingly dynamic urgency. By this regular rhythmic, measured fall in relation 
to the narrative's movement of action, the reader appropriates a sense that the action is moving 
to a climax, even a sense of resolution or completion. This does not mean that this pattern of 
cadence ensures that the love of Abraham for his son is carried through the action to become the 
defining feature in the figure of the sacrificial act, but plays a key element in the reader's grasp 
of this figure. 
As indicated above, the stress pattern of the narrative prose rhythm is, for the most part, directly 
related to the verb structure. This is combined with a tendency to monosyllabic verbs with an 
incisive, crisp sound that resonates with a sense of a positive beat in the rhythmic movement. 
Each action is combined with an anticipatory stress. The stress pattern begins in verse 1 with an 
almost relaxed pace leading to a flowing, modulated rhythm in verse 2 which mediates a sense 
of the intimacy and closeness of father and son, and the grave nature of the command. Verse 
3 changes the mood to one of commitment and determination with the stress on the practical 
needs of responding to the command. Then in verse three the sound and resonance mediates a 
holding back with respect to the sentence structure, and the upward tone of'lifted up' and 'saw'. 
The reader feels the hesitancy and disturbance in Abraham's movement towards the climax. Even 
the cadence of assurance is mingled with this disturbance in an impression of a struggle between 
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a rise and fall in 'afar off. The holding back is maintained in verse 5, but with the stress upon a 
different tone in 'abide' and 'worship' mediating a diversion of revival; a kind of 'stopping for 
breath' in a determination to complete the course. Here the cadence is the clear fall of trust and 
conviction. The pace picks up again in verse 6 with a similar stress pattern to verse 3, and once 
more is held up in verse 7 and 8. This time the focus of stress is upon the son. But it is the son 
in relation to Abraham, and therefore what is mediated is a state of being appropriated by the 
reader whereby the figure of Abraham remains the centre of attention. The holding back is not 
one of hesitancy but curiosity and trust, and Abraham's response of paternal assurance. Verse 9 
repeats the pattern of verses 3 and 6 so that the movement from verse 2 to verse 10 is maintained 
throughout the narrative with a dominant practical sense of action as the essential ontological 
dynamic of the metaphoric semantic interaction precipitated by the iconic moment in verse 10. 
The stress pattern of the climactic moment in the narrative is one of the three ringing tones of a 
bell - 'stretched', 'took' and 'slay'. At the moment in the reader's habitation of the narrative's 
perspective, the ringing resonates with a trembling in the Kierkegaardian sense(2v). The trembling 
is the effect of an ontological sonority which is mediated through the productive imagination in 
the reader's creative response to the figure of Abraham in this moment when his love for his son 
informs the act of sacrifice. This is not a response of cognitive understanding, but the disclosure 
of a figure, in the Heideggerian sense(28), which becomes the focus of the metaphoric iconic 
moment. 
Sound and Imaginative Vision 
What must be appreciated is the unity of sound and imaginative vision in this creative process 
of disclosure. It is analogous to the sculptor's creative activity in disclosing the image in and 
through the material medium. The sculptor works with the marble or stone. His creativity is 
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tactile, and allied with the particularity of the medium. He chooses his material carefully, 
sensitive to its touch by which he may discern the possibilities of disclosure. Even then, he must 
engage in a creative relationship with the chosen object in the revelatory process of his work. So 
too, the sensitive reader is responsive to the objective materiality of prose rhythm in terms of its 
sound and the effect of its resonance in relation to an act of configuration, or metaphoric figure. 
The rhythm is the material medium of the creative, figurative act. It is the dynamic materiality 
which gives impetus and convergence in the disclosure of the figure. With respect to the 
'Authorized Version' of the particular Biblical text, what is proposed is that its prose rhythm is 
the medium that makes possible the reader's grasp of a figure of a loving father in the act of 
sacrificing his son by which he or she is given understanding. The figure affirms a sense that this 
is not an irrational act. It provokes the reader to seek a rational explanation. Prose rhythm is the 
medium of the productive imagination. It is not the figure that may be disclosed in the work of 
the imagination, but, to draw upon another analogy, the texture and weave of the figure. 
The Instant of Affirmation 
The act of grasping the metaphoric figure of the iconic moment is analogous to the moment of 
poetic vision, for example, expressed by Gerard Manley Hopkins in his poem God's Grandeur 
when the sight of a bird in flight, caught by the sun, captures a sense of divine presence in the 
world: 
Oh, the morning, at the brown brink eastwards, springs - 
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent 
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings. 
For the reader of'Abraham's Sacrifice' who appropriates the trembling resonance of the iconic 
moment, inhabiting the Other's ontological perspective upon a figure which mediates profound 
meaning beyond the seemingly absurd, tragic moment, affirmation involves an instant of 
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relinquishing self reflection. It is the achievement of an ontological vehemence in the metaphor's 
power of re-description. Such re-description comes only by means of an instant of abandoning 
rational description. It is a loss of Self in the Other in the re-discovery of Self in relation to an 
open horizon of the hermeneutical spiral. With respect to the story of 'Abraham's Sacrifice', the 
reader's grasp of the metaphor is not limited to the analogy of poetic vision. It is potentially, and 
may actually involve, an intense, penetrating act of perception analogous to T. S. Eliot's attempt 
to express Thomas Becket's moment of vision in Murder in the Cathedral: 
I have had a tremor of bliss, a wink of heaven, a whisper, 
And I would no longer be denied; all things 
Proceed to a joyful consummation. 
It is an affirmation of an ontological grounding of Self in the perspective of the Other in the 
process of a creative grasp of meaning that opens the horizon of reason to continuing 
interpretation and rational description. But the inherent propensity of reason is definition. The 
logical structures of cognition are intrinsically unambiguous, and semantically founded upon 
univocity. Metaphoric ontological vehemence in uprooting the univocity of a literal meaning to 
interact between semantic fields is therefore a dynamic shattering of cognitive resistance in an 
instant of affirmation. The ontological trembling is the effect of this shattering and recovery of 
cognition in a new spatial pattern. This is analogous to shaking the kaleidoscope in the shattering 
of one pattern in the instant of creating a new one. 
It may be helpful in understanding this notion of the instant to consider Kierkegaard's attempt 
in The Concept of Dread to define his interpretation of Plato's conception in Parmenides: 
It is assumed that unity (va ev) is and is not, and then it is shown what the consequence will be 
for it and for the rest. The instant now appears to be that strange being (ä zo iro v- the Greek word 
is admirably chosen) which lies between movement and repose, without occupying any time; and 
to this and out of this "the moving" passes over into the rest, and "the reposing" into movement. The 
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instant therefore becomes the general category of transition (pcrap oArj); for Plato shows that the 
instant is related in the same way to the transition from unity to plurality and from plurality to unity, 
from likeness to unlikeness, etc., it is the instant in which there is neither Iv nor noAAä, neither 
discrimination nor integration. 
The Concept of Dread p. 75 
In the instant of grasping the metaphoric figure, the tension of the is and the is not in the semantic 
interaction of the metaphora is transcended by the power of the productive imagination generated 
by the ontological sonority in the dialectic between Self and Other. It is transcended by the power 
of the imagination re-organizing, within the instant, a unified perception of the world, and, 
consequently, the rational 'space'. 
Chapter seven will attempt to demonstrate the fundamental role of the imagination in the 
hermeneutical movement from suspicion to affirmation. It will endeavour to show that the power 
of the imagination in this movement is related to the objective, corporeal aspect of the body as 
well as the phenomenal; and fundamentally is grounded in the dynamic of ontological sonority. 
To this end, it will draw upon Ricoeur's interpretation of the Kantian notion of the productive 
imagination. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Creative Imagination 
Throughout this study, the role of the imagination has been fundamental to the analysis which 
attempts to disclose the ontological ground of understanding through language, taking the 
reading of prose narratives as paradigmatic(i). That is, to show that and how it is the reader's 
imagination, grounded in his or her being-in-the-world, whereby a foundation is given to 
understanding which may be rationally affirmed. It is the fundamental role of the imagination, 
as the expressive mediation of the ontological foundation for a rational 'space', that is the critical 
difference between the approach of this study and the rational philosophies of Descartes, Kant 
and Husserl. In contrast, each of these have attempted to ground the rational structures of the 
mind directly in an a priori, transcendental foundation. 
Kant's Notion of the Productive Imagination 
The imagination does indeed play a key part in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique 
of Judgment, and his notion of the productive imagination, particularly with reference to 
Ricoeur's attempt to redefine its role, is influential in this study. It is therefore important, in 
attempting to explore the critical role of the imagination, to clarify the significance of adopting 
this notion in a philosophical perspective that is radically different from that of its original 
introduction by Kant. That is, the difference between an ontological foundation expressively 
mediated by the productive imagination, and Kantian transcendentalism with, what may deemed 
to be, a more circumscribed understanding of its role(2). 
Kant's aim is to validate rational unity by means of an ahistorical, transcendental subjective 
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foundation(3). According to Kant, although the mind is rooted in the world through sensible 
intuition, it is not dependent upon empirical faculties in its power to think rationally. The original 
unity of rational thought is direct, and outside of history in terms of the transcendental structures 
of the mind. It may therefore be concluded that from Kant's point of view it is unchanging and 
absolute. In contrast, the aim of this study is to validate the unity of a perspective in which 
rational reflection is probable(4), and which is linguistically mediated through texts that are 
temporally structured, and is, therefore, historically mediated. Consequently, it is a unity that is 
not free from historical change and, therefore, the suspicion and constant questioning of an 
hermeneutical spiral. Fundamentally, the source of this unity, as considered in the preceding 
chapters, is the dialectical relationship between the Self and Other. The unity of a rational 
perspective is grounded in a relationship of the Self with the Other in terms of a reader's 
appropriation and habitation of the narrative identity of a text. 
As a preliminary introduction to the analysis of this notion of the productive imagination in 
relation to these two differing perspectives with the aim of clarifying its significance regarding 
the theme of this study, the following is a brief outline of Kants attempt to define the role played 
by the imagination in his First and Third Critiques. In the Preface to the Second Edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes, 
it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard 
to them prior to their being given... 
Critique of Pure Reason Tr. Norman Kemp Smith p. 22 
He claims that knowledge of objects, although determined by sensibility, is founded upon a 
priori principles of intuition that he endows with a formal character which he calls the 'science 
of all principles' and terms the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'(s). According to Kant, the appearance 
of sense phenomena in consciousness is represented in cognition under the synthetic control of 
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the a priori principles of intuition by means of the faculty of the imagination. This synthesis, 
which he calls, the 'Transcendental Synthesis', is the effect of the imaginative power to 
schematize a conceptual manifold which brings together, which 'grasps', the empirical 
phenomena represented in empirical form. It is a judgment of understanding with respect to the 
appearance of objects in a rational form(6). 
There are, however, two modes of the role of the imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason. The 
productive mode relates the cognitive process to the a priori principles, or categories of reason, 
whilst the reproductive mode ensures that the schematization of the conceptual manifold is 
based upon sense experience. In reference to these two modes, he writes, 
I sometimes also entitle it the productive imagination, to distinguish it from the reproductive 
imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, namely, of association, 
and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori 
knowledge. The reproductive synthesis falls within the domain, not of transcendental 
philosophy, but of psychology. 
ibid. #24 B 152 p. 165 
Kant entitles the reproductive synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, the figurative 
synthesisp2. It is that which gives form to the representation of the appearance of sense 
experience in consciousness. This reproduction of the form of appearance by the figurative 
synthesis of the empirical imagination, according to Kant, is made possible by the Transcendental 
Aesthetic of pure intuition and form. He writes, 
That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, cannot itself 
be sensation; and, therefore, while the matter of appearance is given to us a posteriori only, 
its form must lie already for sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being 
considered apart from all sensations. 
ibid. # B34 p. 66 
The Transcendental Aesthetic not only determines extension and figure, but the intuitive sense 
of time and spacem. This is the mode of the productive imagination, which Kant develops as a 
creative faculty in the Critique ofJudgment. 
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In this Third Critique, as it is known, Kant's aim in the first part is to show how the subjective 
capacity of the human mind establishes notions of taste, beauty and the sublime. To this end, the 
productive mode becomes the means of defining the imagination as a creative faculty in the mind 
of the genius(v). The reproductive mode continually brings back to the mind an exhibition of the 
forms which have been received through empirical intuition. For the most part, these are derived 
from the natural world. The productive mode has the power of original exhibition; it is a creative 
power that gives birth to aesthetic ideas which are the counterpart of rational ideas. By the 
former, Kant does not mean determinate concepts but refers to a mode of presentation which sets 
intellectual thought in motion(io). 
The imagination, in the Third Critique, with respect to its productive mode, is a faculty with the 
capacity to create an original presentation of images in terms of the free play of the imagination 
acting upon cognition to expand conceptual meaning. By means of the creative capacity of the 
imagination, the rational subject may increase understanding of his or her experience of the 
objective world. But this understanding is determined by a rational unity founded upon the 
transcendental subject and not upon the objective world. Although sensible intuition is the basis 
for the creative capacity of the imagination, unity is derived from the a priori categorical 
structures of the mind, and transcendental apperception as the foundation of the thinking 
subject. It is these critical aspects of unity which need careful consideration in order to make 
clear the contrast with the ontological foundation for unity which is the theme of this study. 
Kant's understanding of the unity of the categories of rational thought was, in the early writings, 
taken over from the traditional transcendental sense of unity derived from the unity of the 
supreme beingguo. Although in the Critique of Pure Reason he seeks to reduce this to a category 
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of quantity, he is also concerned to emphasize the extra-categorical sense of unity as the basis 
of all logical functions in the judgment of rational thought(iz). The significance of this lies in 
Kant's attempt to develop a system of transcendental philosophy as the foundation for science to 
resolve the 'endless controversies' on the 'battleground' of metaphysics. He writes, 
Had the ancients ever conceived such a notion (i. e. the a priori unity of judging and the pure 
concepts of the understanding), doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge, which 
under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have reached 
us in quite another shape, and would have enlightened the human understanding, instead of 
actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculation, thereby rendering it unfit for true science. 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. ed. 1996 p. 87 
Kant's notion of transcendental unity is unconditioned and is the foundation of synthetic unity 
which is thought in the categories. Apperception plays the central role in this foundation of 
transcendental unity. That is, apperception as the source of original unity which is the foundation 
of the thinking subject; in other words, transcendental apperception that lies beyond thought and 
is the unchanging unity of the subject's identity, in contrast to what Kant terms empirical 
apperception. He writes, 
This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception. Conscious- 
ness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and 
always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such 
consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception. What has necessarily to be 
represented numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. To render such 
a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and 
which makes experience itself possible... 
The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts... 
Critique of Pure Reason. A107 p. 136 
The productive mode of the imagination is, therefore, on the one hand, based upon sensible 
intuition, but, on the other, determined by the original unity of transcendental apperception in 
terms of the achievement of greater understanding. This mode of the imagination is dependent 
upon sense experience of objects in creating aesthetic ideas, or the exhibition of new forms, by 
promoting and regulating a cognitive response in conceptual development and expansion. It is 
the dynamic capacity aesthetically to re-structure sensible intuition in a creative power of 
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presentation promoting thought. For example, the imaginative perception of a tree, based upon 
the sensible intuition of the object as a tree, may create an aesthetic idea of the majesty, or 
dignity or nobility of the tree which promotes rational thought in the conceptual descriptions and 
explanations of this idea(ls). But the foundation of the latter is the original unity of subjective 
identity. In contrast to the creativity of the imagination, this unity is not dynamic. It is 
unchanging and ahistorical, otherwise, according to Kant, there is no possibility of validating 
conceptual unity as the basis for rational thought. 
The Productive Imagination and Ontological Perspective 
In this lies the critical difference between Kant's aim and that of this study. As indicated above, 
Kant claims that the unity of consciousness, which he terms transcendental apperception, makes 
possible the purest objective unity in the a priori concepts of time and space, and is thus the a 
priori ground of all concepts. It is that 'mysterious power' which 'makes judging possible'. 
Judging, according to Kant, is the act of understanding in terms of the condition of determining 
judgements as objectively valid with respect to the pure concepts of understanding listed in the 
a priori categories. The problem with Kant's transcendental philosophy, which has been 
identified in the earlier chapters and is a central theme of this study, is the issue of temporality. 
Trancendental apperception, the a priori unity of consciousness, is outside of temporality. If 
consciousness is always and essentially historical, that is, if the conscious 'I', self-consciousness, 
not only inherently possesses a past, present and future but is conditioned by being-in-the-world 
in terms of the Heideggerian notion of Dasein, then the unity of consciousness cannot lie beyond 
history. The source of this unity must lie within history. 
An aim of this thesis has been to show that this unity, defined in terms of the identity of self- 
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consciousness, is grounded in the ontological perspective of a linguistically structured lifeworid. 
This perspective is not limited to a particular way of seeing the world. As Cassirer writes, 
For it is not a question of what we see in a certain perspective, but of the perspective itself. 
Language and Myth p. 11 
In other words, it is a perspective of habitation; it is a way of inhabiting a lifeworld. Cassirer is 
concerned here with the way human beings inhabit'myths'(i4), or lifeworlds, through language. 
He writes, 
Mythology is inevitable, it is natural, it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognize 
in language the outward form and manifestation of thought... Mythology, in the highest sense, 
is the power exercised by language on thought in every sphere of mental activity. 
ibid. p. 5 
Therefore, to inhabit a myth, or lifeworld, is to appropriate an inherent way of being-in-the- 
world, an ontological perspective, a unity of being, and consequently a unity of identity, a unity 
of self-consciousness. 
In his theory of narrative, Ricoeur pays significant attention to the role of myth in the shaping of 
consciousness and thought, particularly in the work of Aristotle. He writes, 
However, long before us, Aristotle had vainly tried to push this intruder outside his sphere of 
discourse. The murmuring of mythical language has continued to resonate under the logos of 
philosophy. Fiction gives it a more sonorous echo. 
Time and Narrative Vol. 3 p. 138 
Among others concerned with the fundamental importance of myth and narrative in ontological 
conditioning of life and thought, Alisdair Macintyre in After Virtue agrees that 'Mythology, in 
its original sense, is at the heart of things. ' More particularly, the concept of selfhood resides in 
the unity of a narrative: 'The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. 'as) 
A fundamental concern of this thesis is not, in the Kantian sense, to validate conceptual unity per 
se, but to establish the perspective of a lifeworld that makes sense, and is, therefore, a unified 
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view which may be rationally described and interpreted(m). The productive mode of the 
imagination is the means of appropriating this perspective in terms of an iconic moment of 
metaphor, and an act of configuration, of grasping a text. This is comparable to the Kantian 
notion of the creative capacity of the imagination, but instead of structuring sensible intuition in 
terms of an aesthetic idea, it posits a creative capacity, in terms of figuration, of an ontological 
act of appropriation and habitation. In contrast to reflection being provoked by an aesthetic idea, 
it is provoked through the imaginative habitation of a lifeworld. The productive imagination is 
ontologically grounded and is the dynamic mediation of the unity of an ontological perspective. 
In relation to the mediation of temporal narratives, the aim is to show that this is the power which 
roots rational thought in history with an horizon open to endless interpretation(i7). 
Linguistic mediation is a key difference between these contrasting views of the imagination. That 
is, the imaginative presentation in terms of appearance in consciousness is linguistically 
mediated(m). The productive mode of the imagination has the capacity to grasp linguistic 
figuration in a creative response to unify a pattern of mediated particular, concrete, sensual 
images(i9). It is the nature of this mediation which marks the critical difference from the Kantian 
understanding. Ricoeurean theories, examined in previous chapters, make clear the importance 
of the symbolic characteristics of metaphor and narrative, and their significance in terms of 
mediation. That is, the grasping of the iconic moment of metaphor, and the configuration of 
narrative, involve an imaginative participation in the symbolically mediated activity. By means 
of these symbolic characteristics, the reader participates in, appropriates and inhabits, a 
linguistically mediated active state of affairs which involves a drive to make sense of this 
activity. 
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Developing Ricoeur's analysis, the aim is to show that the grounding of the conscious and 
cognitive features of this drive is corporeal and ontological. It is on the 'edge' of and lies beyond 
consciousness in the way that Merleau-Ponty defines operative intentionality. Therefore, the 
grasping of the text by the productive mode of the imagination not only 'makes reason think 
more' in the manner of the Kantian notion, but also grounds rational thought in a dynamic, 
teleological drive whereby unity is achieved by means of a dialectic between 'suspicion' and 
'affirmation'(2o). 
Foundation of Rational Unity 
The productive imagination is a way of being in the world of the Other; the means of 
appropriating the ontological perspective of narrative identity. This is not an act of passive 
observation, but an ontological vehemence in the drive towards total involvement which is a 
thorough disturbance of consciousness(21). Consequently, it is a disturbance of operative 
intentionality as the dynamic convergence towards unity. The nature of this disturbance is the 
active state of affairs mediated through prose rhythm, and the expressive effect in terms of bodily 
resonance. In other words, the faculty of the imagination is creative in relation to the resonance 
of corporeal rhythm, and the disturbance of operative intentionality(22 . 
As a result, there is a 
centripetal effect with regard to conscious particular intentionality which is the basis of an 
ontological perspective, or, in Kantian terms, a schematism of the conceptual manifold. The 
provocation of rational thought by the productive imagination's grasp of the narrative is grounded 
in an ontological vehemence in the drive towards unity. Imaginatively, the reader is provoked to 
understand the world of the text in terms of inhabiting that world. It is the world of the Other that 
challenges rational thought to be open to its horizon of meaning by relinquishing any absolute 
sense of unity in order to affirm a new sense of unity; a new meaning, that is, in order to 
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understand and make sense of the world of the Other. But the Self, which is provoked into 
reflection by imaginative habitation, relinquishes conceptual unity, upon which its identity 
depends, within a Kierkegaardian instant. Within that instant, it is the ontological vehemence 
which is sustained in terms of sonorous Being as the moment of affirmation(23). In this sense, 
affirmation is beyond consciousness but determines the conscious intentional drive towards unity 
in terms of the relationship between operative and particular intentionalities as described in 
chapter four. 
But if the moment of affirmation is beyond consciousness how is such affirmation possible? 
Kant's original foundation of unity lies beyond consciousness, but affirmation is in terms of 
rational unity. The unity of apperception is the original grounding of rational unity with respect 
to transcendental synthesis in the 'pure' concept of the a priori categories of thought. Kantian 
affirmation is, therefore, clearly in terms of 'pure'conceptual unity, although, it may be observed, 
since the a priori grounding lies beyond consciousness, it is beyond questioning, and is, 
consequently, a closure of rational thought, raising questions about the nature of this affirmation. 
In contrast, if affirmation of a unity of being in terms of an ontological perspective upon a 
lifeworid is achieved beyond consciousness, and is not an affirmation of conceptual unity free 
from suspicion, what is the nature of that affirmation and its relationship with conceptual unity? 
How is such affirmation possible if rational thought is never free from suspicion? How is it 
possible to validate a rational unity with respect to an ontological perspective? In response to 
these questions, it will be helpful to look first at the nature of the unity of this perspective in 
terms of intentionality and the notion of sonorous concordance in the achievement of 
affirmation. 
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Corporeal Intentionality and Sonorous Concordance 
In the example of'Abraham's Sacrifice' analyzed in chapter six, an attempt was made to show 
how it may be possible to gain an understanding of this story without complete explanation. That 
is, to imaginatively inhabit the lifeworld of the narrative by means of the prose rhythm of the 
'Authorized Version' so that the reader becomes totally absorbed and loses himself, or herself, 
in the text. In such an act of reading there may be a moment, an instant, when self identity 
becomes one with the narrative identity; that is, one with the unity of the narrative's lifeworld. 
This can only happen if there is the possibility of grasping a viewpoint, a perspective, whereby 
intentionality, the drive to understand, is grounded in corporeally expressed ontological 
concordance(24). In other words, as the reader attempts to inhabit the world of this seemingly 
absurd and tragic act, there is discordance in his state of being, and an active disturbance 
expressed in his body and consciousness. But the prose rhythm that mediates the ontological 
condition of the world of the narrative, and is corporeally appropriated by the reader, may 
resonate with a sense of concordance as the reader reflects upon the story. It is a concordance 
which affects operative intentionality at the 'edge' of and beyond consciousness. It is this 
concordance which is the ontological grounding of an affirmation of the perspectival unity. As 
the reader inhabits the world of the story, it is the fundamental appropriation of the activity of the 
story, particularly the central act of Abraham's sacrifice, through the mediation of the prose 
rhythm that makes possible a sense of concordance, and therefore an affirmation of an 
ontological perspective. The imaginative active habitation of the story by the mediation of prose 
rhythm resonates with a concordance affirming a conviction that the story does make sense, and 
the drive to reflect, interpret and explain is continually sustained. 
It may be contended that such a sense of concordance does not necessarily mean rational 
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affirmation since this involves conscious reflection. The discordance of conscious disturbance 
caused by reading the story of'Abraham's Sacrifice' is the extreme provocation of the questions, 
'What does this mean? ', 'How can it be explained? '. Any affirmation of a rational resolution of 
these questions must surely involve reflection; and if any attempted resolution by reflective 
analysis and interpretation is suspect then affirmation is suspect. The problem here seems to lie 
in the apparent attribution of rational affirmation to the sonorous characteristics of an ontological 
perspective. The habitation of a narrative may be grounded in the imaginative appropriation of 
such a perspective involving the movement from sonorous discordance to concordance, but what 
is the relationship between this sonority and reflection? This question appears to be more 
problematic if it is conceded that rational unity is never free from suspicion. 
The question calls for further consideration of the effect of corporeal and ontological sonorous 
concordance in the relationship between operative and particular intentionalities, and the latter's 
key role in the act of configuration with respect to narrative and the iconic moment of metaphor. 
This will be given closer examination below, particularly with respect to the creation of meaning 
in the relationship between the ontological perspective and reflection. 
Operative intentionality is the centripetal dynamic, at the 'edge' and beyond consciousness, which 
drives conscious particular intentionality focused upon the image of a concrete, particular act. 
In the example of Abraham's act of raising the knife to sacrifice his son, the imaginative power 
to grasp that act as the focus of configuration to give a sense of meaning to the story is the 
ontological sonorous concordance expressed in the dynamic of operative intentionality. As the 
reader appropriates and inhabits the story, there is a movement of resonance, mediated by prose 
rhythm, from discordance to concordance whereby the image is grasped by means of the dynamic 
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of operative and particular intentionalities. In other words, operative and particular 
intentionalities are fundamental characteristics of the creative power of the imagination(25). 
The grasping of the focal image is a configuring act grounded upon the movement from 
discordance to concordance. However, it is important to take account of the involvement of 
reflection in the way the reader appropriates and inhabits the story, which is ontologically 
grounded in terms of sound and corporeal resonance, and in the way the image is grasped, or 
created; the two are essentially the same in this imaginative act(26). In the process of this act, the 
effect of concordance is the imaginative achievement to perceive an image that draws together, 
that is, configures, the whole narrative in a unity which provokes and promotes rational 
explanation. It is to grasp the image of Abraham in the act of sacrificing his son in such a way 
that every particular concrete aspect of his relationship with his son in that particular moment are 
united in an image which vehemently uproots the semantic discord in reflection to configure the 
narrative in the drive to achieve a resolution, or semantic concordance, in understanding(27). 
Distanciation and the Primordial Dialectic 
In such a way the imagination creates a perspective upon the lifeworld of the Other which is 
dialectically related to rational reflection. That is, the hermeneutical process of imaginative 
habitation is grounded in a sonorous movement in achieving the concordance of an ontological 
unity, but which is dialectically related to the movement of a semantic resolution towards rational 
unity. It is the appropriation of the prose rhythm of the Abraham story that configures the 
narrative which makes rational explanation of an initially seeming absurdity potentially 
availableR88. Equally, the reader's reflection upon the sacrificial act plays an integral role in 
achieving the unity of an ontological perspective. In this sense, suspicion does not have a 
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negative effect, but is critical in the drive towards affirmation. 
Reflection takes place within the world created by the imagination. Ricoeur calls this 
distanciationR9). In contrast to the Kantian transcendental rational structures of the mind that are 
not subject to historical change, distanciation is always within history, and the imaginative 
creative act which, as it were, sets the scene for habitation and reflection. As the reader inhabits 
the lifeworld configured by the imagination focused upon the image of the act of sacrifice, he or 
she is driven to reflect in relation to the imaginative grasping of the unity of the image. This 
unity, achieved by the dynamic of particular intentionality, gives impetus to the reflective 
process in terms of the drive to understand in continuing interpretation and explanation. It is the 
primordial dialectic of distanciation between understanding founded upon the power of the 
imagination, and explanation of rational thought. Within this dialectic, 'affirmation' is achieved 
as a perspectival unity upon the imaginatively inhabited lifeworld which promotes rational 
reflection, whilst'suspicion' relates to conceptual unity in terms of the word as the basic unit of 
rational thought and explanation. The foundation for 'affirmation' is mediated through the 
figurative, or 'poetic' mode of the total narrative with the sentence as the basic unit, whereas, 
conceptual unity, in terms of the word as the basic unit, is never free from 'suspicion' because 
continuing interpretation is the basis of rational explanationr3o). 
An examination of this dialectic was made in chapter six in the example of'Abraham's Sacrifice'. 
The reader imaginatively inhabits the world of actions drawn towards the moment of sacrifice. 
It is the prose rhythm of the 'Authorized Version' which gives momentum to this movement 
towards the act of Abraham raising the knife to make the fatal strike. It is in the pattern of sound 
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of the prose rhythm that the reader imaginatively perceives the various images of activity grasped 
in a configuration focused upon the act on Mount Moriah, at the same time as reflecting upon 
these actions. The images of the loving father taking his son on a fateful journey; the actions of 
the trusting son oblivious of his father's intentions; the apparent hesitancy along the way; the 
preparations for the sacrifice; and the climactic moment: all are drawn together in the reader's 
imagination by the sense of concordance in the effect of the prose rhythm. In relation to his 
imaginative grasp of the story, the reader continually reflects upon the actions of the world he 
inhabits. He is driven by the effect of the prose rhythm to affirm that this world does make sense; 
that this act of a loving father sacrificing his own son is not absurd. Therefore his attempt to 
rationally explain this act, although unresolved in any absolute sense, and, consequently, not free 
from 'suspicion', may be held within a dialectic of'affirmation' and'suspicion'. In other words, 
an explanation may be provisionally affirmed in terms of potential availability in the process of 
continuing interpretation. 
Metaphor and the Creation of Meaning 
The dialectic must, however, be looked at more closely with respect to metaphor. Configuration 
is the imaginative creation of the setting for continuing reflection. It is the basis of an 
understanding that continually provokes interpretation and explanation. Metaphor, in terms of 
the interactive theory, is the linguistic mediation of the creation of new meaning. Understanding 
is aimed not only by the focal image of an act of configuration, but by an iconic moment which 
vehemently uproots a literal meaning into a process of semantic interaction whereby a new 
meaning is created. This theory was examined in the first two chapters. The significance of this 
theory is that a new meaning is created which potentially, and may in time actually, expand and 
develop conceptual thought. It is not simply the creation of an ontological perspective but a 
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conceptual enlargement in response to an open horizon. In the story of 'Abraham's Sacrifice', in 
which it was claimed that verse one to ten should be read as a metaphor, the reader's attention 
focuses upon the metaphoric image of the sacrificial act in verse ten in grasping the meaning of 
the narrative by which he or she may acquire a greater understanding than through the literal, 
conceptual meaning of the words. A new meaning of this sacrificial act is opened up by the 
imaginative, figurative : appropriation of the metaphor. The literal meaning of the sentence, 'And 
Abraham stretched forth is hand, and took the knife to slay his son', is uprooted by the 
metaphoric image which mediates a vehement interaction between this meaning and the whole 
narrative, particularly the words, 'Take thou thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest.. ' As 
the reader endeavours to understand the story, to grasp the viewpoint of the narrative, the power 
of his imagination, which is linguistically structured through and through, may transcend any 
conceptual inhibitions by a figurative dynamic that uproots and suspends the literal meaning in 
an imaginative response to an open semantic horizon. The literal meaning of a father in the act 
of killing his son is suspended in the reader's ontological grasp of the configuration of the 
narrative focused upon the metaphoric image. He responds to the possibility of a different and 
new meaning as he imaginatively inhabits the activity of the story. There is a discordance in his 
state of being initially provoked by an attempt to reflect upon the meaning of the act. But his 
imaginative response to the metaphoric image in, as it were, an iconic moment, overcomes the 
cognitive resistance of this discordance whereby this agitation of his state of being is resonantly 
directed towards a concordance and semantic innovation. The mediation of this imaginative 
response is the textual figuration grounded in the prose rhythm. The prose rhythm of the text is 
the mediation of the active condition of inhabiting the story. To understand the story is not 
fundamentally imaginatively to perceive, or to reflect, but corporeally to inhabit the activity of 
the narrative. Prose rhythm mediates this corporeal activity in terms of sound and bodily 
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resonance whereby the reader's attention, momentarily freed from reflection upon this mediation, 
is captured by figuration of the text focused upon the metaphoric image(3i). It is, however, the 
reader's active condition in terms of his sonorous state of being which imaginatively animates 
the figuration giving rise to semantic interaction and innovation. Although consciously he may 
be unaware of the effect of prose rhythm, the reader's imagination is dynamically grounded in 
this effect with respect to his sonorous state of being expressed in the power to grasp the active 
focal image. It is this dynamic appropriation and habitation, grounded in an ontological 
vehemence, which uproots the literal reference of the sacrificial act to achieve, by semantic 
interaction, what Ricoeur calls, a second order, metaphorical reference(32). That is, an 
imaginative, ontologically generated reference which is directed through and beyond the 
linguistic semantic inhibitions of literal, conceptual meaning to an active image which opens up 
a new meaning. 
This view of the imagination and metaphor is a key issue in contemporary philosophical debate, 
particularly with respect to those who claim that not only is there no foundation for 'truth', but 
that denotation is irrelevant and misleading. What is important, it has been maintained, is the 
creative capacity of the imagination in terms of the poetic mode of language to change the 
perspective, to inaugurate new ways of thinking with respect to different viewpoints in relation 
to experience. For example, in his Report on the state of knowledge in the Western World, Jean- 
Francois Lyotard writes, 
Given equal competence (no longer in the acquisition of knowledge, but in its production), what 
extra performity depends on in the final analysis is "imagination, " which allows one either to make 
a new move or change the rules of the game. 
Postmodern Condition, p. 52. 
Another influential philosopher in this debate is Richard Rorty who writes, 
A sense of human history as the history of successive metaphors would let us see the poet, in the 
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generic sense of the maker of new words, the shaper of new languages, as the vanguard of the 
species. 
Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p. 20. 
Metaphor plays a central role in this philosophical concern for the creative capacity of the 
imagination in the continual change of perspective upon historical experience. The work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche has been and continues to be an important influence upon the philosophical 
perspectival view, and what he terms, 'the primitive world of metaphor'(33) in this primordial 
activity of the 'artistically creating subject'. For Nietzsche, language is informed by the primal 
energy of the artistic subject whose creative power is revealed in world production as an infinite 
regress of images. His famous and much-quoted definition of truth succinctly expresses the 
dominant thrust of his influence: 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms - in short, 
a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically enhanced, transposed, and 
embellished, and which after long use seem fixed, canonical and binding to a people: truths are 
illusions; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power, coins which have lost their 
picture and now matter only as metal, no longer as coin. 
'On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense' in Philosophy and Truth pp. 79-97. 
According to Nietzsche, language is essentially an amoeba-like sensuous figurative mode of 
continuously changing metaphors which are forgotten in relation to the cognitive, conceptual 
mode as the process of use wears away the consciousness of figuration as the images of coins are 
worn away. Derrida makes use of this metaphor of the coin which Ricoeur criticizes in their early 
exchange of views in Derrida's'White Mythology' in Margins of Philosophy, Ricoeur's Study 8 
in The Rule of Metaphor, and Derrida's response in The Retrait of Metaphor. The fundamental 
differences of their views were looked at in chapter 2, as may the particular and important feature 
of Ricoeur's interactive theory of metaphor which makes a clear division between the figurative 
and semantic characteristics of metaphor. 
182 
It is this understanding of metaphor which plays a significant role in setting the philosophical 
perspective of Ricoeur and this thesis, distinct from those which commend a relinquishing of any 
notion of'truth', or affirmation of rational unity, in favour of unleashing the imaginative power 
of world-production(34). In Lyotard's rhetorical appeal: 
Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the 
differences and save the honor of the name. 
The Postmodern Condition, p. 82 
Although this critical difference with respect to the contrasting theories of metaphor, as presented 
in chapter 2, reveals that the interactive theory, together with the narrative theory, as interpreted 
by Ricoeur and developed in this thesis, provides a way of understanding a hermeneutical process 
in which rational unity may be affirmed, the fundamental issue provoked by Nietzsche, and 
contemporary philosophers such as Lyotard and Rorty has not been fully addressed. Stephen 
Clark makes this very clear in his study on Ricoeur: 
Ricoeur's study of metaphor was vulnerable to the obvious powerful objection that it is 
meaningless to talk of reference with respect to innovations that by their very nature cannot 
be subject to procedures of verification. The generous invitation to enter a'habitable world' 
(TN 1: xi) must deal with the rejoinder: whose world, and how does it relate to the more 
mundane environment in which we live and move and have our being? 
Paul Ricoeur, p. 190 
Clark raises the issue of verification which has been an important one, particularly in the Anglo- 
American logico-empirical tradition. Although the nature of the debate relating to this issue has 
radically changed, especially following the publication of Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations(3S), there are those, including Ralph C. S. Walker who claims that 'Verificationism 
refuses to die. '(36) The concern of this thesis is not to pursue this debate but to address the issue 
of verification with respect to the affirmation of the imaginative appropriation of narrative 
identity as the foundation for inhabitation. That is, objective verification of sameness is 
ontologically grounded in the validation and attestation of the Self's appropriation of the 
otherness of narrative identity. This will be addressed in the context of the final chapter in which 
183 
the ontological grounding of sonorous being, and the mediation of prose rhythm, will be related 
to the notions of validation and attestation with the aim of re-interpretating certainty in terms of 
reasonable hope. 
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Chapter Eight 
Reasonable Hope 
It is the central aim of this thesis to show that reasonable hope of affirming rational unity is 
achieved through the mediation of metaphor and narrative in the process of reading a text. 
Reasonable hope is not certainty, in the sense of what has been known in the tradition of logico- 
empirical philosophy as objective verification grounded in the 'principle of verifiability(i), but a 
sustained teleological conviction subjected to a continuing critique in relation to an open 
hermeneutical horizon. It is the achievement of the dynamic of a primordial dialectic between 
conviction and critique, understanding and explanation, Self and Other. The latter dyad refers to 
the nature of the grounding of this dialectic in the reader's imaginatively active habitation of the 
world of the text, the world of the 'other' in terms of narrative identity. In other words, reasonable 
hope arises from the affirmation of selfhood in the appropriation of narrative identity. 
This raises the critical issue of identity that Ricoeur addresses in Oneself as Another in 
developing the work on narrative identity which he had begun in Volume 3 of Time and 
Narrative. In attempting to grasp the heart of the problem of personal identity, he distinguishes 
a structural difference between what he terms idem identity, or sameness, and ipse identity, or 
selfhood. The former relates to the permanence of identity, particularly with respect to character; 
whereas, the paradigm for the latter is, making a promise. Ricoeur's concern in making this 
distinction arises from his response to the question who? in relation to "I can": I can speak, I can 
act, I can recount, etc. This is the historical 'I' which evades the discursive descriptions of idem 
identity. Narrative identity is the notion that relates the who? of personal identity to temporality 
which is thematized by narrative. 
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This examination of personal identity is the central theme of the first six studies of Oneself as 
Another in which Ricoeur investigates the literature of Anglo-Saxon philosophy in this area. In 
critically acknowledging the importance of defining personal identity in terms of sameness in this 
rich field of analytical philosophy, it is in relation to otherness, particularly in terms of narrative 
identity that, according to Ricoeur, an ontological foundation is established. It is in the dialectic 
between ipse identity of making a promise that is willed, sustained and proclaims itself despite 
of change, and the idem identity of sameness that the heart of personal identity resides. But how 
may the 'I' of personal identity be affi med? How is affirmation of the historical 'I', whose identity 
is grounded in the otherness of narrative identity, possible? Ricoeur attempts to respond to this 
critical issue, especially with respect to its ethical dimension, by developing the notion of 
attestation. This notion is examined later in this chapter. 
But first, there is a question regarding affirmation, or attestation, that is key to the aim of this 
thesis, which Ricoeur does not appear fully to address. How is affirmation of personal identity 
possible if it does not escape, or transcend not only sameness but temporality since these are the 
modes of suspicion? These are the modes in which the capable 'I', to use Ricoeur's language, is 
inescapably confronted by the question of'who? ' with respect to'I can... ', and'I promise'. Must 
not personal identity transcend the primordial dialectic which lies at its heart if it is to be 
affirmed? But if it does, how is affirmation possible? Is this question moving the debate to the 
levels of conviction, or spirituality where identity is renounced, and therefore beyond 
philosophical discourse? Ricoeur does touch upon this question in response to the work of Derek 
Parfit(2), and particularly his statement, 'Identity is not what matters. ' In Parfit's attack on what 
he calls, the "self-interest theory"(3) in which a person aims at the outcome of ethical decisions 
that would best serve himself, he argues for altruism in terms of a renouncement of personal 
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identity. Acknowledging the importance of Parfit's view, Ricoeur claims he has gone too far. He 
writes, 
I still do not see how the question "who? " can disappear in the extreme cases in which it 
remains without an answer. For really, how can we ask ourselves about what matters if we 
could not ask to whom the thing mattered or not? 
Oneself as Another. p. 137. 
His response is given a clearer focus, particularly in relation to this thesis, when he further 
attempts to address a 'crisis within selfhood' provoked by Parfit's moral reflection. That is the 
crisis of different kinds of ownership in terms of 'what I have' and 'who I am', and Parfit's 
concern in attacking the "self-interest theory". Ricoeur writes, 
But is not a moment of self-dispossession essential to authentic selfhood? And must one not, 
in order to make oneself open, available, belong to oneself in a certain sense? We have already 
asked: Would the question of what matters arise if there were no one to whom the question of 
identity mattered? Let us now add: if my identity were to lose all importance in every respect, 
would not the question of others also cease to matter? 
ibid. p. 138-9. 
In the discussion recorded in Critique and Conviction regarding the question of selfhood, he 
makes a revealing and significant statement, 
I have to fight to the end, then, as a philosopher on behalf of identity, prepared to renounce - in the 
strict sense of the word - at another level; we shall return to this no doubt when we talk about 
religion. 
Critique and Conviction, p. 90. 
The critical question is, can selfhood in terms of personal identity be affirmed unless identity is 
renounced, or preferably, relinquished in an instant of transcendence? What is the nature of 
affirmation, or is affirmation possible if it is limited to the primordial dialectic? Must not the 
dialectic between suspicion and affirmation of personal identity be sustained by a transcendental 
source of affirmation in the loss of this identity? But then, what is the nature of the relationship 
between this loss and affirmation, or, more particularly, attestation as defined by Ricoeur? m In 
terms of the main theme of this thesis, what is the relationship between sonorous Being and 
attestation? Do not the rhythms of the soul, to use the language of religious discourse, play a 
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fundamental role in the 'finding' of the self? 
Second-Order Reference 
In an attempt to determine the nature of this relationship between sonorous Being and attestation, 
the notion of second-order, metaphorical reference (examined in chapter 7 in relation to the 
imaginative appropriation and habitation of a story in the power to grasp a focal image, and 
analyzed in chapter 2 with respect to the notion of split-reference) must now be looked at more 
closely. Attestation of selfhood among other things raises the issue of the nature of this second- 
order reference. If attestation of selfhood is in terms of its mediation through the otherness of 
narrative identity, what is the nature of the reference with respect to the textual mediation of this 
identity? More particularly, with respect to the focal, or metaphorical figure of this identity, what 
is the nature of the second-order reference, especially when taking into account the critical 
questions raised above regarding the loss and affirmation of personal identity? 
Affirmation, or attestation also raises semantic questions: What kind of meaning is opened up 
by this imaginative response to the text? What is the nature of semantic unity of this second order 
reference in terms of an ontological grounding for rational reflection? How can this metaphorical 
reference, circumscribed by the particularity of the text, provide the foundation for universality 
of conceptual unity? Is it not a purely relative, incommensurable reference? If prose rhythm is 
its ontological grounding, does this not reveal a certain arbitrary nature? What ensures that prose 
rhythm may indeed be the dynamic of an extra linguistic reference to an objective, active state 
of affairs, the being-in-the-world of narrative identity, and not simply the textual means of 
arousing the imagination in an arbitrary fashion? 
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In order to address these questions, drawing later upon the juridical analogy, it will be helpful, 
first of all, to continue to examine the role of the imagination particularly with respect to the 
critical issue of reference and attestation. What is at issue here is, first, an ontological and 
phenomenological reference in contrast to the referential relation of word to object of rational 
description. It is ontological reference in terms of the expression of Self hood compared to an 
understanding of reference in terms of the Cartesian Cogito(5). It is the reference of Self to Other. 
Secondly, it is a temporal reference; a diachronic, semantic reference not the ahistorical, 
synchronic, semiotic reference of structural analysis(6). It is the reference of discourse as distinct 
from language. In Saussurean terms, the reference of parole rather than langue(7). Thirdly, the 
basic unit of the former is the sentence which always has an external reference. It is always about 
something; it refers beyond language to the lifeworld as structured through the imagination. 
Fourthly, in Ricoeur's words, 
With the sentence, Language is oriented beyond itself. It says something about something. This 
intending of a referent by discourse is completely contemporaneous with its event character and 
its dialogical functioning. It is the other side of the instance of discourse. The complete event is 
not only that someone speaks and addresses himself to an interlocutor, it is also the speaker's 
ambition to bring a new experience to language and share it with someone else. It is this exper- 
ience, in turn, that has the world for its horizon. Reference and horizon are correlative as are figure 
and ground. Time and Narrative Vol 1 p. 78 
In terms of reading, in the endeavour to imaginatively appropriate the world of the text, the 
reader brings new experience. The referential power of the imagination is, therefore, not only the 
capacity to refer to something beyond language, but the refiguring of the mediation of the horizon 
of the Other in relation to experience. 
Fifthly, it is a reference of activity. It is a reference to the temporal state of being which is a state 
of activity. The transcendent power of the imagination is the power to grasp the active state of 
being through the mediation of discourse. It has the power to create the sensible image in the 
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form of the iconic moment of metaphor and the configuration or emplotment of narrative which 
is the grasping of an active state of being. In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur analyzes the 
difference between Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, and in particular the expression imitation 
of nature in terms of mimesis and phusis: 
Might there not be an underlying relationship between'signifying active reality' and speaking 
out phusis? 
But mimesis does not signify only that all discourse is of the world; it does not embody just the 
referential function of poetic discourse. Being mimesis phuseos, it connects this referential 
function to the revelation of the Real as Act. This is the concept of phusis in the expression 
mimesis phuseos, to serve as an index for that dimension of reality that does not receive due 
account in the simple description of that-thing-over-there. To present men 'as acting' and all 
things'as in act - such could well be the ontological function of metaphorical discourse, in 
which every dormant potentiality of existence appears as blossoming forth, every latent capacity 
for action as actualized. The Rule of Metaphor p. 43 
In other words, in grasping reality through the mediation of the text, the transcendent referential 
power of the imagination, in terms of metaphor and mimesis, creates new meaning and 
redescribes the textual horizon by enlivening the potentiality of being; that is, by imaginatively 
setting the possibility of concrete acting beings before the eyes to imaginatively apprehend, 
through the potential of activity, the temporal perspective of the Other at and beyond the horizon 
of the text. 
Sixthly, the ontological reference is to the actual and potential activity of being, and, therefore, 
it is to the One who acts. For this reason it is an intersubjective reference. It is a reference 
between the reader, the Self who imaginatively appropriates the activity mediated by the text, 
and the 'who' of the text; the 'who' whose presence is mediated through the implicit as well as 
explicit pronouns, and temporal adverbs. This relates directly to narrative identity which has 
been looked at in detail in chapter three. It is the 'who? ' of the text which is fundamental in the 
hermeneutical process rather than the 'what? ' in terms of description and analysis. The latter 
question leaves unresolved the prior question 'who? ' which relates not to cause and effect but to 
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motives and intentions. It is this question that gives expression to an encounter with the Other 
through the appropriation of narrative identity by the Self. Although these questions are to be 
clearly understood as being separate, they are dialectically related. To appropriate the narrative 
identity in the grasping of the Other involves a return to the Same(8), following, what Ricoeur 
calls, a detour through the mediation of the linguistic figurative structures(v), in asking the 
question 'what? ' in the process of understanding and reflection in the hermeneutical spiral. 
Attestation: Fantasy or Reality 
Before proceeding to look more closely at the notion of attestation with particular regard to the 
fundamental role of prose rhythm in the light of the above six characteristics, it is important to 
emphasize the distinction made above that this ontological reference is not to be confused with 
the empirical reference of scientific, rational description. It is not aimed at verification in the 
sense of determining 'truth' in conceptual terms. Nor is its purpose to establish certainty in the 
Cartesian tradition(Io). Its aim is what Ricoeur calls attestation. In the introduction to Oneself as 
Another he writes, 
Attestation presents itself first, in fact, as a kind of belief. But it is not a doxic belief, in the 
sense in which doxa (belief) has less standing than episteme (science, or better, knowledge). 
Whereas doxic belief is implied in the grammar of "I believe that", attestation belongs to the 
grammar of "I believe in. " It thus links up with testimony, as the etymology reminds us, 
inasmuch as it is in speech of one giving testimony that one believes. One can call upon 
no epistemic instance greater than that of belief - or, if one prefers, the credence - that 
belongs 
to the triple dialectic of reflection and analysis, of selfhood and sameness, and of self and 
other. Oneself as Another p. 21 
Although attestation cannot claim any guarantee or foundation in the Cartesian strong sense of 
attempting to establish it on self founding theoretical knowledge, and is vulnerable to the 
permanent threat of suspicion, Ricoeur argues that there is no recourse against suspicion, or false 
testimony, but a more reliable attestation(Ji). However, because of the detour by way of analysis 
within the hermeneutical process, verification is included as a necessary epistemic moment in 
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reflection(m. But it is attestation, in the sense of a 'reliable attestation', that validates affirmation 
because fundamentally it is an attestation of self. It is the essential credence or trust in the power 
of recognition of oneself as a character in the narrative. 
This instant of recognition is analogous to Kierkegaard's 'leap of faith'. It is analogous to the 
instant when someone first takes his feet off the bottom of the pool and becomes a swimmer. His 
state of being has changed in an instant, and his self identity is transformed: he is a swimmer. It 
is a profound act of conversion. It is to see the world and self in a radically new way. It is this 
conversion which lies at the heart of the problem of the relationship between affirmation and 
suspicion. The critical question is, what is the basis of trust and conviction in the selfs 
appropriation of a transformed identity in terms of the recognition of self as a character in the 
narrative; or, more particularly, as the grasping of a unity of narrative identity? Is such an 
appropriation made as a result of the suspension or relinquishment of rational reflection? For 
example, in the case of a child's freeplay of the imagination in appropriating the identity of a 
fantasy character. This of course is acceptable because it is a way in which the child learns to 
develop and enjoy the richness of the imaginative power in creating settings for emotional and 
psychological experiences in a secure environment where the child is protected from the 
consequences of such play if it were allowed to roam free in the world outside. Also, the child 
would seem to be aware, or is made to be aware, of the difference between the fantasy world of 
play and the realities of daily life. However, the recognition of the difference may be lost at 
times, and it would appear this may be a fundamental dilemma, not only of childhood, but also 
of the adult world. Narrative may become the medium for appropriating identities whereby the 
difference between fantasy and reality is lost. 
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In 1605, Miguel de Cervantes published the first part of Don Quixote which was to become a 
classic in European literature. As the conclusion to part II, published in 1615, he writes 
For my sole object has been to arouse men's contempt for all fabulous and absurd stories 
of knight errantry, whose credit this tale of my genuine Don Quixote has already shaken, 
and which will, without a doubt, soon tumble to the ground. Farewell. 
Don Quixote p. 940 
During the sixteenth century there had been an extraordinary compulsion to read stories of 
chivalric romance. Although the vogue of reading these romances had been in fast decline since 
the 1580s, it is evident from the above that Cervantes was still convinced that they needed to be 
treated as a menace to good taste. Whether that was true or not, they had been condemned by 
many priests and humanist critics for controlling the mind and imagination in popular culture 
causing people to live in the fantasy world of romance instead of the reality of everyday life. The 
figure of Don Quixote is a parody of the chivalric knight. When the things 'the knight of the 
sorrowful countenance' sees, or thinks he ought to be seeing, do not appear that way to others, 
he finds in the figure of the unseen but malevolent wizard ready-made explanations that enable 
him to keep his delusions intact: if a castle looks like an inn or a giant like a windmill, or 
Dulcinea like a peasant girl, it is because his enemies have tampered with the appearance of 
things to deceive or frustrate him. Don Quixote is an extended parody of the world which the 
readers of these romance stories sought to appropriate and inhabit. Its insistent note of irony 
strikes at the heart of the romantic identity to reveal the duplicity of its seeming unity. Its aim is 
to destroy any foundation of trust and conviction the readers may have had in their imaginative 
delusions. 
The question is, why did these romance stories have such an effect upon people? One seemingly 
obvious reason would be the powerful and seductive attraction of the identity of the chivalrous 
knight at that period of history. It would require a detailed historical and cultural study to reveal 
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the subtle complexity of this attraction which is outside the aim of this thesis. However, the 
critical aspect of this attraction is the way it is mediated through the textual characteristics of the 
romance narratives and the act of reading. The effect of this mediation is the power to convince 
the reader of the trustworthiness of the narrative identity as the basis for affirming a transformed 
self identity; an affirmation based upon an imaginative unity achieved at the cost of a blindness 
to the duplicity of rational reflection. Although, as in the case of Don Quixote, this powerful 
transformation of his self identity initiated a process of reflection whereby every illusion is given 
an explanation, there is still a suspension of reason and of continuing interpretation. A windmill 
may of course be interpreted in numerous ways, but to describe one as a giant is a clear 
suspension of reason. This is, of course, Cervantes' parody upon the chivalric illusions of that 
period. Throughout history to the present day there are many examples which demonstrate the 
problem of the affirmation of self identity in the act of appropriation, or the recognition of self 
in a narrative. The power and attraction of the images and configurations of such narratives 
influence and pervade ideals and visions in social, political and religious contexts. A northern 
Ireland bishop who had served as a priest in the Falls road area of Belfast made the ironically sad 
and implicitly tragic comment, 'The problem with "sincere Christians" is you cannot reason with 
them. ' 
This study has been concerned to show that consciousness is linguistically mediated through and 
through; and the primary mode of this mediation is through the characteristics of the written text. 
The power and attraction of the illusionary identities referred to above are revealed in the text, 
particularly in the relationship of prose rhythm and configuration. The power of rhythm to seduce 
and control consciousness and behaviour, sometimes in extreme ways is evident in the 
mesmerizing effect of simple, primitive rhythms. In terms of narrative in textual mode, the 
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combined effect of prose rhythm and image as the expressive mediation of the productive 
imagination is equally powerful in the creation of illusionary lifeworlds which foster trust and 
conviction. The resonance of sonorous Being may achieve a sense of corporeal concordance at 
the cost of relinquishing reflection in terms of a continuing dialectical process of questioning and 
interpretation in relation to an open semantic horizon. This is illusionary affirmation founded 
upon rational duplicity; an affirmation that may lead to madness and self destruction. 
It is not that the power and attraction of such images, configurations and illusionary affirmation 
prevent reflection. Don Quixote reveals, as noted above, the way in which reflection is employed 
to provide explanations for the illusionary self identities. But reflection is dominated by the 
imaginary identity in the sense of being separate and not dialectically related. That is, reflection 
is ontologically grounded in an imaginative identity, and not the otherness of narrative identity 
rooted in the primordial dialectic between a metaphorical second order reference and the literal 
reference of discursive thought. In other words, there is a failure to allow for the mode of 
distanciation as defined by Ricoeur. 
Consequently, reflection, which is of the order of the Same, is taken up into the imaginary world 
and the self attempts to reflect upon the active state of being with respect to the image and 
configuration as though they were also of the order of the Same. Because the modes of being in 
terms of reflection and habitation are not dialectically separated, the mode of habitation or 
otherness is treated as though it were of the order of the Same, since the nature of reflection is 
inherently of the Same. It is an attempt to reflect upon the image in terms of its objective 
characteristics analogous to a critique of the artistic merit of a painting in terms of the makeup 
of the paint. What is required of a critical appreciation of artistic merit is the imaginative 
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appropriation of the work of art to reflect upon such aspects as light, shade, colour, etc., from the 
perspective of that appropriation(i3). It is to appropriate and inhabit the perspective of the Other 
to reflect within that perspective, and not upon the Other. The absolute dichotomy between the 
Self and Other cannot be bridged by reflection, but by an imaginative appropriation of the 
perspective of the Other. The perspective of the Other imaginatively circumscribes the 
distanciation of reflection. For this reason, reflection provoked by narratives which seduce the 
reader to inhabit illusionary self-identities and rational duplicity is not rooted in the primordial 
dialectic between the Self and Other. Without the rational space, or distanciation created by this 
dialectic, there is a propensity to affirm unquestioned unity with a sense of absoluteness because 
of the dominating power of illusionary affirmation, and the suspension of a continuing rational 
process. 
Attestation and Practical Wisdom 
What is fundamental with respect to affirmation which maintains a continuing rational process 
is reflection within an ontological perspective based upon the characteristics of second order 
reference of narrative and metaphor as outlined above. It is reflection borne out of involvement 
and participation in particular, concrete situations. Its basis is not the universality of the word, 
but the semantic singularity of the sentence in its reference to particular, contextual activity. Its 
achievement is not the certainty of abstract analysis and deduction, but conclusions of potential 
availability or probability(i4) grounded in an imaginative, intuitive, and inductive(is) process in 
relating to the images and configuration of temporal activity. This view of the ontological 
foundation for reflection draws upon the Aristotelean notion of practical wisdom, or phronesis. 
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In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is concerned with deliberation upon the practical aim of 
goodness, or moral excellence. In relation to this aim, how is it possible to determine the practical 
choice which is concerned not simply with abstract reasoning but what is right with respect to 
both passions and actions. According to Aristotle, deliberation is a correctness of thinking with 
regard to the particular end in view in terms of excellence. He writes, 
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference 
to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense 
is that which succeeds relative to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical 
wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to 
the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension. 
Nichomachean Ethics VI 9,1142b 30 
In his essay, 'Practical Reason', and the Ninth Study of Oneself as Another, Ricoeur develops this 
notion of practical reason, or practical wisdom. An important and significant characteristic of 
practical wisdom, analyzed in the former, is the notion of reason for acting. He sets out four 
major features of this notion related to the category of motives which are retrospective and 
interpretative. That is, these are reasons which concern the retrospective intentional character of 
explaining, or justifying or excusing a completed action. At a more fundamental, ontological 
level, there is 'the intention with which we do something', or 'the character of desirability'. He 
writes, 
The idea of an order of reasons for acting is the key to practical reasoning. This reasoning has no 
function other than to order the "long chain of reasons" to which the final intention has given rise. 
The reasoning starts from a reason for acting held to be ultimate, that is to say, one that exhausts 
the series of questions why; in other words, it starts from the character of desirability (in the 
broadest sense of the word, including the desire to do one's duty). It is this character of desirability 
that orders, regressively, the series of means envisioned to satisfy it. 
Practical Reason. From Text to Action, p. 193 
Relating this to the aim of this study, the character of desirability may be defined as an 
intentionality grounded in the condition of being-in-the-world. It arises from an active state of 
being that is driven to achieve harmony which may be considered analogous to the ethical aim 
of moral excellence. It is a desirability borne out of the aporias of discordant being which are 
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explored in this study in terms of sonority. Sonority is the key expressive characteristic of active, 
temporal being. It is the expressive mediation of operative and particular intentionalities in the 
drive to achieve, in concrete, particular, active situations, the desired aim of rationally affirming 
a self identity. It is the ontological grounding of reflection, or correctness of thinking, in terms 
of practical wisdom. It is reflection in tune with the rhythm of active being-in-the-world in a 
movement from discordance to concordance. 
To these features of practical wisdom must be added reflection which grasps an integrated view 
of concrete temporal activity. In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, 
Practical knowledge, phronesis, is another kind of knowledge. Primarily, this means that it is 
directed towards the concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the "circumstances" in their 
infinite variety. 
Truth and Method p. 21 
Thus, it is the power of the productive imagination as the synthetic dynamic of the conceptual 
manifold which roots the latter in its grasp of particular concrete activity with an ontological 
vehemence that drives it towards a unity of being-in-the-world. 
In this way, the act of conversion of self identity in the instant of affirmation may be founded 
upon trust in the testimony of reliable attestation. What is important here with respect to 
'reliable attestation' is the trustworthiness of testimony based upon argumentation and the 
witness of practical wisdom. That is, the unity of selfhood achieved with respect to 
argumentation of practical wisdom is not that of the unity of the Same, but the unity of being as 
act and powerao. In other words, the affirmation of the achievement of unity in the dialectic of 
Self and Other is fundamentally a unity of act and power expressed in the attestation of 
conviction. This relates to the nature of the second order ontological reference of the 
imagination in terms of the textual mediation of metaphor and narrative as the power to grasp 
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an active state of affairs. 
But the question with respect to the seemingly relative or arbitrary nature of this unity needs 
further attention. How is it possible to engage in argumentation to give testimony and express 
conviction of the achievement of the unity of being in action? The aim of this study is to 
demonstrate that it is the dialectical relationship between argumentation and habitation in terms 
of the mediation of active being through prose rhythm which gains this achievement. With 
respect to reading, 'argumentation' is the process of reflection within the rational 'space' or 
distanciation created by the perspective of the Other. In other words, in the process of grasping, 
of imaginatively inhabiting the world of the text, the reader is provoked into continuing 
reflection by its configuration ontologically grounded in terms of prose rhythm. It is a 
questioning that may be compared analogously with the juridical process of attempting to 
understand and judge the evidence in terms of the facts and stories that are related in court. It 
is not simply an analytical process, but one based upon rational judgement in terms of the 
juridical process described below. It is a process of practical wisdom, of phronesis which may 
achieve probability not certainty. The point being made here is that this reflective process is 
grounded in the mediation of an active condition of being. It is the corporeal resonance of 
sonorous Being dialectically related to the process of practical wisdom that may bring the reader 
to the moment of relinquishing self reflection in grasping the narrative identity. A moment of 
affirmation of the unity of identity, that in an instant is the affirmation of the unity of selfhood 
which immediately comes under suspicion in the detour through reflection. 
In the story of'Abraham's Sacrifice' in the text of the 'Authorized Version' of the Bible, as the 
reader imaginatively appropriates the active world of the story which draws him towards the 
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figurative focus of the sacrificial act, provoked into questioning by his imagination, the 
movement of this dialectical process is founded upon the way he is enabled imaginatively to 
participate in the actions of the story. It is his state of being in terms of his bodily habitation of 
the actions which may drive him to the moment of complete identification with the narrative's 
viewpoint. At that moment, the reader's self identity is lost in the narrative. It is the moment of 
transcending temporality because there is a loss of consciousness of historical time. It has been 
relinquished on the basis of conviction and trust. The instant of this loss is the achievement of 
resonant concordance through the dialectical process of practical wisdom and imaginative 
appropriation and habitation ontologically grounded in the sonorous mediation of prose rhythm. 
The reader achieves the moment of understanding, of Verstehen(», which is the moment of 
conviction and trust. At the one side of this dialectic is the imaginative focusing upon the act of 
sacrifice in terms of particular intentionality which resonates in relation to operative 
intentionality corporeally mediated by prose rhythm; and, on the other side, is the process of 
reflecting upon this act in terms of practical wisdom. It is an hermeneutical spiral which may 
teleologically move towards the affirmation of a unity of active being as the foundation of 
Verstehen, and the attestation of conviction and trust. The reader grasps the meaning of the 
narrative from the viewpoint of Abraham's sacrificial act which affirms not a complete 
explanation, but an understanding based upon reasonable hope that there is a foundation for 
continuing reflection and enlargement of understanding. 
This is not arbitrary because it is a rational process of practical wisdom based upon the 
achievement of conviction and trust in which, paradoxically, the reader's self identity is at stake 
in the instant of relinquishing self reflection and self identity. This is the critical issue referred 
to at the beginning of this chapter. Here is the instant of losing and finding personal identity. 
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Although reason is under suspicion with respect to the fundamental issue of the affirmation of 
ontological unity as the foundation for reason, nevertheless, the commitment to reason, that is 
reasonable hope, is the critical factor in the achievement of conviction and trust. Reasonable 
hope, which may be compared with Ricoeur's notion of the 'character of desirability, ensures that 
reflection is dialectically related to the dynamic effects of sonorous Being in the hermeneutical 
spiral. In this dialectic, there cannot be a movement from discordance to concordance without 
the corresponding movement from suspicion to affirmation of rational understanding, and vice 
versa. Reasonable hope, defined as an ontological dynamic of intentionality, is the teleological 
characteristic of both sonorous Being and the synthesis of the conceptual manifold. It is the 
dynamic of the productive imagination. 
The Juridical Analogy 
In an endeavour to show how this dialectical movement is possible, the juridical process, which 
occupies Ricoeur's thought in his later work, is a valuable analogy. The aim is not to attempt to 
enter the historical and contemporary wide-ranging debate on the issues of justicea8), but simply 
to draw the analogy relating to three key elements of judgement in the juridical system. These 
are, the commitment to the rational principle, argumentation based upon practical wisdom, and 
an imaginative appropriation of human actions. A commitment to the rational principle is 
fundamental to a juridical system which endeavours to demonstrate its rejection of arbitrary 
judgement. Although the system is recognized as not being free from the possibility of error, this 
does not detract from but strengthens the commitment. It is this commitment which informs and 
shapes the process and procedures of judgement by the dynamic of its motive and intention. This 
commitment to the rational principle does not, or should not, close the process of judgement. Its 
aim is not conviction in terms of solution but justice which may leave the conclusion unresolved. 
201 
For example, if guilt of a crime cannot be judged proven on the basis of evidence then conviction 
is unresolved and the accused is set free because within the process of the particular case justice 
prevails. 
Judgement is not simply based upon a commitment to an abstract principle but is grounded in a 
dialectic between argumentation of practical wisdom and the imaginative appropriation of human 
actions. As stated above, it involves an uncompromising determination to establish empirical 
facts. This does not mean that such facts may be treated in an absolute sense. They are set clearly 
within the context of descriptive evidence which directly relates to the testimony of witnesses 
in terms of narrative(iv). The facts are subject to the interpretation of testimony. This is analogous 
to the words which make up the descriptions of written narratives; for example the story of 
Abraham. They are subject to interpretation based upon the appropriation and interpretation of 
the narrative. The issue is one of probability not certainty. However, the point being made here 
is the way the juridical process reveals that the commitment to the rational principle is rooted in 
the process of interpretation by argumentation in a system of advocacy. This is not limited to 
analysis, but is committed to rational judgement on the basis of practical wisdom. Crucially, this 
is founded upon concrete temporal actions, and therefore the imaginative appropriation of human 
action. Although commitment to the rational principle is fundamental to the juridical system, it 
is judgement in terms of a process of interpretation founded upon the appropriation of human 
activity that is the basis of conviction and trust in the system. A conviction that judgement is 
made in terms of an achievement of understanding the particular act that has been performed. 
Although this study is not directly concerned to examine the juridical process and procedures 
with respect to the role of the imagination in relation to the spoken word in contrast to reading 
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prose narratives in terms of the written word(2o), it may be considered to provide a valuable 
analogy. The commitment to the rational principle is analogous to reasonable hope in reading 
and interpreting prose narratives. The juridical system is based upon a commitment to the rational 
interpretation of evidence with respect to facts that are inextricably part of the narratives of 
witnesses. It is the rational process of understanding and explaining these narratives whereby the 
meaning of the crime may be grasped in terms of the 'who? ' and'why? '. In this system, it is not 
enough to claim understanding, there must be rational explanation in terms of argumentation and 
the conclusions of probability. This may be seen to be analogous to reading narratives that are 
not imaginative flights of fantasy but imaginative habitation of lifeworlds which may create 
change in the personal identity of the reader. A reader's and a jury's appropriation and habitation 
are both dialectically related to the rational process of argumentation and reflection, internal with 
respect to the reader. This grasping of the narrative is, in the case of the jury, a grasping of the 
perspective of the narrative(s) whereby there may be a rational understanding and explanation 
of the meaning of the crime in terms of probability; and, in the case of the reader, a grasping of 
the perspective of the otherness of narrative identity whereby there may be a rational 
understanding and explanation of a new meaning of personal identity. The former is based upon 
a commitment to the rational principle, the latter to reasonable hope. 
It is the dynamic intention of rational understanding and reflection in terms of practical wisdom 
which directs and informs the hermeneutical dialectic between jury, or reader and narrative(s). 
In the philosophical terms of this thesis, it is the dialectic between Self and Other. Sonorous 
Being is the ontological nature of the commitment to the rational principle, or reasonable hope 
expressed in the dynamic of resonance in terms of corporate and particular intentionalities. 
Discordant sonority is the ontological agitation of the Self in the face of the problematic of 
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rational unity, or the seemingly meaningless Other; it is the profound disturbance of reasonable 
hope as the security and teleological dynamic of the Self. Reasonable hope is the breath of life. 
Internal Dynamism of Reasonable Hope 
The metaphor, 'breath of life', expresses intentionality not simply as a subjective commitment but 
a condition of being. In his study entitled, 'What Ontology in View? ', Ricoeur concludes his 
discussion of Aristotle's energeia by making some brief but seemingly significant observations 
upon Spinoza's idea of conatus in the Ethics(2i) which may shed light upon the notion of 
reasonable hope. He quotes proposition 4 of book 3 (which appears to be an error in the 
number)(2v), and claims that it is in man that conatus is clearly readable, particularly in relation 
to consciousness. Acknowledging the definition of conatus in proposition seven of Spinoza's 
Ethics, that would seem to exclude all initiative of intention which may break with the 
determinism of nature(23), conatus, according to Ricoeur, is the power of being of all things which 
in terms of man is the power to act by means of the passage from inadequate to adequate ideas. 
He writes, 
Thus there is a close connection between the internal dynamism worthy of the name of life and 
the power of intelligence, which governs the passage from inadequate to adequate ideas. 
Oneself as Another. p. 316 
The idea of conatus, or the notion of an internal dynamism, which in one sense is pre-reflective 
but generated by reflection grounded in activity, relates significantly to the juridical analogy. 
Commitment to the rational principle which dynamically informs and shapes the system is 
embodied and animated by the relationship between argumentation grounded in the appropriation 
of activity and imaginative grasp of the narrative. Argumentation is not reasonable because of 
the commitment to the rational principle, but because of the incarnation of this commitment in 
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argumentation rooted in the appropriation of action. 
This is analogous to reading prose narratives with respect to reasonable hope. That is, according 
to the analysis conducted in this study, this dynamism is generated by the creative relationship 
between two modes of being: the mode of Self reflection, and the mode of activity as the 
ontological engagement with the Other; a creativity that is fundamentally imaginative. It is the 
dynamism of reasonable hope which is the creative energy of the productive imagination 
enfleshed in the prereflexive relationship of the Self with its own body as its intimacy with the 
Other, and the consequent provocation of argumentation in terms of practical wisdom. It is the 
dynamism of the desire of the Self to validate its appropriation of the open horizon of the Other 
in a vehement affirmative act to be free of suspicion. It is, for example, to read the story of 
'Abraham's sacrifice' imaginatively driven by reasonable hope that the sacrificial act may be 
understood and, to some extent, may be reasonably explained. The qualifying clause, 'to some 
extent' implies that conviction based on the achievement of understanding does not mean 
complete explanation, but affirms trust in continuing interpretation and explanation; in the 
movement from suspicion to affirmation. 
In conclusion, acknowledgement must be paid to Ricoeur's endeavour to address the seemingly 
intractable aporias of tragic action in the quest for selthood, particularly at a time of profound 
sadness in the personal tragedy of his son's death. In directing his attention to the tragedy of 
Antigone, he submits the deeply moving testimony, 
The tragedy of Antigone touches what, following Steiner, we can call the agonistic ground of human 
experience, where we witness the interminable confrontation of man and woman, old age and youth, 
society and the individual, the living and the dead, humans and gods. Self-recognition is at the price 
of a difficult apprenticeship acquired over the course of a long voyage through the persistent conflicts, 
whose universality is inseparable from their particular localizations, which is, in every instance, 
unsurpassable. Oneself as Another p. 243 
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Through such an apprenticeship there is, what Ricoeur testifies to, a tragic wisdom which is the 
achievement of those who refuse to contribute a'solution' to these conflicts, and pass through, 
what may be a painful conversion of selfhood, a catharsis, whereby practical wisdom responds 
to tragic wisdom to reach the `haven of conviction' beyond. It has been the insistent concern of 
this study to propose that such a conversion is rooted in the discordant resonances of sonorous 
Being, that the `haven of conviction' is affirmed in a `rhythm of hope' whereby there is a losing 
and finding of Self. 
But there is always the suspicion that this is the haven of madness. This is a suspicion from 
which human beings cannot escape. Macbeth's cry of despair would seem to be an inherent, 
fearful disturbance of human consciousness. 
it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing 
In his lecture, Hamlet and Don Quixote, Ivan Turgenev contrasts these two literary figures to 
reveal the nature of their madness. He describes Hamlet as the complete egocentric; the 
obsessively reflective person who doubts everything, including himself, and inflicts merciless 
suffering on himself. Turgenev finds in Don Quixote a more appealing figure of madness in his 
willingness to sacrifice himself. However, both suffer in a way that is destructive. Hamlet's self 
reflection is not rooted in the powerful dynamic of reasonable hope which informs practical 
wisdom. Don Quixote's unconstrained hope is not subject to an apprenticeship of tragic wisdom. 
In both directions lie madness and self destruction(24). It has been the aim of this thesis to show 
that Reasonable Hope may be affirmed when it is grounded in the rhythms of sonorous Being. 
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NOTES 
Chapter One: Presence, Meaning and Metaphor (Part I) 
1. Kants attempt to establish a transcendental grounding for rational knowledge in place of traditional 
metaphysics decisively influenced the developments of the debate, particularly Husserl's Transcendental 
Idealism and the consequent radical critiques of Ricoeur and Derrida analyzed in this first chapter. 
An important introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason is Kants Prolegoma to Any Future Metaphysics 
(ed. Beryl Logan, Routledge, 1996). Among the considerable number of studies on the first Critique, Henry 
E. Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism, written as an interpretation and defense, is a valuable 
supplementary text. 
2. Ricoeur's theory of metaphor and semantic innovation in The Rule of Metaphor contrasts with the interest 
shown by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida in metaphors as single words whose figurative characteristics 
have 'worn away (usure), like the face on a coin or medal, and in vulgar usage have become accepted as 
concepts. 
3. Temps et Recit forms a pair with La Metaphorie Vive in dealing with the same basic phenomenon of 
semantic innovation and the role of the productive imagination. 
4. For example, see Imagination and Chance: The Difference between the Thought of Ricoeur and Derrida. 
Leonard Lawlor. 
5. The notion of the 'rational mind has been the subject of wide ranging debate and interpretation, particularly 
since the advent of Cartesian rationalism. A valuable contribution to this debate from an ontological 
perspective is Heidegger's The Principle of Reason . See also Roger Triggs 
Reality at Risk with respect 
to the Anglo-American logico-empirical tradition. 
6. The many forms of Empiricism lay stress on experience, typically sensory experience, as a source of 
knowledge or belief. See 'Empricism, Bruce Hunter, included in Blackwell's A Companion to 
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Epistemology (ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa). 
7. In relation to phenomenology, a valuable analysis of the Cartesian Cogito may be found in Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology of Perception, Part III Chapter 1, 'The Cogito'. 
8. The notion oP givenness' draws upon Heidegger's interpretation of the tern , es gibt (there is, it gives; thus, 
"the given"). See Being and Time, H7, pp. 26-27 See also Derrida's use of this notion particularly in Glas. 
9. First Meditation §4 <51>, Cartesian Meditations, Edmund Husserl, pp. 10-11 
10. See chapter 7, 'Kant and Husserl' in Ricoeur's Husserl: An Analysis of his PhenomenoloSy. 
11. See Husserl's analysis of the Essential Distinctions of the term 'sign' with respect to 'indication' and 
'expression', Chapter 1, 'Investigation I, Expression and Meaning, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1. In relation 
to the Analytic tradition and how far Husserl's view is a variant of Frege, see 'On Sinn and Beteutung' in 
The Frege Reader, ed. Michael Beaney. See also Peter Simons"Meaning and Language' in The Cambridge 
Companion to Husserl (ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith). 
12. According to Ricoeur, Husserl's phenomenological reduction is based upon a metaphysical decision (see 
above pp. 190-192. See also Emmanuel Levinas' criticism of Husserl's failure to clarify the meaning of 
'absoluteness' with respect to the assertion of the 'absolute existence of consciousness' in The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, p. 29. Northwestern University Press, 1995). 
13 'Suspicion' is a central theme throughout Ricoeur's work. Prior to the development of his thought in Freud 
& Philosophy with respect to 'the hermeneutics of suspicion', the fundamental issues relating to this notion 
were addressed in his early work, History and Truth, particularly in the final chapter, Negativity and 
Primary Affirmation'. A critical view of this theme can be found in S. H. Clark's, Paul Ricoeur, chapter 4. 
14. Derrida is critical of Husserl and traditional Western philosophy for privileging the voice, la voix, the 
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spoken word, parole, with respect to its dominance as self-presence. This "apparent transcendence" of the 
voice is directly linked, according to Derrida, with the concept of truth in the history of philosophy. See 
Speech and Phenomena, pp. 74-79. 
15. The immediacy of Husserl's understanding of intuition is grounded in the ontological structures of the 
transcendental ego's historical presence in terms of intentional consciousness. This contrasts with the 
variants of Aristotle's account in the Posterior Analytics in which he claims that intuition is the originative 
source of Scientific knowledge (Book II, 19,100b), and Kant's view that although the immediacy of 
intuition is situated at the level of sensibility, it is grounded in the a priori formal structures of the rational 
mind (CPR, B73). See Levinas's illuminating study of Husserl's theory of intuition (as above). 
16. In chapter 6, The Voice that Keeps Silence, in Speech and Phenomena pp. 82 - 87, Derrida is critical of 
Husserl's attempt to demonstrate how the voice is the temporal self-presence of absolute subjectivity. See 
On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, (quoted PCIT in following notes) §36, p. 
17. See, in particular, Derrida's critical commentary on Husserl's use of Vorstellung in chapter 4 Meaning and 
Representation' (ibid. ) See also, §19 ('Repetition') in PCIT p47f 
18. See No. 45 PCIT p. 308ff. 
19. For an overview of Derrida's work and philosophy see A Derrida Reader Between the Blinds ed. Peggy 
Kamuf; also Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. David Wood. For a summary of Derrida's principal arguments 
see Deconstruction, Theory and Practice, Christopher Norris. 
20. The importance of the iconic moment of metaphor in Ricoeur's thought is rooted in his work on symbols. 
A valuable essay on the development of this work is, The Symbol Gave Rise to Thought', by David Pellauer 
in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn. 
21. For Ricoeur's view see, 'Imagination in Discourse and Action' in From Text to Action,. Ricoeur. Two 
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helpful commentaries on Ricoeur's development of the role of the imagination are, The Hermeneutical 
Imagination' Richard Keamey's Poetics oflmagining, (Harper Collins, 1991), and Imagination and Chance, 
Leonard Lawlor. For a criticism of this interpretation of Kants Third Critique, see The Resistance to 
Theory, Paul De Man. 
22. See PCIT, Appendix III, pp. 109 - 114. 
23. See Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, pp. 218 - 233. 
24. See PCIT Appendix IV, pp. 113 - 114. 
25. See PCIT §30. pp. 64-66. 
26. The concept 'closure' in modern philosophy is used in the contemporary debate about the end of 
Metaphysical discourse. For a valuable contribution see Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of 
Metaphysics, John Sallis. Also Derrida's important essay, The Ends of Man' in Margins of Philosophy, and 
Simon Critchley's The Ethics of Deconstruction. Chapter 2. 
27. Ferdinand de Saussure's notion of 'difference' is a key element in his theory of signs. A word is a sign 
consisting of two integral parts: the signifier or sound-image, and the signified or concept. It is the former 
in terms of intra-linguistic difference in sound which is the basis of meaning. The theory is set out in Course 
in GeneralLinguistics. This notion has played an influential role in Structuralist thought, see The Feud of 
Language: A History ofStructuralist Thought, Thomas Pavel, and The Prison-House ofLanguage, Frederic 
Jameson. With respect to the Post-Structuralist debate, see, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism 
and Postmodernism, Madan Sarup, and Superstructualism, Richard Harland. For a further example of 
Saussure's role in modern linguistics see Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein, Roy Harris. 
28. The phenomenological horizon is used in the work of Husserl and Heidegger to describe the way perception 
is rooted in a "background" experience. Heidegger relates this to the ontological meaning of the disclosure 
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of Dasein; that is, the horizon is defined as the ecstatical unity of temporality. See Being and Time, 365, 
p.. 416. This concept has become part of hermeneutical philosophy. For example, see H. G. Gadamer's Truth 
and Method pp. 302-307. 
29. See Derrida's essay, Differance, in Margins of Philosophy. 
30. Ricoeur and Derrida borrow the notion of the trace from Emmanuel Levinas. See The Trace, Meaning 
and Sense in Emmanuel Levinas : Basic Philosophical Writings. ed. Adriaan T. Peperkzak, Simon Critchley 
and Robert Bemasconi. pp. 59-64. See 'Archives, Documents and Traces' in Ricoeur's Time and Narrative, 
Vol. 3, pp. 116-126. See also, Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, pp. 75-87. 
31. The word Retrait in French has a variety of meanings, including withdrawal, retirement and retreat, which 
Derrida draws upon in relation to metonymy with respect to semantic deferral in his theory of metaphor. 
(See The Retrait of Metaphor', Enclitic 2.2,1978). 
32. This primary conceptual break refers to the traditional implicit metaphysical assumption or explicit critical 
philosophical attempts to ground rational, conceptual thought on an absolute foundation. 
33. Ricoeur's fundamental view of the human condition runs through his work and is the basis of this 
teleological movement. In his early existential writings (see Fallible Man) Ricoeur claims that there is an 
originating affirmation which allows a human being to think and act only through the existential negation 
which he calls perspective, character and vital feeling. This relationship between affirmation and negation, 
which is later interpreted in terms of the notion of suspicion, then becomes the primordial dialectic of the 
hermeneutical spiral in which conceptual thought is affirmed. 
34. See Ricoeur's essay, Explanation and Understanding' in From Text to Action. 
35. See Derrida's'White Mythology' in The Margins ofPhilosophy. According to Derrida there is a continuity 
between concept and metaphor in which the former is a'dead' mode of the latter whose image has'worn 
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away'. In a process of deconstruction the metaphor is unveiled revealing its metonymic characteristic of 
endless semantic deferral. 
36. Ricoeur and Derrida are committed to the view that mediation of self-knowledge or self understanding is 
prior to thought or perception. Furthermore, mediation as the externalization of thought in a system of signs 
is essentially linguistic mediation. For a helpful summary of the similarities and difference between them, 
see Leonard Lawlor's Imagination and Chance. 
37. In particular, see Language, Truth and Logic, A. J. Ayer. What Sort of Concept is Existence? by 
S. G. Williams is a useful essay in Blackwell's, A Companion to Metaphysics (ed. Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. 
Tsui-James). 
38. The question of the meaning of Being is fundamental to Heidegger's project in Being and Time. In Part I 
of the Introduction he attempts to demonstrate ¶ 1. 'The Necessity, Structure and the Priority of the 
Question of Being' acknowledging that in Western philosophy it is said to be the 'most universal and 
emptiest of concepts. ' (p. 2) 
39. Ricoeur acknowledges his debt to Heidegger with respect to his ontological analysis of temporality in Being 
and Time, but is critical of the failure, according to Ricoeur, to the return to address the ordinary concept 
of time, or universal time of the human sciences. See Heidegger and the "Ordinary Concept of Time' in 
Time and Narrative, Vol. 3. 
40. Derrida raises the question about the "we" in Heidegger's text ("The Ends of Man', Margins of Philosophy). 
Also in Of Spirit Derrida considers the implication of Spirit (Geist) in Heidegger's writings. 
41. See Part 4 of the Introduction, Being and Time. Refer also to 'Ontic Ontology' in Theodore Kiesel's The 
Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 424-439. 
42. Vorhanden and Zuhanden respectively. See Being and Time, pp. 70-74. 
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43. In Being and Time, Heidegger's concern with presence as the appearance of Being is in terms of place as 
the site of Dasein's letting be. In his later writings, following what is known as his turning, or Kehre (see 
the Introduction to Basic Writings, pp. 32-35. ed. David Farrell Krell, ) he explores the notion of presence 
in terms of art in which the figure is a clearance, a rift in the concealment of Being. See 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art'. 
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Chapter Two: Presence, Meaning and Metaphor (Part II) 
1. See the interview with Ricoeur, 'Poetry and Possibility' in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection & Imagination, 
ed. Mario J. Valdes. 
2. The Symbolism of Evil is part of the early trilogy, including Fallible Man and Freedom and Nature: The 
Voluntary and the Involuntary in which he first addresses the nature of the symbolic with respect to 
concrete expressions of the human experience of evil. His aim is to identify a method for making sense of 
mythic language which is symbolic through and through. Later, he developed this work on the symbolic 
features of metaphor and narrative. See Time and Narrative, Vol i, pp. 57 - 58. 
3. Ricoeur's idiosyncratic work on Freud (Freud and Philosophy) is devoted to the language of his 
psychological discoveries, and not, as Ricoeur confesses, with psychoanalysis. It is again a concern with 
mythological language with respect to the expressions of unconsciousness. For an opposing view, see the 
article, 'Psychoanalysis as anti-hermeneutics, Jean Laplanche in Radical Philosophy 79. 
4. In Creative Evolution chapter 1, Bergson writes, "Time is an invention or it is nothing at all. " He explains 
that creative time or duration is originally experienced as time lived in the stream of consciousness and then 
applied by analogy to the universe. Therefore it is inner time that is being analyzed. From Bergson's view, 
calendar time is merely an externalized form of time, a "fall" of time in the direction of spatialization. 
5. This is Heidegger's term which first emerged in his Summer Semester 1919 at Freiburg University. It is 
a term referring to a method of disclosing presuppositions and their ontological origins in factic life 
experience which is linked, in 1920, to "systematic" deconstruction. (See Appendix D, p. 493-4, The 
Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Theodore Kisiel). 
6. Because of Derrida's linking of Heidegger's term with his notion of D(erance, it is more elusive in its 
definition. According to Derrida, meaning is endlessly deferred and any attempt to make Deconstruction 
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into another critical philosophy must be resisted. See Deconstruction. Christopher Norris. See also, 'From 
ironist theory to private allusions: Derrida' in Richard Rort s, Contingency, irony and solidarity; and The 
Deconstruction of Actuality: Derrida Interview' Radical Philosophy 68. 
7. It is 'non-conceptual' in the paradoxical sense that, according to Heidegger, cannot be defined in terms 
of traditional Western logic. See Introduction, Part I, Being and Time. For a discussion of this paradox in 
the context of a penetrating account of the problem of Being, see An Introduction to Metaphysics. 
8. For a critical study of Heidegger texts with respect to the German poets refer to Heidegger and the Poets: 
Poiesis, Sophia, Techne. V6ronique M. Föti. 
9. 'Self-identity relates to a number of associated notions, e. g. personal identity, 'self-awareness', self-concept', 
'mind. In modem philosophy, the contemporary debate has its roots in eighteenth century thought, among 
others, Hume who held, 'what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, 
united together by certain relations, and suppos'd falsely, to be endow'd with perfect simplicity and identity. ' 
(A Treatise of Human Nature, 1978a [1739-40] ed. P. H. Nidditch); Locke claims that the 'idea' of person 
is not a material mass but consists'in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly 
fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organised body' (An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, 1990 [1671], ed. Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. Rogers). The contemporary debate 
has been influenced by this issue in developmental psychology, e. g. Identity and the Life Cycle' by 
E. Erikson in Psychological Issues, Monograph 1,1959. With respect to phenomenology, the notion relates 
particularly to self-consciousness. Husserl writes, The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also 
as I, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that ego, as the same I. ' Cartesian 
Meditations, §31, p. 66. Ricoeur's perspective is set out in the Introduction to Oneself as Another. 
10. See Narrative in Culture, ed. Cristopher Nash; also, Love's Knowledge, Martha C. Nussbaum.. 
11. See Study I in The Rule of Metaphor. In his Poetics, Aristotle sets out his definition of metaphor as 
'the application of an alien name by a transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, 
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or from species to species, or by analogy, ' 1457b 4-9. He also discusses the use of metaphor with respect 
to style in section 9 of theRhetoric. 
12. In The Philosophy of Rhetoric, I. A. Richards was the first to propose that two ideas are active together in 
metaphor, although he did not offer any explicit definition or theory. Nevertheless, he did identify the one 
idea as the vehicle which is conveyed by the literal meaning of the words used metaphorically, and the tenor 
as the idea conveyed by the vehicle. The metaphor is neither the vehicle nor the tenor but the two conjoined. 
13. In Models and Metaphors, Max Black makes a number of significant contributions and emendations to 
Richards. He claims, a metaphor is not an isolated term but a sentence. He calls the metaphorical sentence 
the frame, and the word or words used the focus. The frame imposes 'extension of meaning upon the focal 
word'. He makes explicit what Richards only hints at, namely that a metaphor not merely invokes two 
subjects but, in the case of the vehicle, involves a'system of associated commonplaces'. Such a system will 
serve as a'lens' or'filter' by which to organize the view of the principal subject. 
14. To account for metaphorical meaning, Monroe C. Beardsley, in his Aesthetics, makes a distinction between 
designation, denotation and connotation. For example, the term 'wolf designates certain characteristics that 
define a class of animals; it also denotes the animals that have those defining characteristics in common, 
and it connotes characteristics that wolves have, or are believed to have, such as fierceness, persistence, 
predatory clannishness. In a metaphor there appears a falsehood or logical absurdity that makes reading at 
the level of designation of the terms impossible. Consequently, the reader falls back on the level of 
connotation that is called metaphor. In Beardsley's'controversion' theory, as it is called, there is a conflict 
of word meaning in metaphor that is resolved by moving down the hierarchy of readings. 
15. The 'ornamental' or'emotional' theory of metaphor has been dominant in the traditional theories until this 
century, although, Ricoeur, among others, attempts to show the historical roots of these theories in 
Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric. See Study 1, The Rule of Metaphor. See also 'The Classical View' in 
Terence Hawkes' Metaphor, and'Classical Accounts of Metaphor' in Janet Martin Soskice's Metaphor and 
Religious Language The key issue is whether metaphor has a cognitive element, or is simply an emotional 
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figure of speech. Donald Davidson rejects the view promoted by Ricoeur that metaphor involves a creation 
of new meaning. By means of emotional surprise, he claims, metaphors help in the appreciation of particular 
facts. See'What Metaphors Mean' in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon Sacks. 
16. See The Rule of Metaphor, p. 313 
17. ibid. pp. 299 - 230 
18. ibid. pp. 187 -191. 
19. For an outline of Ricoeur's thought in this early period, see the Biographical Essay' in Charles Reagan's, 
Paul Ricoeur: His Life and His Work 
20. In Ricoeur's early years, Gabriel Marcel had an important influence upon him. A general theme identified 
by Marcel was the distinction between "problem" and "mystery". A problem can be resolved, whereas a 
mystery, which he claimed was the proper concern of philosophy, are not subject to present or future 
resolution. See the introduction to Fallible Man, pp. xi-xiii. A particular influence was Marcel's 
understanding of a second-order method of 'secondary reflection' to grasp experiences that 'primary 
reflection', reputed to be reductive and objectifying, was held to obliterate and rob them of their original 
and affirmative power. Ricoeur confesses, 'to Gabriel Marcel I owed the problematic of a subject at once 
embodied and capable of placing desires and powers at a distance, in short a subject who was master of 
himself and the servant of necessity in the figure of character, the unconscious, and life. ' 'Intellectual 
Autobiography' in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Lewis E. Hahn. 
21. The notion of lebenswelt, or life-world, first introduced into hermeneutical philosophy by Wilhelm Dilthey 
(see, The Construction of the Historic World in Human Studies' Dilthey's Sellected Writings). His concern 
was a form of science correlative to the study of human experience. "Life" represents the shared flow of 
human experiences both in its social activity and individual particularity. Husserl attempts to illuminate the 
conditions of the possibility of this science in terms of the life-world as the horizon of subjective modes 
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of givenness upon which the objectified world of the natural sciences is erected. Heidegger suspends the 
search for ultimate cognitive foundations below the life-world replacing Husserl's transcendental ego with 
being-in-the-world. These interpretations have profoundly influenced the developments of hermeneutical 
philosophy, particularly in H-G. Gadamer's Truth and Method, and Ricoeur. It is also used in other 
philosophical disciplines with differing interpretations. For example, Habermas's understanding of the 
notion to social systems. See The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Also, Wittgenstein uses the term 
"forms of life" in relation to his notion of"language-games": See Philosophical Investigations, No. 7, p. 5e. 
22. See Fallible Man, chapter 1. 
23. The influence of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception upon Ricoeur's thought was significant 
in an early period particularly in his attempt to develop Husserl's eidetic analysis with respect to affection 
and volition in Freedom and Nature: Voluntary and Involuntary. Merleau-Ponty's description of 
representative acts of consciousness revealed a way of resisting Husserl's idealism and the traditional 
dualism of consciousness and corporality. 
24. Ricoeur's notion of the "hermeneutics of suspicion" became clearer in his thought during his work on Freud. 
At the end of this study, in establishing a dialectic between suspicion and faith, drawing upon Merleau- 
Ponty's term for psychoanalysis, the "archaeology of the subject" as the topography for the unmasking of 
illusions, he proposes that, faith being the opposite of suspicion, there must be a "teleology of the subject". 
Consequently, he creates a dialectic between psychoanalysis as the interpretation of the unconscious and 
eschatological hope which moves beyond a human being is to what he may become. See Freud and 
Philosophy, Book III, Chapters 2 and 3. 
25. Ricoeut's interest in Paul Tillich's view on symbols was influential in the development of his thought. See 
Tillich's essay, The Religious Symbol' in a collection of essays under the title Myth and Symbol, ed. 
F. W. Dillistone, and John E. Smith's essay, 'Freud, Philosophy and Interpretation' in The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur, ed. Lewis E. Hahn, pp. 150-152. 
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26. Freud and Philosophy, p. 494. 
27. Freud and Philosophy, pp. 93-95 and 496-506 
28. Kant, Critique of Judgment, §314. 
29. Among others, Paul Tillich's theological interpretation of social and religious symbols with respect to an 
immanent participation in a transcendent ultimate reality (e. g. Part 2, 'Concrete Applications' in Theology 
of Culture, and the work of Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms), were profoundly influential 
in the development of Ricoeur's thought leading to the description of the symbolic resources of the practical 
field as the second anchorage of Mimesisi in Time and Narrative, vol. 1, pp. 57-58. See also, Northrop 
Frye's essay, Theory of Symbols' in Anatomy of Criticism. 
30. See Note 27, Chapter 1. 
31. Time and Narrative, Vol-1, p. 58. An important and significant experimentation with respect to the 
readablity of the symbolic structuring of social reality is set out in the work of the Brazilian educator, Paulo 
Freire, in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
32. Translation must take account of sound considering its fundamental significance with respect to the 
historical developments of any particular language (see 'The Importance of Sound-changes' in A History 
of the English Language, Albert C. Baugh & Thomas Cable pp. 230-235). However, the theory that language 
has its roots in metaphor and narrative means that this particular historical development of sound-change 
is grounded in the rhythmic sound patterns and images of a linguistic culture or lifeworld. Translation 
therefore involves an appropriation of a linguistic lifeworld of which sound and image of metaphor are 
primary. 
33. Derrida writes, The primitive meaning, the original, and always sensual and material figure... is not exactly 
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a metaphor. It is a kind of transparent figure, equivalent to a literal meaning (sens propre). It becomes a 
metaphor when philosophical discourse puts it into circulation. Simultaneously the first meaning and first 
displacement are forgotten. The metaphor is no longer noticed, and it is taken for the proper meaning. ' 
('White Mythology' in Margins ofPhilosophy p. 21 1). This proper meaning, however, according to Derrida, 
is an illusion. Language is subject to D jerance, the endless play of metaphoric displacement, which he 
describes in terms of "supplementarity" and "spacing"; a play of language as a system of inscribed signs, 
of writing or 1'ecriture. 
34. Derrida's understanding of metaphor in a metonymic sense closely relates to the question of western 
metaphysics and presence, and the withdrawal of Being. He writes, 'This metaphysics as a tropical system 
and singularly as a metaphoric detour would correspond to the withdrawal of Being: unable to reveal itself 
except in dissimulating itself under the 'species' of an epochal determination, under the species of an as 
which obliterates itself as such (Being as eidos, as subjectity, as will, as work, etc. ), Being would allow 
itself to be named in a metaphorico-metonymical divergence (ecart). One would then be tempted to say: 
themetaphysical, which corresponds in its discourse to the withdrawal of Being, tends to reassemble, in 
resemblance, all its metonymic divergences in a great metaphor of Being or of the thought of Being. This 
bringing together is the language of metaphysics itself' 'The Retrait of Metaphor' p. 21. 
35. Logical Investigations, Fifth Investigation 
36. Delimitations, John Sallis, pp. 67-68. 
37. In chapter 21 of the Poetics, Aristotle follows the derivation of the term 'metaphor' in saying that metaphora 
(carrying across) is a kind of epiphora (carrying over). The 'carrying over', or transference is a word, or 
word's meaning. In the traditional theory of 'carrying over' it is for the purpose of substituting one word 
for another. The word's meaning stimulates surprise and emotion by the nature of its deviance. The'carrying 
over' is not cognitive process, and does not involve any change or creation of meaning. According to this 
theory, metaphor is one type of trope in the classical glossary of figures of speech. According to Ricoeur 
(Rule of Metaphor, Study 1, p. 17), for Aristotle's definition of metaphora a sort of displacement applies 
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to every transposition of terms. He claims that this understanding of transpositional movement may be seen 
to apply to all domains including the sentence, and therefore it is movement involving semantic change. 
38. Chapter 3 of Janet Martin Soskice's Metaphor and Religious Language(see Note 15) is a good summary 
of the various theories. 
Nietzsche's view of metaphor has had profound effects on Derrida and many 'postmodernist' philosophers. 
See Nietzsche and Metaphor, Sarah Kofinan. The interest in metaphor in many'postmodernist' philosophers 
relates to the attention given to the study of'Aesthetics' and the 'world-creating! capacity of'poetic' language 
(See, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Terry Eagleton; The Condition of Postmodernity, David Harvey; 
Postmodernism-Philosophy and the Arts, Continental Philosophy III, ed. Hugh J. Silverman. ) 
With respect to cognitive theories , see Eva Feder Kittay's, Metaphor; and 
from a scientific perspective, 
Earl R. Mac Cormac's, A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor. John Searle's chapter on'Metaphor' in Expression 
and Meaning is also important in relation to his theory of speech acts. 
39. See Study 2 in The Rule of Metaphor. For the renewed interest in the contemporary developments 
of literary studies and philosophy, see The Bible as Rhetoric, ed. Martin Warner; also, Persuasion: Greek 
Rhetoric in Action, ed. Ian Worthington. 
40. See 'Semantic Field Theory', chapter 6, Metaphor, Eva Feder Kittay. 
41. See Rule of Metaphor, pp. 222-228; 'Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics' Style in Language, ed. 
T. A. Sebeok; and a helpful commentary, 'A Synecdoche' in Russian Formalism, Peter Steiner. 
42. In philosophical terms, one definition of a proper name, or noun, is, 'A proper noun is used to refer to a 
particular individual person or thing. A common noun refers to any member of a class. ' Talking Philosophy, 
A. W. Sparkes. This definition is qualified in the sense that a proper name is rendered'more proper' by the 
addition of descriptive phrases. A helpful essay in the Analytical philosophical tradition is John R. Searle's 
'Proper Names' in The Philosophy of Language, ed. A. P. Martinich. Derrida's approach to proper names 
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is from a radically different perspective related to his concern with iterability of the sign, and more 
particularly with the singularity and repeatability of the signature. See'Signature Event Context' in Margins 
of Philosophy. 
43. The Hegelian term auJhebung has still not been really translated, or rethought in English.. See an additional 
note of Hegel's The Encyclopaedia Logic, tr. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris, '... we should 
remember the double meaning of the German expression "aufheben". On the one hand, we understand it 
to mean "clear away" or "cancel", and in that sense we say a law or regulation is cancelled (aufgehoben). 
But the word also means "to preserve", and we say in this sense that something is well taken care of (wohl 
aufgehoben). This ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a negative and a positive 
meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source 
of confusion. We ought rather to recognise here the speculative spirit of our language which transcends the 
"either-or" of mere understanding! p. 154. In the contemporary Continental philosophic debate there are 
a number of varied interpretations of this concept. Derrida says, 'We will never be finished with the reading 
or rereading of Hegel, and in a certain way, I do nothing other than attempt to explain myself on this point. ' 
Quoted in the Introduction to Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett, p. 1. In the essay by Kevin 
Thompson, 'Hegelian Dialectic and the Quasi-Transcendental in Glas' he claims that there is a deep affinity 
between aufhebung and d jerance. p. 239. 
44. How to do thing with Words, J. L. Austin, and Speech Acts, John R. Searle. 
45. See Ferdinand de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics, tr. Roy Harris, [23ff] p. 8ff. 
46. In 'Differance' (Margins of Philosophy), Derrida writes, 'we will designate as d jerance the movement 
according to which language, or any code, any system of referral in general, is constituted "historically" 
as a weave of differences. ' p. 12. According to Derrida, this movement of d/erance is possible only if the 
present element, that is, each element appearing on the scene, is related to something other than itself to 
keep its mark of the past, and letting itself be vitiated by the mark of the future. Therefore an interval must 
separate the present from what is not in order to be the present. 'In constituting itself, in dividing itself 
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dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, or becoming-space of time or the becoming-time 
of space (temporization). ' p. 13. Derrida's concept of supplementarily relates to D{erance in that since 
presence is always deferred there is, what he calls, a logic of supplementarily in language. The word is 
supplemented in the absence of presence. His interest in the Confessions of Rousseau who tells how in 
society he shows himself to be'completely different to what I am', and so, this leads him to absent himself - 
'writing and hiding himself. ' In The Essay on the Origin of Language' in Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri 
Spivak, Derrida explores this concept of supplementarity. 
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Chapter Three: Presence, Sound and Narrative 
See Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book IV, 1005b, 20. This is qualified with respect to temporality in De 
Intepretatione, Chapter 6,17a, 30. Kant, although affirming the principle with respect to analytical 
judgements, reconsiders the Aristotelean temporal qualifier by supplementing the principle with a series 
of additional ones. See the entry on'contradiction' in A Kant Dictionary, Howard Caygill, p. 134-35. A 
radically different view is taken by Hegel in his Logic in relation to the dialectical movement of the 
becoming of Being. According to Hegel, everything is inherently contradictory. See the Science of Logic, 
tr. A. V. Miller, `C. Contradiction', pp. 431-443. It is this view which has influenced the developments in 
dialectical philosophy including Ricoeur and Derrida. 
2. The separation of rational and poetic modes of language in the rational tradition of Western philosophy 
has its roots in the Platonic concern with 'truth'. For example, see Book X of the Republic. (See also, 'Plato 
on poetic creativiy, Elizabeth Asmis, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut. ) Platonic 
idealism has not remained the only philosophical influence in the Western tradition. The commitment to 
the ideal of rational 'truth' free from poetic emotional contamination has continued dominant, particularly 
with respect to science. However, the radical questioning of the notion of'truth' in all disciplines of modern 
philosophy has led to an increased interest in the role of poetry, especially in hermeneutic philosophy. For 
example, see, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, Richard Rorty. For a different perspective which aims 
at a greater integration between the rational and the poetic, see Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum. Also, 
A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection & Imagination, ed. Mario I. Valdes. 
3. See Study 8 of The Rule of Metaphor and the conclusions of Time and Narrative, vol. 3. 
4. See The Linguitic Sign' in Course in General Linguistics, Part One, Chapter II, p. 65ff. 
See chapter 2, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri C. Spivak. 
6. The metaphorical reference is founded upon the symbolic characteristic of 'this is that'. Ricoeur retains the 
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ontological naivete of the metaphorical is in relation to a tensional view of metaphorical truth and literal 
truth by insisting upon the inclusion of the literal 'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the 
metaphorical W. See, Rule of Metaphor, pp. 247-256. 
7. The 'inside' of language is the acoustical production of meaning. The written word, from Saussure's view, 
is semantically dependent upon this system, and is therefore 'outside' of it. 
8. In particular the notion of difference: 'It is at the price of this war against language against itself that the 
sense and question of its origin will be thinkable. This war is obviously not a war among others. A polemic 
for the possibility of sense and world, it takes place in this difference, which, we have seen, cannot reside 
in the world but only in language, in the transcendental disquietude of language, Indeed, far from only living 
in language, this war is also the origin and residence of language. Language preserves the difference that 
preserves language. Speech and Phenomena p. 14. 
9. From 1920 a new development in linguistics, based upon a theoretical rigour endeavouring to make the 
science of natural languages logical, spread in Central Europe, the English speaking countries and 
Scandinavia. Hjelmslev's work in the School of Copenhagen was part of this. For a critical view of the 
relationship of this work and phenomenology, with particular reference to Derrida, see Thomas Pavel's The 
Feud of Language, pp. 54-61. 
10. In Derrida's concern to isolate the literary text from the "natural bond" of the sound of the voice, the 
development in the Copenhagen School of glossematics as the means to reach the literary element in terms 
of an irreducible graphic text provides an example of a way to study the play ofform. 
11. The fundamental problem of the structuralist endeavour to establish a scientific approach to the study 
of language as a linguistic sign system is the failure to question the subjective foundation of this approach. 
U. This notion of the text contrasts with Derrida's view that it is 'a fabric of traces referring endlessly to 
something other than itself, to other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all the limits assigned to it 
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so far... everything that was set up in opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, the real history, and what 
not, every field of reference - to body or mind, conscious or unconscious, politics, economics, and so forth). ' 
'Living On - Border Lines' in Deconstruction and Criticism, ed. Harold Bloom. 
13. This does not refer to the author, living or dead, but to the 'who' of the text, or the 'implied author'. 
14. That is, configuration understood as an achievement of a creative process involving the objective sonorous 
materiality. 
15. The figurative characteristic of language, in one sense, is analogous to a musical score in terms of the sound 
patterns, but in place of the notes it is the imagistic feature that is intrinsically related rhythmic sonority with 
respect to the particular focal metaphor and the narrative profile. 
16. This is a reference to the descriptive statements clustered around an entity in terms of, for example, the 
representation of the objectified 'what' of Cartesian realitas objectiva, or the Kantian epistemologically 
inaccessible, intuited Ding an sich. See Heidegger's The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 34-38.. 
17. See Being and Time, ¶ 4. pp. 32 - 35. 
18. For a helpful definition see Theodore Kiesel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Appendix D, 
pp. 494-95. 
19. See Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, particularly chapter 3. For a useful commentary refer 
to M. C. Dillon's Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, Part 2, Chapter 8. 
20. According to Howard Caygill in A Kant Dictionary, Aristotle's definition of energeia in terms of both 
actuality and action, was incorporated in his argument for the eternity of matter and the world which later 
posed problems for the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 'A solution favoured by the scholastics was 
to subordinate the cosmological exposition of actuality ... to an onto-theological one. ' p. 51. 
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21. Oneself as Another, p. 3 15. 
22. Merleau-Ponty's, The Visible and the Invisible is unfinished and is a seminal work. Consequently, the 
references to sonorous being are not part of a defined ontology. Furthermore, his work on the linguistic 
implications is incomplete, and does not address the issue of the written text. Nevertheless, he provides 
valuable insights into nature of the lived body and sonority as a key characteristic. 
23. Dylan Thomas writes about poetry and words, and the first poems read to him as a child: 'What mattered 
most was the sound of them... And these words were, to me, as the notes of bells, the sounds of musical 
instruments, the noises of wind, the rattle of milk carts, the clopping of hooves on cobbles, the fingering 
of branches on a window pane, might be to someone, deaf from birth, who has miraculously found his 
hearing. ''Notes on the Art of Poetry in Modern Poets on Modern Poetry, ed. James Sculley . 
24. This notion of 'grasping' has its roots in the Kantian act of synthesis. Kant consistently relates this either 
to 'power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have 
no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious' (CPR a 78B 103), or to 'an act of 
spontaneity of the faculty of representation' or 'an act of the self-activity of the subject' (B 130). 
25. In his concern with the human condition and the disciplines of the human sciences, Ricoeur clearly 
acknowledges his work in teens of a philosophical anthropology particularly in his early work, Fallible 
Man. But also in his later work, for example, Time and Narrative, when he is sensitive to the accusation 
of interpreting Heidegger's Being and Time from the viewpoint of philosophical anthropology and failing 
to apprehend the anti-metaphysical critique of this work (vol. 3 p. 60-61), he claims that an attentive reading 
may discern features of the present which do not reflect the alleged errors of intuitive metaphysics. If this 
is combined with his criticism of Heidegger's failure, according to Ricoeur, to return to the level of rational 
discourse, it reveals his insistent philosophical anthropological aim to establish a foundation for the human 
sciences. 
26. See conclusion to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis White Beck, pp. 169 -171. 
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27. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, pp. 54 - 71. 
28. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, chapter 2. Also, Ricoeur's essay, 'Life in Quest of a Narrative' in On Paul 
Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, ed. David Wood. 
29. See Ricoeur's comments on the 'symbolic resources of the practical field' in Time and Narrative Vol 1, 
pp. 57 - 58. 
For a concise study of Cassirees analysis of the thought processes that go to make up culture, see Language 
and Myth, tr. Suzanne Langer. 
30. Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, p. 60. See Ricoeur's response, pp. 71 - 76. 
31. in particular, as they relate to the relationship between historical, or'lived' time, and linear, or'cosmic' time. 
32. See Addendum to The Origin of the Work of Art', Basic Writings, pp. 207 - 121. 
33. See Note 25. 
34. See 1326 - 328 B&T. 
35. See 1 284f. B&T. 
36. See Vol. 3 T& N, pp. 135.36. 
37. See p. 123f. 
38. See Note 26 Chapter 1. 
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Chapter Four: Prose Rhythm: The Mediation of Sonorous Being 
1. See The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics, Chapter 1, 'An Introduction to Metaphysics'. 
2. See Chapter 4, Being and Time. 
3. That is, the question regarding, to use Derrida's phrase, 'the principle of all principles', the principle of self- 
presence. See pp. 126-6, 'The Ends of Man' in Margins of Philosophy. 
4. If the disclosure is founded upon an unquestioned self-presence, it is a disclosure which is not under 
suspicion and therefore its validation is an illusion. 
5. It is a dilemma that Derrida seeks to avoid by means of deconstruction, and Ricoeur by a dialectic of 
suspicion and affirmation. 
6. But Heidegger's aim is not to question in terms of the subject-predicate analytical process, since this 
approach assumes the ontological question to be invalid. Consequently, his attempt to radically question 
the who is disclosed in self consciousness through the mediation of reflection is in existential terms. But 
this labour of language' may be judged a failure, particularly in the light of Derrida's critical observation 
with respect to the 'we' of the text. 
7. The critical question is, can existential analysis escape the inherent problematic of the reflective mode of 
being? That is, the problem of an unquestioned mode of being as the foundation for reflection. It would 
seem significant that existential philosophers, particularly, Kierkegaard and Sartre have written so 
extensively in narrative form. 
8. That is, the possibility of a linguistic mediation of an extra-linguistic foundation of an affirmation of 
conceptual unity. 
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9. See The Rule of Metaphor p. 313. 
10. See ibid. p. 224. For a criticism of split reference see Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious 
Language, pp. 86 - 89. 
11. See Introduction to A Ricoeur Reader: Refection and Imagination, ed. Mario J. Valdes. 
12. This ontological understanding of textual sonority and phonicity is not to be confused with sound patterns 
in language related to generative phonology described in The Sound Pattern of English, by Noam Chomsky 
and Morris Halle. 
13. For an interesting and valuable analysis of phenomenological intentionality with respect to rhythm, which 
will become a key feature of this study, see §A 'Rhythmizing Intentionality' Rhythms by Nicholas Abrahams. 
14. Merleau-Ponty writes about music and language in The Intertwining - The Chiasm' and describes such 
moments of intensity as follows: 'We do not possess the musical or sensible ideas, precisely because they 
are negativity or absence circumscribed; they possess us. The performer is no longer producing or 
reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata 
sings through him or cries out suddenly that he must "dash the bow" to follow it. And these open vortexes 
in the sonorous world finally form one sole vortex in which ideas fit with one another. ' Signs, p. 151. 
15. 'It confirms my working hypothesis that the distinction between selfhood and sameness does not simply 
concern two constellations of meaning but involves two modes of being. ' Oneself as Another. p. 309. 
16. See The Hermeneutical Imagination' in Richard Kearney's Poetics of imagining. 
17. This hidden power of interrogation will be looked at more closely in relation to Ricoeur's notion of 
distanciatiom See The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation' in Hermeneutics & the Social Sciences. 
See also 'Philosophical Interrogation' in Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible. The notion of 
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interrogation has its roots in Aristotle's fundamental conviction 'All men by nature desire to know. ' 
Metaphysics 1.1,980a21. See also Jonathan Lear's Aristotle the desire to understand, chapter L. 
18. See 'Resonance' in R. L. Trask's A Dictionary of Phonetics and Phonology, particularly with respect to 
'resonant frequencies'. See also Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible, p. 133f, beginning, The look, 
we said envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things. As though it were in a relation of a pre-established 
harmony with them... '. Another interesting literary source, with respect to involuntary memory, is to be 
found in Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, particularly in the concluding part Time Regained 
in Vol. 3. 
19. The notion of rational identity used in this study relates to the Cartesian Cogito, and more particularly to 
Kant's concept of apperception. See the entry in Caygill's A Kant Dictionary. 
20. See particularly The Rule of Metaphor, pp. 295 - 303. 
21. See A History of Reading by Alberto Manguel, particularly, 'Learning to Read. 
22. With respect to rational, discursive texts of an abstract nature, two key features must be noted: 
i. The ubiquitous nature of metaphor in these texts. See, e. g. Models and Metaphors, Max Black, The 
Displacement of Concepts, Donald Schon, Metaphors of the Mind, Robert Sternberg, A Cognitive Theory 
of Metaphor, Earl R. Mac Cormac. The influential role may be shown to be dependent upon the sonorous 
characteristic. 
ii. The semantic nature of these texts may be shown to be rooted in cultural narratives. See particularly Jean- 
Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, and Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity. The 
important difference, however, in this study is the dialectical relationship between poetic and rational 
linguistic modes whereby the latter is grounded in the former. Again, there is no good reason to suggest that 
the significance of sonority in terms of the resonance of cultural narratives may not have a decisive 
influence upon scientific and other texts of an abstract nature. 
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23. See Mimesis, Culture, Art, Society tr. Don Reneau 
24. Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece, tr. Janet Lloyd. 
25. See The Rhythm of Continuity: Prose' in An Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 263 - 268. 
26. Ethos see Aristotle's Poetics, chapter xv, and dianoia see chapter xix. For a helpful discussion see the 
Critical Notes in S. H. Butcher's tr. p. 337f. 
27. See Poetics, A. 1450a. 7. mythos - plot, ethos - character, dianoia - thought, melos - analogous or otherwise 
connected to music, lexis - diction, opsis - spectacle. 
28. In his analysis of his notion of Threefold Mimesis, Ricoeur, drawing upon Heidegger's Being and Time, 
describes the experience of the unity of time and space in terms of the activity of temporal being. See Time 
and Narrative, Vol. 1, pp. 59 - 64. 
29. See Anatomy of Criticism p. 243 - 244. 
30. See Note 26. 
31. Although Nicholas Abraham's Rhythms deals mainly with poetic rhythm, it offers a valuable analysis which 
may be related to prose rhythm. See the first part, 'Outline of a Phenomenology of Poetic Expression, 
particularly the Semantic and Mythological layers. 
32. Leavis includes this novel under'Minor Works and Nostromo' but claims that(it) is by common consent, 
one of Conrad's best things' (p. 201). In contrast to Leavis's view of Conrad, Frank Kermode, for example, 
claims that he is more of a romantic. Leavis concedes that he was "in some respects a simple soul", pointing 
to the lack of irony and the Poe-like melodramatic intensities in Heart of Darkness. ' (Leavis by Ronald 
Hayman, p. 72). 
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33. See Nicholas Abraham's Rhythms with respect to his notion of Paradeictic as related to translation pp. 133- 
154. 
34. See 'Proust and Signs', 'Proust's work is based not on exposition of memory, but on the apprenticeship of 
signs' (p. 4). Quoted by Ricoeur in Time and Narrative, Vol. 2, p. 131. 
35. See The Tea and the Madeleine' in George Painter's, Marcel Proust, chapter 7. 
36. See Phenomenology of Perception p. 384f. 
37. Ibid. 'The theory of the body is already a theory of perception', pp. 203 - 206. 
38. See chapter 4, The Visible and the Invisible. 
39. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 193f. 
40. See Chapter 1, Note 30. 
41. See the chapter on the Phenomenology of Language in Signs, pp. 88 - 89. 
42. 'Being is the "place" where "modes of consciousness" are inscribed as structurations of Being (a way of 
thinking oneself within a society is implied in its social structure), and where structurations of Being are 
modes of consciousness. ' The Visible and the Invisible, p. 253. 
43. See phenomenology of Perception, p. 429. See also, James Schmidt's Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Between 
Phenomenology and Structuralism, pp. 40 - 1, and 156 - 7. 
44. See The experience of Time' in Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, Chapter 1. Also, 'The Human Experience of 
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Time and Narrative in Reflection and Imagination, p. 99f. 
45. This understanding of metaphor relates to the sensual plasticity of the poetic mode of language together with 
its centripetal dynamic particularly as defined by Northrop Frye in chapter 3 of The Great Code. Among 
the many critical views of the nature and importance of poetic language examples may be found in 
A. C. Bradley's Oxford Lectures on Poetry, particularly, 'Shelley's View on Poetry'; Paul Hamilton's 
Coleridges Poetics, especially Chapter 5 The Necessity of Poetry; and Masterful Images by A. E. Dyson 
and Julian Lovelock. 
46. See D. H. Lawrence: Novelist by F. R. Leavis, and DA. Lawrence by Tony Slade. 
47. Tony Slade's D. H. Lawrence, p. 63. 
48. See 'Narrative Identity and the Dialectic of Selfhood and Sameness' in Oneself as Another, p. 140E 
Also; Life in Quest of a Narrative' in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation.. 
49. Aristotle's Poetics, 1459a 3-S. 
50. See Chapter 2, Note 29. 
51. T. S. Eliot's Burnt Norton, Line 61. See Derek Traversi's T. S. Eliot: Longer Poems, pp. 110 - 11. 
52. See Modernist Fiction by Randall Stevenson pp. 45 - 53. 
53. ibid. pp. 195 -199. 
54. See Preface to Phenomenology of Perception. 
234 
Chapter 5: The Primordial Dialectic and Temporal Perspective 
1. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, p. 160- 166. Also Martha Nussbaum's distinction of three author figures 
in Love's Knowledge pp. 9-10. A useful definition may be found in Jeremy Hawthorn's A Concise Glossary 
of Contemporary Literary Terms, ed. under the entry, 'Author' pp. 11 - 12. 
2. This process is central to hermeneutical philosophy. For example, see 'Analysis of Historically Effected 
Consciousness' in Gadamer's Truth and Method p. 341£ With particular regard to Ricoeur's thought, the 
essay by Kathleen Blamey, 'From the Ego to the Self' in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. L. E. Hahn, 
is of interest and importance. 
3. The notion of risk is an existential one with respect to the security of self identity. It relates to Kierkegaard's 
understanding of becoming a Christian, see The Journal's of Kierkegaard, pp. 185 - 6.; also to his Concept 
of Dread, and the notion of 'the leap' of faith. 
4. It is suspicion of conceptual unity which is inherent to the teleological dynamic of the unity of identity of 
the Other. 
5. Ricoeur draws upon Aristotle's Poetics and the 'all-emcompassing concept' of mimesis. See Time and 
Narrative, Vol. 1, p. 33f. David Wood comments, '-we recall that the study of metaphor and narrative are 
for Ricoeur integral parts of a general poetics, 'one vast poetic sphere', both instances of the productive 
imagination. ' On Paul Ricoeur, Narrative and Interpretation, p. 6. 
6. See Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible pp. 248 - 251. 
7. See chapter 12 on Rhythm in The Psychology of Music by John Booth Davies. Also chapter 7, 'Mother 
Goose Rhymes, Ballads' in James Reeves, Understanding Poetry. 
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8. This problematic was considered in chapter 1. Refer also to Husserl's Cartesian Meditations, §3 and 
§ 10, and 'The Cogito' in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, p. 369f. 
9. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 1 p. 68, and Vol. 3 pp. 48 - 49. For Kant's analysis, see CPR, § A137/b176 - 
§A147/13186. Kevin J. Vanhoozer provides a helpful commentary, 'Kant and the Creative Imagination' in 
On Paul Ricoeur, Narrative and Interpretation, chapter 3, pp. 3 5- 41. 
10. For a brief outline of rhyme structure see chapter 4 of Philip Hobsbaum's Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form. 
11. ibid. chapter 7. 
12. See Eliot's essay, 'The Music of Poetry' in On Poetry and Poets, particularly, '... there are possibilities of 
transitions in a poem comparable to the different movements of a symphony or a quartet' p. 38. See also 
Literature in Perspective: T. S. Eliot by T. S. Pearce pp. 111 - 12. 
13. Biographia Literaria, p. 270 
14. For an examination of the influence of ancient oratory and rhetoric upon literary genres see, Persuasion: 
Greek Rhetoric in Action, ed. Ian Worthington. See also The Bible as Rhetoric, ed. Martin Warner. 
15. See entries under'stress' in A Dictionary of Phonetics and Phonology, by R. L. Trask. 
16. Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form, p. 96. 
17. ibid. pp. 100 -110. 
1 8. See Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism pp. 243 - 244. 
19. See Time and Narrative, vol. 1, chapter 2. 
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20. Prose Rhythm is the creative refinement of expression in the poetic mode of language drawing upon the 
sedimented rhythmic patterns of ordinary, everyday speech. 
21. See Note 4, chapter 2. 
22. In his critique of Heidegger in Time and Narrative, vol. 3, p. 78, Ricoeur writes, 'What appears to me to be 
shunted aside is the problematic of the trace..: This comment is made in reference to the past. It also may 
be made with respect to the future in terms of the sonorous mediation of the trace as rhythms of hope. 
23. See chapter 3, Time' in Modernist Fiction by Randall Stevenson. 
24. In Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 32f, Ricoeur gives some thought to melody in Aristotle's Poetics with 
respect to imitation, and also the notions of concordance and discordance. But he does not appear to pursue 
the musical connotations of these notions in terms of phonicity and the ontological possibilities. In The Rule 
of Metaphor he makes clear his understanding of the work of resemblance involves an auditory 
characteristic in terms of the sensible characteristic of poetic language (p. 209), but does not develop the 
critical ontological implications as presented in this thesis. 
25. Ricoeur's ontological view of action, particularly with respect to the relationship between Self and Other, 
gives to the ability to follow a story, in terms of a phenomenological act of perception, an ontological 
foundation which transcends the narrative. It is the imaginative appropriation of actively inhabiting the 
narrative, that is ontologically grounded, and not founded upon transcendental subjectivism. 
26. This metaphor 'anchorage' would seem to express a maritime sense of an haven of security as the 
hermeneutic destination on a semantic ocean, but which must be relinquished in a continuing journey. 
27. See ibid. pp. 54 - 57. 
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28. For a critical commentary on this unfinished work, see M. C. Dillon's Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, Chapter 
10, particularly, pp. 194 - 208. 
29. See Freud & Philosophy pp. 10 -11. 
30. That is, the rhythmic expression of the physical body is the phenomological mediation of the ontological 
condition of the flesh's sonorous being-in-the-world. 
31. In Barthes' essay, The Structural Analysis of Narrative' in The Semiotic Challenge, in which he analyzes 
Acts 10 - 11, he concludes, 'the message is its very form, it is its destination' (p. 245). A post-structuralist 
critique of this view, for example Geoff Bennington and Robert Young in the introduction to Post- 
Structuraliosm and the question of history, states, 'Structuralism attempts to examine the structure of such 
systems from a more 'impersonal' or 'scientific' perspective than that of the perceiving subject' (p. 1). It 
therefore leaves aside the question of history. But then the question, which this thesis attempts to address, 
is what is the grounding of the historical subject? How is appearance affirmed? 
32. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, pp. 61 - 64. 
33. See, Textuality and the Question of Origin: Heidegger's reading of'Andenken' and'Der Ister" in Heidegger 
and the Poets, Veronique M. Foti. 
34. The film or still photographs of Belsen may be explained in terms of the decisions and events which led 
to the horrific scenes, or the corpse-like figures may be described in detail, or attempts may be made to 
understand the accounts given by the victims, but there is a failure in these terms to understand, to ascribe 
meaning to these images. 
35. They are aesthetic creations that may be considered analogous to music. See George Steiner's Real 
Presences, particularly, pp. 215 - 227. 
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36. For a particular influential example, see J. H. Newman's sermon, "The Nature of Faith in relation to Reason' 
in Newman's University Sermons. A contemporary example is presented in John Polkinghorne's Reason 
and Reality. 
37. See Fear and Trembling, pp. 67 - 70. Also, Kierkegaard Commentary, T. H. Croxall, pp. 19 - 22. 
38. Macbeth, Act V. Scene V. 
39. See Philosophical Fragments, Chapter III. With respect to language, see also, Kierkegaard and Modernity, 
ed. Martin J. Matustik and Merold Westphal pp. 137 - 138. 
40. A significant aspect of Ricoeur's understanding of Kants notion of the regulative idea is the sense of a limit- 
idea. For example, see Time and Narrative, vol. 1, p. 160. See also, Critique and Conviction, pp. 65 - 67. 
For a helpful commentary see Kevin J. Vanhoozer's essay, 'Philosophical Antecedents to Ricoeur's Time 
and Narrative' in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, pp. 38 - 41. 
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Chapter Six: Self and Other; Suspicion and Affirmation 
1. See Critique and Conviction, p. 119. 
2. See the chapter, 'Work and the Word', in History and Truth. 
3. See Chapter 7: The Creative Imagination'. 
4. That is, a literary critical perspective on the text is taken for the philosophical analysis. 
5. For a helpful study of the significance of sacrifice in the cultus of ancient Israel see chapter 4 in Theology 
of the Old Testament, vol. 1, Walter Eichrodt. 
6. See entries under, ' acoustics, phonicity and resonance' in RLTrask's A Dictionary of Phonetics and 
Phonology. 
7. See George Steiner's essay, 'A Preface to the Hebrew Bible' in No Passion Spent, particularly pp. 53 - 
57. 
8. See T. R. Henn's The Bible as Literature, pp. 38 - 40. With respect to the significance of cadence in the 
relationship of prose and poetry, see Seamus Heaney's essay, 'The Makings of Music', in Preoccupations: 
The given line, the phrase or cadence which haunts the ear and the eager parts of the mind, this is the tuning 
fork to which the overall melodies are worked or calculated. ' p. 61. 
9. See The History of the English Language, Chapter 8, The Renaissance, 1500 - 1600, pp. 232 - 245. 
10. Although the themes of obedience to God, and the covenantal relationship are inextricably part of 
Abraham's faith, and therefore his motives for decision and action, the fundamental love of the father for 
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his son, made clear in the narrative, cannot be ignored in terms of its decisive influence upon the particular 
sacrificial act, and consequently that which is seemingly incomprehensible. This is the essential nature of 
the singularity of the act, and the secret between God and Abraham to which Kierkegaard and Derrida refer. 
11. In this narrative, the metaphorical figure is not in terms of a single word, but a verbal structure which, in 
the process of reading, gives rise to an'implicit' metaphor. See Northrop Frye's TheGreat Code, pp. 57 - 59. 
12. See entry for 'Symbol' in The New Bible Dictionary, ed. J. D. Douglas. 
13. The sacrificial act is not a substitution for expiation or propitiation of sins, and a relationship of obedience, 
it is an act of these fundamental characteristics of the ancient cultic ritual of sacrifice. See entry for 
'Sacrifice in The New Bible Dictionary. 
14. See Kierkegaard's, 'Speech in Praise of Abraham' in Fear and Trembling, pp. 49 - 56. 
15. See Derrida's critique of Heideggerian onto-theology and negative theology in his essay, 'Difffrance', in 
Margins of Philosophy. Also, see a commentary on his relationship with negative theology in John D. 
Caputo's The Prayers and Tears ofJacques Derrida, chapter 1, §1 'God Is Not differance'. 
16. Here 'closure' means the instant of affirmation in terms of ontological, corporeal intentionality in which 
reflection is relinquished. Suspicion is aroused in the detour of reflection but dialectically related to the 
effect of the affirmation in terms of reasonable hope (see chapter 8). 
17. See the entry 'convention' in Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Earnest 
Sosa. 
1 8. Derrida's appropriation of Kierkegaard's notions of secrecy and silence conveys the view of the 
incomprehension of Abraham's act. See The Gij? of Death, pp. 57 - 61. 
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19. That is, not free from suspicion of its seeming transparency of meaning in a fiduciary institution of 
conventional language, and the necessity for a continuing hermeneutical spiral in relation to temporal active 
being-in-the-world. 
20. An unquestioned self-identity which implicitly, or explicitly assumes a metaphysical closure. 
21. See Levinas's Truth and Infinity, - Section 1A, 1. 'Desire for the Invisible', pp. 33 - 35. 
22. See Levinas's essay, Transcendence and Height' in Basic Philosophical Writings. 
23. See Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, pp. 76 - 77. 
24. See Oneself as Another, Tenth Study, 3a One's Own Body, or the Flesh, pp. 319 - 329; and Merleau Ponty's 
The Visible and the Invisible, Chapter 4. 
25. This rhythmic structure of the narrative is integrally related to the metaphoric configuring effect of the 
iconic moment of verse 10 so that it is incorporated into the dynamic of the ontological vehemence which 
precipitates the semantic interaction and the probability of new meaning. 
26. The first three verses take the following form: 
Woman much missed, how you call to me, call to me, 
Saying that now you are not as you were 
When you had changed from the one who was all to me, 
But as at first, when our day was fair. 
The final verse is: 
Thus I; Faltering forward 
Leaves oozing around me falling, 
Wind oozing thin through the thorn norward, 
And the woman calling. 
27. See Fear and Trembling and the notion of the 'dizziness of freedom' in the Concept of Dread, p. 55. See 
also Derrida's The Gift of Death, pp. 53 - 56. 
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28. See The Origin of the Work of Art' in Basic Writings, particularly, p. 189. 
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Chapter Seven: The Creative Imagination 
1. See Ricoeur's'Model of the Text' in From Text to A ction, pp. 166 - 167. 
2. For two valuable essays on Ricoeur's re-interpretation of the Kantian productive imagination see Richard 
Kearney's, The Henneneutical imagination' in Poetics of Imagining, and Kevin J. Vanhoozer' s'Kant and 
the Creative Imagination' in On Paul Ricoeur, ed. by David Wood. The development of this re- 
interpretation in this thesis is with respect to linguistically mediated ontological sonority as a fundamental 
characteristic of the imagination. 
3. Kant uses the concept of unity in a number of ways. The transcendental unity is the a priori ground of all 
concepts (CPR A 107) which is the unity of'transcendental apperception', or the transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness. It is this ground of unity which is referred to in the text as ahistorical in contrast to the 
dialectical relationship of the affirmation and suspicion of unity grounded in the ontological condition of 
historical self-consciousness. The other uses of this concept by Kant are, categorial unity as the basis of 
unity of given concepts (CPR B 131), the unity of understanding which is a categorical unity of reason, and 
syntheticunity of reason which is an extension of transcendental unity in the act of judgment (CPR B 383). 
See the entry for'Unity' in Caygill's A Kant Dictionary. 
4. That is, the hermeneutical process of reading a narrative creates the conditions whereby rational reflection 
can take place. In the course of the analysis, the notion of probability will be introduced as a significant and 
central development with the intention of demonstrating that rational reflection may not only be possible 
but will be expected in terms of an affirmation of rational meaning on an open semantic horizon. 
5. See CPR A 42 - 44, B 60 - 62. Also, 'aesthetic' in A Kant Dictionary. 
6. ibid. A 77 - 79, B 103 -105. 
7, ibid. B 151, 
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8. ibid. A 37 - 39, B 54 - 56. 
9. See CJ Part I §49 314-315. 
10. Ibid. 315. 
11. See The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God' in Cambridge 
Ed. I, Theoretical Philosophy 1755 - 1770, tr. David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote, pp 107 - 
201. 
12. See Note 3. 
13. See Note 9. Also CJ § 57, Comment I. 
14. For a Ricoeurean view of'myth', see the interview with Richard Kearney, 'Myth as the Bearer of Possible 
Worlds' in A Ricoeur Reader: Rej7ection and Imagination, ed. by Mario J. Valdes. 
15. After Virtue, pp. 218 - 219 
16. In his conclusion to The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur states, 'What is given to thought in this way by the 
'tensional' truth of poetry is the most primordial, most hidden dialectic - the dialectic that reigns between 
the experience of belonging as a whole and the power of distanciation that opens up the space of speculative 
thought. ' p. 313. See also his essay, The Hermeneutical function of distanciation', in Hermeneutics & the 
Human Sciences, Part 11,4. 
17. That is, the power of historical activity as the expression of sonorous being mediated by the rhythmic 
characteristics of temporal narratives. 
Is. Ricoeur is concerned to make clear that the constitution of presentation (Darstellung), preceded and 
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supports the linguistic medium which it summons, and that the reference of language back to the structure 
of experience is the most important presupposition of hermeneutics. See Hermeneutics & the Human 
Sciences, pp. 117 -118. However, the view in this thesis is that Ricoeur's understanding of the relationship 
between language and presentation must be complemented by Merleau-Ponty's linguistic phenomenology, 
for example, when he states, 'Language is much more like a sort of being than a means, and that is why it 
can present something to us so well. ' Signs, p. 43. 
19. See Time & Narrative, Vol. 1 p. 68. 
20. The problematic of the notion of unity is identified in the early writings of Ricoeur in, for example, History 
and Truth in the chapter on 'Negativity and Primary Affirmation'; and in Book III, chapter 3, 'Dialectic: 
Archaeology and Teleology' in Freud and Philosophy. This theme is central to the development of his 
hermeneutical philosophy appearing in his later writing, Oneself as Another with respect to the dialectic 
between Self and Other and the issue of the unity of self-attestation. This thesis attempts to develop the 
analysis of the dialectic between 'suspicion' and'affirmation' in terms of discordance and concordance of 
sonorous being. 
21. It disturbs the viewpoint of consciousness affecting every aspect of perception in a discordance between 
the present's inherited perspective and the ontological dynamic of a re-focusing of this perspective. This 
may be compared with Gadamer's fusion of horizons in the hermeneutical process. See Truth and Method, 
pp. 302 - 307. 
22. This is analogous to the process of adjustment in inhabiting an alien culture. It is an intentional, active, 
corporeal process. The rhythmic patterns of cultural activity effect a physical process which is the grounding 
of the conscious intention to achieve an appropriate condition of living in a new world. 
23. In the mode of reflection, affirmation cannot escape suspicion but it is sustained by a teleological conviction 
grounded in the instant at the ontological and corporeal levels which lies at the 'edge' and beyond 
consciousness. 
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24. In Time and Narrative, vol. 1, Ricoeur attempts to define the plot with respect to the notion of Emplotment 
as 'A Model of Concordance' (see pp. 38 -. 42). In his reading of Aristotle's Poetics, he identifies Melody 
as the feature of mimesis as that which interests him with respect to the importance of linguistic rhythm in 
theimitation or representation of action (p. 33). Furthermore, he notes the play of discordance internal to 
concordance in Aristotle's theory of tragic plots (p. 38). He does not however appear to develop the 
significance of the role of rhythm as an ontological grounding of affirmation. 
25. Imagination is here defined not simply in terms of a faculty but the dynamic of a condition of being-in-the- 
world. 
26. That is, the imaginative act is a creative response to the 'grasping of the image. It is not limited to vision 
but is an ontological and corporeal creative response whereby the dynamic mediation of prose rhythm 
provokes the act of configuration. 
27. The dynamic process of configuration, effected by the iconic moment of the sacrificial act in verse 10, 
uproots the literal reference of this act in terms of the act of a father killing his son to create a second order 
metaphorical reference by means of an interaction within the semantic structures of the narrative with 
particular emphasis upon the relationship between verse 2 and verse 10. This second order reference is a 
teleological drive towards the unity of the love of the father and the sacrificial act. 
28. Throughout the analysis of this thesis there is an attempt to move towards the notion of 'probability with 
respect to Affirmation. At this stage, the analysis has not reached the point where this notion may be used 
since the important criterion of attestation has not been considered. For this reason, the notion of'potentially 
available' is being used. The significance of the notion of 'probability' included in the final chapter and 
corresponding notes. 
29. See 'The Henneneutical Function of Distanciation' in Ricoeur's From Text to Action, chapter 3. For a useful 
commentary, see Leonard Lawlor's Imagination and Chance, Part II, 'Ricoeur's Notion of Distanciation'. 
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30. In the relation of the word and sentence in the process of continuing interpretation, Ricoeur's theory of 
metaphor is fundamental. See his essay, 'Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics in A Ricoeur 
Reader: Reflection and the Imagination, ed. by Mario J. Valdes. 
31. In this instant, the primordial dialectic is transcended. It is a transcendence of habitation in terms of the 
operative characteristic of corporeal intentionality as the mediation of sonorous being. In other words, the 
imaginative grasp of a particular viewpoint as the basis of understanding is grounded in, and in an instant 
transcended by, the corporeal rhythm of being-in-the-world. 
32. See Study 7, 'Metaphor and Reference' in The Rule of Metaphor. 
33. See'On Truth and Lies in Nonmoral Sense' in Philosophy and Truth, pp. 79-97, ed. and trans. by Daniel 
Breazeale. Also, The Forgetting of Metaphor' in Nietzsche and Metaphor, chapter II[, by Sarah Kofman. 
34. The notion of linguistic world production is an important theme in contemporary debate in the philosophy 
of language. Among its advocates are Jean-Francois Lyotard (see The Postmodern Condition), Richard 
Rorty (see Contingency, irony and solidarity), and Nelson Goodman (see Languages ofArt and Ways of 
Worldmaking). The context of this theme in the debate relates to the wide-ranging notion of postmodernism. 
Examples of the contributions to this debate may be found in Postmodernism - Philosophy and the Arts, 
ed. by Hugh J. Silverman. For a critical view of this notion see What's Wrong with Postmodernism? by 
Christopher Norris. 
35. That is, the radical change from logical atomism in his earlier Tractatus to the concept of language-games 
in the Philosophical Investigations. See also The Wittgenstein Reader, ed. by Anthony Kenny, particularly, 
chapter 2 The Rejection of Logical Atomism'. 
36. See the essay, 'Verificationism, Anti-Realism and Idealism' by Ralph C. S. Walker in European Journal of 
Philosophy, volume 3 number 3, December 1995. 
248 
Chapter Eight: Reasonable Hope 
1. See chapter 16 on 'Logical Positivism' in John Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Also, A. J. Ayer's 
Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 7- 21. 
2. See Oneself as Another, pp. 137 - 139. 
3. See Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit, p. 3: 'S gives to each person this aim: the outcomes that would be 
best for himself, and would make his life go, for him, as well as possible'. 
4. This question provokes the critical issue with respect to the relationship between fiction and reality. See 
Ricoeur's essay, 'The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality' in Reflection & Imagination, ed. by Mario J. 
Valdes. It also relates to the question of subjectivity, and what S. H. Clark refers to as 'The Limits of 
Narrative' in his study on Paul Ricoeur, p. 190f 
See Descartes' Discourse on Method and the Meditations, Second Meditation. 
6. Since meaning in structural analysis is derivative of the internal structural differences of linguistic sign 
system, according to Saussure, language does not possess extra-linguistic characteristics and therefore may 
deemed to be anti-referential. For a helpful study of a history of structuralist thought, see Thomas Pavel's, 
The Feud of Language, particularly, chapter 5, 'On Conventionalism in Poetics'. 
7. See Course in General Linguistics. 
8. The notion of'Same' is used here in the Levinasian sense of identity (see extract from Transcendence and 
Height in Basic Philosophical Writings, pp. 11 - 20), and in particular in the way Ricoeur employs this 
notion in relation to idem-identity. (See "The Question of Selfhood' in Oneself as Another, p. 18). 
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9. See Richard Keamey's interview with Ricoeur, The Creativity of Language' in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection 
& Imagination, pp. 468-469. 
10. Descartes's approach to certainty in terms of an epistemological foundation for knowledge was based upon 
his sceptical arguments in the First and Second Meditations, and his ontological argument for the existence 
of God in the Fifth Meditation. In the Cartesian tradition, the former have been favourably received, but 
the latter has been rejected. In recent debate, See Wittgenstein's On Certainty, in which he enunciates a 
number of theses about how doubt presupposes certainty. 
11. See Oneself as Another, p. 22. 
12. This refers to the moment of change or increase in knowledge in the process of textual interpretation. 
According to Ricoeur, this is closer to the logic of probability than to the logic of empirical verification (see 
the essay, The model of the text' in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, pp. 212 - 213). However, in his 
essay, The question of proof in Freud's writings', part III, Truth and Verification', he claims that the 
cumulative effect of validation makes proof 'probable and even convincing. ' (p. 271) Verification is used 
in this sense with respect to the 'necessary epistemic moment' that ensures the hermeneutical circle is not 
vicious. Th is will be looked at further later in this final chapter. (See note 14) 
13. See Kenneth Clark's, Looking at Pictures, particularly his pattern of discipline p. 16. 
14. The notion of probability is a key feature which has been implicit and at times explicit in the development 
of the analysis in this study. In this final chapter, there is an attempt to complete the analysis with respect 
to the critical importance of attestation in relation to probability. The analysis draws closely upon Ricoeur's 
work in which there is also a development of this notion which has its roots in Aristotle's Rhetoric. At the 
beginning of The Rule of Metaphor, he writes: 'Rhetoric is the treatise containing the equilibrium between 
two opposed movements, one that inclines rhetoric to break away from philosophy, if not to replace it, and 
one that disposes philosophy to reinvent rhetoric as a system of second-order proofs. It is at this point, 
where the dangerous power of eloquence and the logic of probability meet, that we find rhetoric stands 
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under the watchful eye of philosophy. It is this deep-seated conflict between reason and violence that has 
plunged the history of rhetoric into oblivion... ' (p. 12) Plato played a powerfully influential role in this 
separation and decline of the importance of the art of persuasion in claiming, incorrectly according to 
Ricoeur (see also Michael Gagarin's essay, Probability and Persuasion' in Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in 
Action, ed. by Ian Worthington), the early Rhetoricians placed probability above truth. Ricoeur also 
attempts to show that metaphor was reduced to a single figure of speech, and in consequence the dynamic 
of metaphoric displacement involving the sentence and whole discourse was lost in the traditional western 
substitutional theory of metaphor. The effect of the neglect or loss of the integral relationship of the logic 
of probability and metaphor in the separation of the poetic and rational modes of discourse was the 
consequent loss of the crucial importance of second-order proofs in philosophy. Ricoeur's concern to reunite 
the poetic and rational modes of discourse in a dialectical relationship is pursued in development of his 
hermeneutical philosophy. In his essay, The model of the text', in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, 
the nature of second-order proofs is taken up in the contrast of validation in contrast to verification. He 
writes, 'As concerns the procedures of validation by which we test our guesses, I agree with Hirsch that they 
are closer to a logic of probability than to a logic of verification.... Validation is an argumentative discipline 
comparable to the juridical procedures of legal interpretation. It is a logic of uncertainty and of qualitative 
probability. ' (p. 212) He is, however, aware of the danger of the hermeneutical circle being a vicious 
circularity, and the need to show that an interpretation must be more probable than another. He states, 
There are criteria of relative superiority which may easily be derived from the logic of subjectivity. ' (p. 231). 
It is apparent in relation to the latter that this leads to his work on the notion of attestation, particularly in 
Oneself as Another. (For a helpful study on this notion, see Jean Greisch's essay, Testimony and Attestation' 
in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics ofAction, ed. by Richard Kearney). Attestation is a central theme of 
this final chapter which attempts to demonstrate that it is not based upon the logic of subjectivity, but the 
logic of sonorous Being. 
15. Intuition relates to the poetic and induction to the rational linguistic modes which are separate but 
dialectically related in the hermeneutical process. 
16. See Ricoeur's interpretation of Aristotle's concepts of dunamis and energeia in section 2 of the tenth study 
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of Oneself as Another, pp. 303 - 317. 
17. Verstehen was first developed as a method of understanding in hermeneutical philosophy by Dilthey and 
has since become a key concept in the developments of this branch of philosophy. See Ricoeur's essay, The 
task of Hermeneutics' in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences. See also Josef Bleicher's Contemporary 
Hermeneutics, particularly, chapter 1, 'The rise of classical hermeneutics'. 
18. For a useful outline of the various contemporary legal issues, see The Philosophy of Law, ed. by 
RM. Dworkin. 
19. See Bernard S. Jackson's essay, 'Narrative Theories and Legal Discourse' in Narrative in Culture, ed. by 
Christopher Nash. 
20. This thesis follows Ricoeur's theory of texts as the paragdigmatic case for the conflict of interpretation with 
respect to the critical importance of mediation in the objectification of discourse as a process of 
exteriorization calling for a detour through explanatory devices. However, the closeness of this 
hermeneutical theory of the 'said' and a dialogic theory of 'saying is revealed in the 'Debate with Hans- 
Georg Gadamer' recorded in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection & Imagination. 
21. See Oneself as Another, pp. 315 - 317. 
22. The proposition, 'Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being' is given as 
proposition 6 of book 3 in The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. by Edwin Curley, p. 159. 
23. Oneself as Another, p. 316. 
24. In Points... Interviews, 1974 - 1994, Derrida is recorded as saying, '... a certain "madness" must keep a 
lookout over every step, and finally watch over thinking, as reason does also? ' p. 363. Is this kind of 
madness the madness of the self keeping a lookout over the self keeping a lookout over the self keeping a 
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lookout over the self... as the self is deconstructed and disseminated? In contrast, in the continuing 
hermeneutic founded upon the primordial dialectic between 'suspicion' and 'affi oration' the latter may be 
the moments of the dying and resurrection of self in the manner of George Herbert's poem Mortification, 
That all my dyings may be life in death. ' 
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APPENDIX 
Prose Rhythm 
of 
Abraham's Sacrifice of Isaac 
(The 'Authorized Version' of the Bible) 
// - dominant stress 
- light stress 
--- - cadence 
// // 
Genesisl22: 1 And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, 
// // ---------- 
and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold, here I am. 
II II II 
Genesisl22: 2 And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, 
II ------------------ 
and get thee into the land of Moriah; 
II - II 
and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will 
------------- 
tell thee of. 
// // 
Genesisj22: 3 And Abraham rose up early in the morning, and saddled his ass, 
// 
and took two of his young men with him, and Isaac his son, 
// ------------------------ 
and clave the wood for the burnt offering, 
// -------------------- 
and rose up, and went unto the place of which God had told him. 
H- // --------- 
GenesisI22: 4 Then on the third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, and saw the place afar off. 
II 
Genesisl22: 5 And Abraham said unto his young men, Abide ye here with the ass; 
II ---------------------- 
and I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you. 
II - II 
Genesisl22: 6 And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering, and laid it upon Isaac his 
son; // 
and he took the fire in his hand, and a knife; 
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H ------------------- 
and they went both of them together. 
H- // 
Genesisl22: 7 And Isaac spake unto Abraham his father, and said, My father: 
// 
and he said, Here am I, my son. 
// 
And he said, Behold the fire and the wood: but where is the lamb 
---------------------- 
for a burnt offering? 
H ii 
Genesisl22: 8 And Abraham said, My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt 
offering: 
so they went both of them together. 
GenesisJ22: 9 And they came to the place which God had told him of; 
// // 
and Abraham built an altar there, and laid the wood in order, 
// ---------------------------- 
and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the wood. 
H // // 
Genesisl22: 10 And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son. 
Genesisl22: 11 And the angel of the LORD called unto him out of heaven, and said, 
Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. 
Genesisl22: 12 And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto 
him: 
for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, 
thine only son from me. 
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Genesisl22: 13 And Abraham lifted up his eyes, and looked, 
and behold behind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns: 
and Abraham went and took the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering 
in the stead of his son. 
Genesisl22: 14 And Abraham called the name of that place Jehovahjireh: 
as it is said to this day, In the mount of the LORD it shall be seen. 
Genesisl22: 15 And the angel of the LORD called unto Abraham out of heaven the second 
time, 
Genesisl22: 16 And said, By myself have I sworn, saith the LORD, 
for because thou hast done this thing, 
and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son: 
Genesis 122: 17 That in blessing I will bless thee, 
and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, 
and as the sand which is upon the sea shore; 
and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies; 
Genesisl22: 18 And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; 
because thou hast obeyed my voice. 
Genesisj22: 19 So Abraham returned unto his young men, 
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and they rose up and went together to Beersheba; 
and Abraham dwelt at Beersheba. 
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